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This dissertation centers on providing an extreme

nominalistic answer to the question, "What does Wittgenstein hold an object to be in the Tractatus ?"
stein,

claim, holds that objects are absolutely bare.

I

Part
1916
I

Wittgen-

I

examines Wittgenstein*

s

Notebooks, 1914

-

Beginning with a brief look at his logical theory,

.

quickly move to a presentation of his linguistic theory.

Both of these are preparatory to a discussion of Wittgenstein*

s

ontology in the Notebooks

.

Here, too, Wittgen-

stein holds that objects are absolutely bare, though

I

do discuss several points at which he vacillates.

Part II is devoted exclusively to the Tractatus

.

The first chapter argues that the notion of substance,
as Wittgenstein developed it, clearly shows that he is

committed to absolutely bare objects.
the same for the notion of form.

Chapter II does

The third chapter

criticizes three alternative positions, those of Copi,
Sellars and Allaire.

Experienced objects, however, are not simple, and

Wittgenstein does not claim that they are.

In the last

V.

two chapters of my dissertation,

complex objects

.

In the first,

related to simple objects.

I
I

discuss experienced

discuss how they are

In the second,

I

argue that

Wittgenstein's theory of complex objects actually implies
his acceptance of an unusual kind of Platonism.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

What is an object or thing?

This question has

occupied the attention of philosophers for
two and a
half millennia*
it is perhaps the central question of

metaphysics.

In the following chapters

I

examine the

answer Wittgenstein gave to the question in his
early
period, that during which he wrote his Notebooks.

1916

and the Tract at us Logic o-Philosophicus

that,

in both works, he uses the word 'object*

ambiguously

*

.

^

1

1 914

argue

or 'thing*

on the one hand it means something absolute-

ly simple, having no qualities at all;

on the other it

means a complex, something which does indeed possess
qualities.

Because the Notebooks and the Tractatus differ

vastly in style (and at times in content),

section of the following to each.

I

devote one

Wittgenstein claimed

that his fundamental insights came from his theory of
logic,

so

I

-

begin Part

I

with a brief examination of

that theory and the consequences it seemed to him to

carry for a theory of language.

This leads directly to

the question of the nature of objects.

Since Wittgenstein' s philosophical thought changed

radically at least once, if not twice, the question of

2

.

the relevance of any one work to any other becomes
more

pressing than with philosophers like Kant, whose later
works form an organic whole.

In this case, however, the

worry is of little importance.
ly close to the Tractatus

.

The Notebooks are palpab-

so close that often passages

from them are identical in wording, or nearly so, to passages in the Tractatus

,

There are points of disagreement

between the two works, of course.

In the earlier, Witt-

genstein was developing positions which appeared in the
later as final or above debate.

Naturally there were

some false starts, some faulty conclusions, in the earlier

work, and these he discarded.

In nearly every instance

where he discards an old position or assumes a new one,
he gives reasons for his action, and does so more discur-

sively and clearly than in the later work,
A brief examination of the Notebooks prior to exam-

ining the Tractatus has therefore two advantages.

First,

it allows us to witness Wittgenstein struggling with the

problems given final answer in the Tractatus

;

by seeing

what he rejects and what he retains in this struggle, we
become more acutely aware of what was of the greatest
value to him in them.

And thus, secondly, the reason

for the moves he makes in his struggle are brought to
light,

reasons which, whether forgotten or suppressed,

are not evident in the Tractatus itself.

3

My examinat i on of

"the

.

Notebooks closes with a dis-

cussion of Wittgenstein’s developing ontology; my examination of the Tractatus opens with a discussion of his

developed ontology.

In the first chapter

examine one

I

of the central arguments for the simplicity of
objects,

that found in 2,021

-

2.0212.

This leads to an examin-

ation of the concepts of form and substance.
turn,

in the second chapter,

I

then

to the notion of form, and

argue that it too commits him to the claim that objects
are bare,

i.e.,

absolutely simple.

In order to preserve the continuity of the text,

I

avoid comparisons with alternative views of Wittgenstein’s

ontology until the third chapter.

There

I

criticize the

views of Copi,^ Sellars,^” and Allaire.^
The final two chapters of Part II develop the other

sense of the ambiguous term ’object', that in which it

means 'complex thing®

.

I

begin the discussion by con-

sidering, in chapter four, a variety of interrelated

concepts;

Here

I

world,

(complex) thing, properties and facts.

also discuss the problem of internal and external

relations.

The final chapter explicates what

genstein's Platonism.

I

call Witt-

It is an unusual Platonism,

will not here anticipate my discussion of it there.

so I

4

.

I

Wittgenstein complained that no one had successfully
rea d and understood his work; he felt that it
was constantly misunderstood and misinterpreted.

The misunder-

standing he saw around him began with that of one
of his
closest and most admired associates, Bertrand Russell.

Wittgenstein expressed his disappointment with Russell's
interpretation of the Tractatus in at least three of his
lecters.

In the first, dated April

9*

1920, he writes,

"Ich bin mit so manchem darin nicht ganz einverstanden;

sowohl dort, wo Du mich kritisierst, als auch dort, wo
/

Du bloss meine Ansicht klarlegen willst."
ond,

dated May

6,

In the sec-

1920, he expresses his frustration at

Russell's misinterpretations even more sharply than in
the first

t

"Als ich naemlich die deutsche Uebersetzung

der Einleitung vor mir hatte, da konnte ich mich doch

nicht entschliessen, sie mit meiner Arbeit drucken zu
lassen.

Die Feinheit Deines englischer Stils war naem-

lich in der Uebersetzung -- selbstverstaendlich

—

ver-

lorengegangen und was uebrig blieb, war Oberflaechlichkeit und Misverstaendnis

{
,

Nor did he confine his com-

plaints solely to letters to Russell, for in a letter to
Paul Engelmann he wrote about Russell's introduction:
"Es ist ein Gebraeu mit dem ich nicht einverstanden bin,

5

.

aber da ich es nicht geschrieben habe, so
macht das

nicht viel." 8

Russell had taken Wittgenstein to be interested

principally in the problems of logic, foundations of
mathematics, and logical philosophy
he himself found so absorbing.

—

problems which

He felt that the main

value of the Tractatus lay in its attempt first to correct the errors Wittgenstein had found in the Principia

Mathematica
guage.

.

and then to form a logically perfect lan-

This logically perfect language, cleared of the

errors Russell had made, could then be used to find "on
all essential points, the final solution" to the philo-

sophical problems, as Wittgenstein claimed to have done.

Another of Wittgenstein*

close associates,

s

Ramsey, soon took issue with Russell*

s

F.

P.

interpretation.

He contended that Russell® s view of the Tractatus was "a

very doubtful generalization".

a

Wittgenstein, he claimed,

was far more interested in ordinary language, and less in
logic, than Russell would have him be.

As proof of this,

Ramsey could cite such passages as 5.5563 in the Tracta tus

,

where Wittgenstein claims thati

"Alle Saetze un-

serer Umgangssprache sind tatsaechlich, so wie sie sind,

logisch vollkommen geordnet."

Neither he nor Russell

managed, however, to argue for or against either position

convincingly, and the debate continues to the present day.

6.

In fact this debate cannot
be settled neatly in favor
of
either position.
It stems from the variety
of problems
and interests, both implicit
and explicit, which occupied

Wittgenstein as he wrote the Tractatus

.

Some of these

interests were easily apparent to
all those familiar with
his work.
One such was that in logic and
the foundations
of mathematics.
Indeed, it seemed obvious at that
time
that this was his major interest.
He had left Vienna in
1908 to study engineering at the
University in Manchester,
England.
His interest in engineering was more
theoretical than practical, and led him to study
mathematics
much more deeply than before. He found
the study of the

foundations of mathematics particularly fascinating,
and
left Manchester for Cambridge and Bertrand
Russell,
the

leader in that field at the time.

Wittgenstein migrated to Cambridge in 1911, and very
quickly seemed to become wholly absorbed in philosophy as
it was practiced and taught there.

This principally in-

volved developing his interest in logic and philosophy as

Russell represented it then.

At the same time, he was

introduced to and influenced by the thought and method
of G. E. Moore.

Moore*

s

'‘common-sense'* approach to philo-

sophy underwent a change at Wittgenstein*

s

it was reinterpreted in terms of language.

hands, however

The result,

7

.

Wittgenstein* s thought as the Tractatus
represents it,
was something which fit neither
Russell’s nor Moore *s
approach entirely.
There is thus a tension in the Tractatus
between
ordinary language, on the one hand, and
logic,

other.

on the

Both Russell and Ramsey, as well as those
who

have followed their interpretations,
resolved it simply
by denying half of it.

Both sets of problems, those of logic and those
of
ordinary language, arose through contact with his
philo-

sophical contemporaries, but his method of combining
them and resolving the tensions that arose between
them

was solely his own.

For he accomplished this resolution

through his method, and that gr ew out of studies and interests which he had pursued before coming to England.
In particular, they grew out of his fondness for, and

study of, Schopenhauer's works.

There is indeed no question about the deep influence
his independent study of Schopenhauer's philosophy had on

Wittgenstein's later work.

He had read these works quite

early in life, well before he left Vienna.

He returned

to them while in Manchester, and his Notebooks show that
he continued to read them even after he came under Russell's

influence.

His interest in them even grewi

by the time

8.

of the last entries in the Notebooks

,

it seems to take

precedence over, even to supplant, that in
the works of
11
Russell and Moore,
These studies may or may not have
caused his interest in metaphysics.

They certainly em-

phasized any leanings towards that discipline
which Wittgenstein may already have felt, and may also
have awakened
in him the interest in ethics and
aesthetics which is
visible in the later sections of the Tractatus

.

There were then three major forces shaping Wittgenstein's thought during this period.

One was that of

Mathematics,- logic and Russell's philosophy (as he inter-

preted it), and his contemporaries were clearly aware of
his interest in it.

The second, while not so obvious,

was seen by at least some of his contemporaries!

the in-

fluence of Moore and common-sense philosophy (as he inter-

preted it).

The third, the influence of Schopenhauer's

philosophy, was not recognized at first, despite its cen-

tral position of providing him with the tools needed to

unify the other two.

In ignoring Schopenhauer's influence,

his contemporaries also ignored the more metaphysical con-

cerns of his work.

Russell and Ramsey were at least partly responsible
for the two misinterpretations of the Tractatus we have
seen thus far.

They did not deny that there is an

9

explicitly developed ontology there
.it,

i

.

they simply ignored

misunderstanding its source and importance to Wittgen-

stein,

Russell, at least, may well even have been some-

what sympathetic to metaphysics, if not to
Wittgenstein's

particular variety.

Epistemology, logic, and scientific

philosophy were not seen as contradictory to metaphysical
interests in the early 1900'

s,

for philosophy then was

metaphysical in tone and tendency.

Russell, following

Moore's lead, revolted against an Idealistic metaphysics
founded on Kegel's work and dominated in England by
Bradley,
self.

Neither he nor Moore opposed metaphysics it-

As Warnock writes 12
(t)he idea that metaphysics is in principle
impossible, or 'meaningless', did not appear
until many years later, at a time when, in
this country (i.e., England) at least, oldstyle Idealism was already moribund; and even
then, it was an idea which neither Russell
nor Moore either sponsored or accepted.

Both Russell and Moore added to or reinforced Wittgenstein's
interest in metaphysics.

At the same time they made avail-

able to him the problems and tools of analytical philosophy, which he reformed and reinterpreted, welding them

into his own highly original way of thought.

Another more serious misreading of the Tract atus
occured somewhat later, after Wittgenstein had returned
to Austria.

In 1929, at the house of his sister in Vienna,

he met with Moritz Schlick, who had read the Tractatus

10

and had expressed eagerness to meet its author.

.

Schlick

invited Wittgenstein to join a group of scientists
interested in philosophical questions, a group later
known as
the Vienna Circle.

Though he refused to join the group

formally, he did attend a number of their meetings,
and

soon was thought of as associated with them.
tu_s

The Tracta-

began to be considered a document of that school of

thought,

i

.

e

.

,

as embodying the principles of logical

positivism.
The logical positivists, however, denied any sem-

blance of intellectual respectability to any branch of
metaphysics, and Wittgenstein's concerns with those problems seemed utterly unintelligible to them.

Unlike

Russell and Ramsey, they not only ignored, but denied
the very presence of, these problems in his work.

Ru-

dolph Carnap, for instance, presented an interpretation
of the Tract at us

,

in his Per Logische Aufbau der Welt

,

in which he took a number of Wittgenstein's obviously

ontological claims and reinterpreted them as claims in
a meta-language about an object-language.

By doing so,

he screened out all the metaphysics that was in the

Tractatus

,

and presented it as a work solely (or at

least largely) of logic and epistemology.

We can see how great the gulf is which separates

Wittgenstein's aims and methods from those of the

11

.

the logical positivists by comparing their views on

epistemology.

Logical positivism was an epistemologi-

cal doctrine.

Such interest as its adherents showed in

metaphysics was negative; part of their task was to root
out metaphysics and destroy it.

Wittgenstein, on the

other hand, showed less interest in epistemology than

the positivists did in metaphysics.

Such interest as

he did show was largely negative, for his primary con-

cern was to limit the importance it had had in philosophy since the time of Descartes,

Thus, for example,

when he discusses epistemology in the Tractatus

,

he re-

lates it directly to psychology rather than philosophy*

4.1121*

Psychology is no more closely related
to philosophy than any other natural
science.

*

Theory of knowledge is the philosophy
of psychology.
Elsewhere,

in a letter to Russell,

he again emphasizes

the close relation between epistemology and psychology
(to the detriment of the former as a philosophical dis-

cipline)

*

^

what are
."But a Gedanke is a Tatsache*
what is
and
components
its constituents and
Tatpictured
their relation to those of the
constituents
I don't know what the
sache?"
of a thought are but I know that it must have
such constituents which correspond to the
words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and
It
of the pictured fact is irrelevant.
out.
find
would be a matter of psychology to
.

.

12

At least part of his aim, then,

.

in his attack on epis-

temology is to avoid confuring two related disciplines,

philosophy and psychology.

Y/ittgenstein felt, as did

Husserl, that the confusion between the two which re-

sulted from an over-emphasis on epistemology had penet-

rated deep into the logical and metaphysical studies of
his contemporaries.

By de-emphasizing epistemology, he

felt he could allow both logic and metaphysics to play

again as important a role as they once had played, and
still deserved to play.

His disaffection with epistemology was by no means

hidden subtly in his work, and others have pointed it
out before,

Anscombe, e.g.,

is well aware of it«

she

points it out in her Introduction to Wittgenstein's

Tractatus

,

She claims

but errs by overstating the case.

that "at the time when he wrote the Tractatus

...

,

he

pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the
foundations of logic and the theory of meaning,"

14

and

that he "avoided making theory of knowledge the cardinal

theory of philosophy simply by cutting it dead, by doing
none, and concentrating on the philosophy of logic.

Neither the above quotation from the

T rac tatus

,

15

nor thax

from the letter to Russell, can support the view that he
"cut dead" the theory of knowledge.

As 4.1121 clearly

I

13

.

.

shows, he left a place for it (even if he chose not to

develop what should go in that place)

—

one roughly

parallel in philosophy to that occupied by psychology
in the natural sciences.

From the fact that Wittgen-

stein did little or no epistemology in the Tractatus

,

it does not follow that he felt it to be useless, wrong,

or unnecessary; he simply considered it one philosophi-

cal discipline among many, but one which had received an

i

I

exaggerated amount of interest in recent philosophy.

i

II

In taking the approach

have to the Tractatus

I

leave many important questions unanswered

such asi

I

,

questions

What is the ontological status of the self?

of the laws of physics? or those of ethics?

I

do not

consider these because to do so would involve me in a

work of intolerable length.

I

hope,

rather, that

I

will

have presented clearly and cogently Wittgenstein's an-

swer to the most fundamental question of ontology

What is an object?

If

I

have done this, the answers

to these other questions will not be of frustrating

difficulty, however much space it may take to work them
out

14

.
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CHAPTER

.

II

APPROACH TO THE NOTEBOOKS
Wittgenstein*

s

metaphysics revolves around his

attempts to provide satisfactory answers
to three questions
(i) v/hat is the ontological status
of the "external" world, the world of physical objects?
(ii) what
i

is the ontological status of the self
(or selves),

of

the subject (or of subjects)? and (iii) What
is the

ontological status of laws, particularly scientific and
ethical laws?

The Tractatus provides answers to all

these questions, but it does so in the dark and oracula.r
style for which it is so well known.

Reading it, one is

often mystified not only by the answers Wittgenstein
gives, but by the very questions they are supposed to

answer.

At times one does not quite know what the ques-

tion is supposed to be; at times, though the question
itself may be known, it still seems to have at best mys-

terious connections with the passages which, surrounding
it,

are supposed to bear on it.

Thus to the initial dif-

ficulty of the philosophical thought there is added the
immense difficulty of the style itself.

The elements of abruptness and stylistic mystery
are at least partly dispelled by a reading of his Note -

books, 191**

-

1916

.

It is there that Wittgenstei n first

18

.

raises many of the questions which
he later answers in
the Iractatus; and there, too,
that he first finds many
of the answers for them.

Furthermore, the passages in

the N otebooks often lack his
distinctive aphoristic style.
What the comments there lose by being
either unanswered
01

(in the view of the Tractatus
wrongly answered,
)

gain in clarity due to the different
style.

they

Often, too,

since these thoughts have not yet worked
themselves into
his theories, they are more simply, and
thus more clearly,
put.

In any event, witnessing the philosophical
debate

Wittgenstein carries on with himself over them is
in itself a great help in understanding what he is
getting at.
One cannot,

of course,

simply assume that the Note -

books are philosophically continuous or close to the

Tractatus

Wittgenstein is notorious for having deve-

.

loped two quite different approaches to philosophy 1 that
,

of the Tractatus and that of the Philosophical

tions

.

I nvestiga -

When a philosopher is known to have shifted his

position once radically, only confusion can result by
ignoring the possibility of yet another such shift

2
,

Yet

as Anscombe and von Wright comment in their introduction

to the Notebooks J "it does show clearly what problems
,

formed the context of Wittgenstein's remarks in the

Tractatus

.

.

.

"

.

There is even greater unity between

the two than this implies.

Whenever the Tractatus

I

19

.

disagrees with the Notebooks, there
is almost always a
reason presented already in the
Notebooks for the position later taken in the Tractatus
This allows one actually to see Wittgenstein’s
position change to that of
,

the Tractatus,

and such passages are of special
value

in understanding as exactly as
possible what his posi-

tion is in that work.

Another aim can also be served

by a sensitive examination of these
early notes.

They

present, more clearly than any other
source, the influences acting on Wittgenstein at that time,
These influences, which I have already enumerated,
were not yet so

tightly unified as they became later.

They are thus

easier to see, and to delineate in their relative
importance in V/ittgenstein*

s

thought.

Unfortunately, most of Wittgenstein’s notebooks

were burned, on his orders.

Those which we still have

from this period deal largely with the first of the
three questions which formed the pinions of his meta-

physics

i

the question of the ontological status of

physical objects,

Even so, both in the notebooks we

still have and in the Tractatus we see that he was deeply affected by his researches into two other areas

the nature of logic and of language.

The problems

which arose in these areas, and the answers Wittgenstein gave them, shaped the problems he saw in ontology

20

(and, needless to say,

the answers he gave them ) 4

IMelooks, for example, open with

.

.

The

a comment on logic.

The thought of this opening phrase
delineates a position
which forces Wittgenstein to find a
philosophical method

different from that of his contemporaries
(particularly
Russell),
This he does as he discovers the form of
linguistic analysis that he uses in the Notebooks
and in
llg-Cjatus,

language.

namely, the transcendental analysis of

This method leads him to certain conclusions

about reality, about the objective world.
time,

In the mean-

throughout the entire course of his work, he never

ceases to try to develop a technically sound logic.

Thus

the N otebooks present us with two totally different faces
(as does the Tractatus )

.

depending on whether we chose

to emphasize his logical researches,

or his ontology.

As Kurt Wuchterl comments,
Es sieht aus

als ob Wittgenstein von der
Bestimmten Situation der logischen Grundlagenforschung zur Zeit der Princ.ipia Mathematica
ausging und eine Theorie der Anwendbarkeit“
logischer Systeme zu entwickeln suchte. Seine
Ontologie kann daher als Entwurf ad hoc angesehen werden der die Bedingungen der Moeglichkeit einer vorliegenden perfekten Sprache enthaelt ....
Geht man jedoch von dem fertigen
We rk aus und laesst genetische Ueberlegungen
ausser Acht, so gewinnt man einen ganz anderen
Eindruck,
,

My examination of the Notebooks will try to present
one of those faces coherently, and in doing so to make a
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case for my claim that that face is the more
germaine to

Wittgenstein*

s

thought in general.

I

shall examine very

briefly his comments on logic, and consider how these
influence the development of the method he uses to set
and solve questions in metaphysics.

This leads me

naturally to a consideration of language, and from there
to the problem of the ontological status of things in

the "external world".
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.
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.
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Operativen Phaenomenologie" Z eitschrift fuer Philo sophische Forschung Band 25, Heft 1, Januar - Maerz,

8-11,

,

,

19717"p.

S.

23

.

CHAPTER III
LOGIC AND ANALYSIS IN THE NOTEBOOKS
The very opening sentence of the Notebooks declares
the total independence of logic from all other disci-

plines

'’Die

t

Logik muss fuer sich selbst sorgen ," 1

This realization represents both a central insight and
a central problem for Wittgenstein.

It is an insight

which illuminates for him some of the essential traits
of logic, without thereby defining it* one of the first

conclusions he draws from the comment is that, in logic,
it is "in a sense"

impossible to err.

The comment is

nevertheless more important to him as a problem, for
it forbids, when taken seriously,

a logic based on on-

tology and, conversely, an ontology derived strictly

through logical studies.
negative

t

The most that logic can do is

it can tell one how the world cannot bej

it

can help show the limits of the world, but never what
lies inside of those limits.
a pure discipline,

That is to say, logic is

free from any connection with any

other study or type of study.

Thus a second conclusion

he immediately draws is that "die ganze Theorie der

Dinge, Eigenschaften, etc. ueberfluessig (ist)"

2

for a

theory of logic such as that which Russell and Whitehead
had developed in the Principia Mathematica

.
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The negative sense of this passage,
the sense in

which it poses a problem, leads
Wittgenstein to an important clarification of the goals
of philosophy.
The
questions which are "in some sense" the
genuinely philosophical questions are, in his view,
those which raise
the question of what exists.

two ways.

He himself raises it in

The first proceeds by considering an idea we

have, and asking whether anything corresponding
to it

exists, as when, e.g.

,

Wittgenstein asks, "Gibt es die

Sub jekt-Predikat Form ?" 3

We may also begin at the other

end; we may start with what unquestionably does
exist
(in some sense),
is,

and ask ourselves what its nature really

as when Wittgenstein asks,

"ist ein Punkt in unserem

Gesichtsbild ein einfa.cher Gegenstand

.

ein Ding ?"^

Appearance perhaps to the contrary, Wittgenstein does
not confuse philosophy with science in either of these
two questions.
entist,

When either question is asked by a sci-

or within a scientific discipline,

it has an em-

pirical answer, which can be confirmed or disconf irmed

observationally

.

As Wittgenstein asks them, however,

they are like any other philosophical question!
cal evidence alone cannot answer them.

empiri-

When he asks the

first, he is explicitly aware that no appeal to experi-

ence will answer him.

He continues

i

"ist die und die

.
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Tatsache von der Sub jekt-Predikat
Form?" and replies,
“wie koennen wir dies wissen?
"Aus den Zeichen:” Aber
wie? Wir haben ja gar keine
Zeichen von dieser Form." 5
The same considerations that
prompt him to reject even
the conceivability of empirical
evidence for the first
of these questions act upon him
in the second
too.

Thus at the beginning of Wittgenstein-

s

thought

stands an insight into the nature of
logic which entails,
his view, the sharp separation of three
different
fields!
logic, philosophy, and empirical sciences.
In

m

separating logic from philosophy, he is moving
towards
a conception of the latter very different
from that of
Russell* s, at least as of that time.
Russell accepted
logic as the main philosophical tool, and therefore,
like

any other good tool, quite applicable to the tasks at
hand:

for him there was no divorce between philosophy

and logic.

It was in his view eminently possible to

draw philosophical

(

onto3.ogical) conclusions from argu-

ments based on the properties of a system of logic (and
this procedure is, of course, the basis for his famous
paper,

"On Denoting").

Because he accepted logic with-

out reservation, the questions it engendered became a

primary concern for him.

In particular, the problems

connected with finding some example of a "fully analyzed"
sentence or proposition (in which, then, the true logical

I
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form would be immediately and
unmistakably visible) became of primary importance.
Logic was the tool with
which he would unearth the answers to
metaphysical questions
but for it to work well, it needed
the proper
material
it needed fully analyzed sentences to
work on

-

$

Wittgenstein*

s

attitude towards this kind of philo-

sophical analysis (and especially towards the
problem of
finding a fully analyzed sentence) was ambivalent
until
the period of the Philosophical Investiga t ions
We have
.

already seen that he begins the Notebooks by expressing
doubts as to whether a program which required one to
find examples of real subject-predicate propositions

could be fulfilled.
his doubls?

In the same place he strengthens

"bnd hier fragt es sich wieden

eine vollstaendige Analyse?

Und wenn nicht

denn die Aufgabe der Philosophic

*.

t

gibt es so

Was ist

The sharpness of

the question shows how important it is to him»

behind

all the other questions in the Notebooks and the Tracta ~tus

stands this one.

And behind it stands the realiza-

tion that logic must take care of itself, that logic is
independent both of philosophy and of natural science.

His questioning does not stop here, at his doubts
about whether there is a perfect analysis of sentences.
He continues with a question whether, even if a sentence
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of the real subject-predicate form could
be found, this

discovery would be of any real philosophical value.

answer

"Es scheint nein .'" 7

«

His

Later he goes even further

and declares that "auch der unzerlegte Satz
spiegelt ja

logische Eigenschaften seiner Bedeutung-wieder " 8 -- it
is not even necessary,

in other words, to find a perfect-

ly analyzed proposition in order to examine the real

nature

oj.

the world (the "logische Eigenschaften seiner

Bedeutung").

Unanalyzed sentences do so just as well.^

These doubts, however profound and fruitful their

consequences were for Wittgenstein* s later works, were
just doubts here.

The beginning of the Notebooks is

.

thus marked as negative and critical, in a philosophical
sense.

He sees the problems of ontology as essential to

philosophy, yet he sets limits to the ways in which they

can be solved by removing them both from logic and from
the empirical sciences.

Although interesting, what he

does here is not yet very original.

It is in fact close

to Kant's critical limitation of metaphysics.

Just as

Kant felt forced to separate logic from the natural
sciences and from philosophy, so Wittgenstein felt com-

pelled to separate them one from the other.
in the Notebooks

,

This early

however, he had not determined a

method to systematize his thoughts*

he is not yet

committed to any given reason why the three areas are

s
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sepai ace, as Kant was to the doctrine of
synthetic a

££A P F-L truths.

One of the most active forces guiding

him in philosophy was precisely thisi

to find out why

and how the three were separate, and at the same time,
how to carry forth research in each without impinging
on either of the others.

What is new about the critical side of Wittgenstein*
thought as we see it here is that he turns it against

analytical philosophy as represented by Russell.

The

attempt to find a genuine subject-predicate sentence is
not only temporarily stymied (as Russell thought); it is

worse

i

it is wrong.

There is, as we have seen, no ex-

perience by which we could tell the difference between
a genuine subject-predicate proposition and an apparent
one.

To attempt to find one is, on the one hand, to

violate the limits of philosophy, and confuse it with
the natural sciences in method.

genstein accuses Russell*

s

For this reason Witt-

"Scientific Method in Philo-

sophy" of being "geradezu ein Rueckschritt von der

Methode der Physik".

1^

Scientific method in philosophy

makes no more good sense than philosophical method in
the sciences!

each confuses two essentially separate

endeavors, two essentially different methodologies.

On

the other hand, Russell's method leads to a confusion

between logic and philosophy.

This in its turn brings

I
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into logic, the most certain of disciplines,
uncertainties of philosophy 11 -- which, however
germaine to philosophy, are irrelevant to logic.

Tentatively Wittgenstein

is forced to the conclusion that Russell's
method,

of logical atomism,

that

is a philosophical mess.

The logical theory which Wittgenstein espouses
in
the beginning of the Notebooks is obviously
incomplete.
It-

does, after all, represent only the beginnings of the

theory he later elaborated extensively.

In some respects

it even seems to contradict some very important positions

he later developed.

In particular, if logic

ijs

absolutely

independent of the world, how can he speak of "logischer
Raum"

,

or of the logic of our language,

or any other such

concept, many of which he uses in the Tractatus ?

Such

concepts seem at least to overstep the boundary between
logic and the empirical sciences,
logic and philosophy as well.

if not that between

These problems, however,

must be postponed, and faced later.

My presentation

has been aimed at bringing out some of the implications

Wittgenstein saw in the early stages of his theory, particularly the implications of that theory for methodology
and the rejection of Russellian logical atomism.

Even

though he rejects this theory, holding fast to his "very
important" insight into the independence of logic, he

remains tempted by it, as

I

pointed out.

He replaces

I
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Russellian analysis

—

the analysis which was based on

the methods of logic developed by Russell and
Whitehead

m

their Principia jlathematica

analysis to which

1

—

with a type of language-

turn in the following chapter.

This

analysis, as we shall see there, is by no means of
clear

significance to Wittgenstein at firsts
part of the interest of the Notebooks

,

indeed,

it is

that we can see

clearly how and why this new method replaced the older
for him.

In one sense, perhaps, this change

I

shall

chronicle in Wittgenstein's attitude toward analysis is
one of the most significant portions of the Notebooks

.

It allows us to find one method of unifying the entirety

of his philosophical thought and works, works normally

held to be of totally different, and even inconsistent,

approaches to philosophy and its problems.

Let me

sketch, briefly and perhaps somewhat dogmatically, the

lines along which such a unification would proceed.
In the earliest works,

such as the "Notes on Logic"

(of 1913)* Wittgenstein was most deeply impressed and

influenced by Russell and the program of logical analysis.

(Even here, however, an effort to remedy what

Wittgenstein saw as certain defects is present,)

The

Notebooks shows the decisive turn away from Russellian
logical analysis to linguistic analysis.

In the
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Phjj^s ophische Bemerkungen

.

Wittgenstein* s principal

concern is with essential linguistic structures.
the time of the Blue and Brown B ooks
the

i

.

,

By

which announced

inal version of his method, he had ceased to pick

out any given structures as essential.

He was now con-

cerned with clarification of all ordinary linguistic

structures whatsoever.

But

—

to return us to the

present work -- we are now to be concerned with his
early version of linguistic analysis, one still over-

shadowed by the hopes and fears of logical atomism.

,,
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Ibid.
See also his comment, p. 12
sagenj es kommt nicht darauf an, dass wir es mit
nicht analysierbaren Sub jekt-Predikat Saetze zu tun
haben, sondern darauf, dass unsere sub jekt-predikat
Saetze sich, in jeder Beziehung so wie solche benehrnen, dass heisst also, dass die Logik unserer
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Muss aber nicht die Logik
jener anderen.
(.
.)
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.

9.

Wittgenstein strengthens this position in the Tractatus
In 4.1274 he maintains that "... the^
question, 'Arc there unanalysable subject-predicate
propositions?* cannot be asked", let alone answered.
.

•
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CHAPTER

IV

LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND ANALYSIS

The doubts that bother Wittgenstein
in his critical
phase or mood can quickly be summed up,
as he himself
sums them up when he asks of the question
of philosophy,

"welche Evidenz koennte so eine Frage ueberhaupt
ent-

scheiden
rathei-,

Logic carries with it its own proof, or

1

.

the proofs of or in logic are proofs, not propo-

sitions which stand in need of some other proof.

The

empii ical sciences at least give their practitioners
a

relatively clear idea of what constitutes a proof there,
and intelligible directions as to where to find it for

their claims.

Only in philosophy does one find the prob-

lem of where to look for evidence.

The answer is provided even before the question becomes clear.

Wittgenstein writes,

Also, wenn alles, was gezeicht werden braucht,
durch die Existenz der sub jekt-predikat SAETZE
etc, gezeigt wird, dann ist die Aufgabe der
Philosophie eine andere, als ich urspruenglich
annahrn.
Wenn dem nicht so ist, so muesste das
Fehlende nur durch eine Art Erfahrung gezeicht
werden, und das halte ich fuer ausgeschlossen.

Throughout the Notebooks

,

Wittgenstein affirms again

and again that everything is shown by the existence of

—

subject-predicate Saetze (but not of course subjectpredicate Saetze in a technical or Russellian sensei

)
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Wittgenstein means the
language).

S aetze

.

of our ordinary unanalyzed

Thus the analysis of the Saetze of
language

is the sufficient tool for philosophy.

thing not expressable in its Saetze

.

Were there any-

it would still have

to be made available to us through
experience

—

but ex-

pel ience about which we would necessarily
remain silent,

about which we could not speak.
impossible.

This he dismisses as

(He does not argue for its impossibility here,

or anywhere in his works until his arguments
against pri-

vate language in the Philosophical Investigations
But what are these Saetze ?

.

^

To ask the same thing in

another way, how would one translate the German word
Satz

1
'

into English?

Should it be rendered as "proposi-

tion" or as "sentence"?

"Proposition", as it would be

used here, means "meaning of a sentence".
fines it,

it is "the cognitive

sentence; that is,

As Quine de-

meaning of an eternal

just as much of the meaning as affects

the truth value of the sentence and not its poetic quality
or its affective tone."

Such sentence-meanings, what-

ever they may be or be held to be, are not sentences of
or in any language.

Their whole raison d’etre would be

defeated by reducing them to the same kind of thing as
are sentences.

So the question of whether to translate

"Satz" by "proposition" or by "sentence" comes to the
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question of whether one wishes to commit
oneself to the
claim that Wittgenstein held that
sentences and their
meanings both exist somehow independent
of each other,

or the claim that he held that meanings
do not exist

independently of sentences.
Some passages in the Noteboo ks seem to demand
the

translation of "Satz" as "proposition”

.

Thus, e.g.,

"All dies setzt natuerlich schon die Existenz der
gesaraten Satzwelt voraus

.

.

." 5

From this we get a pic-

ture of Saetze as abstract entities, existing indifferent to their use or disuse by man.

this passage,

The view implied in

in short, throws Wittgenstein open to all

the advantages and disadvantages which attend the assump

tion that there are propositions.

It is of excellent

use when dealing with his logical theory and his work on

negation.

Thus Anscombe, for whom this area of Wittgen-

stein's thought holds especial interest, uses "proposition" to translate "Satz".
On the other hand, certain passages in the Notebooks

seem to forbid such a translation, and demand that "Satz
be translated as "sentence",
it.

as Stenius has translated

Propositions are not bearers of meaning!

meanings.

they are

They do not gain meaning (or a different

meaning) from anything any mere mortal could do with
them.

They always have the same meaning, no matter what

"
I
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sentence expresses them, no matter
when or in what language they are embodied.
Such is not the case with
Wittgenstein* s "Saetze".
A Satz has neither meaning nor
reference until employed by someone,
until or unless a
key of interpretation (so to speak)
is given with it.
Such a "key" is, or can be, very complicated
"Ein Satz'
wie "dieser Sessel ist braun" scheint etwas
enorm Komi

’

pliziertes zu sagen

.

is an early realization of

.

what he expresses more strongly ini

"Die Abmachungen

unserer Sprache sind ausserordentlich kompliziert

8
.

But however complicated, the key must be given.

Neither of these considerations is absolutely final,
partly because both English words are used as well in

totally different ways.

Ultimately here as elsewhere

in translating one must choose between two sets of am-

biguities, and hope for the best.

The English word

"sentence" seems to fit the majority of contexts better

than the word "proposition"

{

so,

despite the problems

this translation raises with a statement of his logical
theory,

I

use it.

The best that can be hoped for is that,

with frequent use, a sense that will approximate Wittgenstein's German meaning will develop.
Sentences, and with them spoken language, have thus

become the focal point of Wittgenstein's analysis.

He
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has accomplished what Bergmann calls
"the right linguistic turn
though he has done so in a way which is
as
yet not clear, even to himself. He
has at any rate left
Russell and the logical analysis of
propositions behind,
but the fact that there is confusion
and uncertainty as
t

to how to translate the word "Satz"
demonstrates the lack
of clarity of this "right" turn.

Nevertheless, language,

sentences, and through them language, have become
the

center of philosophical analysis and have replaced
extra-

linguistic propositions in importance.
ihe language which occupies Wittgenstein's attention
in the No tebooks is written language, and he makes
little
or no explicit attempt to extend his treatment to spoken

language.

We have already noted that his "right linguis-

tic turn" presupposes that an analysis of language will

suffice to solve philosophical problems, and that Witt-

genstein himself does not argue directly for this presupposition's truth.

A parallel lack occurs here, for

he never tries to justify the position that written

language can represent every state of affairs, and so
serve as the model for language in general.

He is aware

that this claim underlies his method, for he writes

explicitly,

Man kann sagen, wir haben ja nicht die Gewissheit,
dass wir alle Sachverhalte in Bildcrn aufs Papier
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brmgen koennen, wohl aber die Gewissheit.
dass
wir alle logische Eigenschaften der
Sachverhalte
einer zweidimensionalen Schrift abbilden
1U

m

koennen.

By the end of the Notebooks he had
already begun to feel
the need to justify this assumption? in
the T ractatus
he again gives at least one indirect argument
for it,

based on the nature of the picture theory of language.

Even there, however, he seems unaware that a proof that
language can represent all states of affairs does not

thereby demonstrate that any given language can or does.
The pivotal position of written language remains unjustified.

The symbols
a dual life.

(

Zeichen

)

or "words"

of a language lead

On the one hand, they are themselves inde-

pendent things with their own characteristics.

On the

other hand, they can and often do refer; in doing so

they are unlike other things and dependent on something

extraneous to themselves.
The traits which symbols have on their own are of
two types.

They have incidental traits, such as that

*x*

has no occurence in a word on this page, or that

'p'

is used by some people to represent the sound for

which others use

‘ly'

.

The only linguistic significance 11

Wittgenstein attributes to this kind of characteristic
is that it has no significance at all.
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groups of symbols, however, possess a set
of
characteristics which come from the fact that
these symbols are part of an actual language.
That means that
the symbols are governed by definite rules
of syntax,

and may thus oe said to have syntactical
characteristics.

For Wittgenstein, the most important unit of
language is
a sentence (as the most important unit of the
actual

world is a fact).

The sentence, he remarks, "konstru-

iert eine Welt mit Hilfe seines logischen Geruestes

M
.

,

^

.

The kind of world which the sentence constructs (or better,
designs) is independent of any success or failure of the

referring function of the words? indeed, words which we
know do not refer are nevertheless fully capable of hel-

ping to design it.

For the sentences themselves are a

complex situation, as a model airplane is a sort of com-

plex plane; taken together the set of sentences forms a

model world.

Each sentence fits into the scheme of

things in the sentence-world, even without further analysis.

Just as, in the world experienced by man, there

can be no unique experience wholly different from any
other,

so in the world designed by sentences,

the sen-

tence-world, there can be no sentence of a unique, wholly

different type.

This Wittgenstein expresses by saying

that there is a general form for sentences!

that there

is such a form

"

sagt nichts anderes alsi

Satzform muss sich voraussehon LASSEN.

Jedo moegliche

The parallel

between the sentence-world and the actual world
is complete, for Wittgenstein justifies his confidence
that

there is a general form for sentences with the claim
that,

if not,

"das wuerde heissen, dass wir eine neue

Erfahrung gemacht haetten, die erst dieser Satzform er~
moeglicht hat." 1 ^
The nature of the model world designed by sentences

depends largely on the caprice of the person who is

using the sentences.

Like logic, however, it is the

case that "die Sprache fuer sich selbst sorgt",' '^
1

That

language must "care for itself" is another theme which
does not fully mature in Wittgenstein's work until the

Philosophical Investigations

.

By it he does not mean

that sentences (the elements of language) are somehow

complete in themselves, i.e., that they are propositions

which have (bear) meaning eternally, with or without
human meddling.

People give sentences meaning, even

where there w as perhaps none before

j

Frege sagtj
jeder rechtmaessig gebildeter Satz
muss einen Sinn haben, und ich sagei
jeder
moegliche Satz ist rechtmaessig gebildet, und
wenn er keinen Sinn hat, so kann das nur daran
liegen dass wir einigen seiner Bestandteilen
keine Bedeutung gegeben habep. Wenn wir auch
glauben, es getan zu haben.

"
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Wittgenstein maintains here (and in the
Tractatus
that every possible sentence is
well-formed.
6ii

in language

,

,

.

)

We cannot

by forming an ill-formed sentence,

even though it seems we can.

All that can happen is

that we fail to give meaning to the elements
of the sentence,
Eli or in language is possible only through
human

incompetence

—

or,

rather, through ceasing to speak a

language at all.

What Wittgenstein did mean by claiming that language
too must care for itself is brought out especially
clearly by one of his comments on definitions.

"Die Defini-

tion ist eine Tautologie und zeigt interne Relationen

zwischen ihren beidern Gliedern. 17

•

Each sentence has

its own unique logical characteristics.

To define one

sentence is to replace it by another, where the logical

traits of the second are supposedly more clear than those
of the first (most often, more clear because more expli-

citly articulated).

In addition to clarifying, the de-

finition presents us with a tautology.

Wittgenstein

offered a now famous definition of tautologies in the

Tractatus

,

as empty propositions, propositions which,

characterizing all the universe, characterize no particular part of it (4.46
ever,

-

4.461 and 2.0122).

Here, how-

he relies on another definition of ’'tautology

8

',

'+

one which is independent of
the concerns of logic,

3

.

A

tautology here is any statement
of the subject-predicate form, where both subject
and predicate share the
same specific logical form, 18

On Wittgenstein's view,

definitions can occur only between
sentences
"There
exists a bachelor" means (is defined
as) "There exists
an unmarried male".
Here, Wittgenstein would claim,
There exists a bachelor" has the same
specific logii

cal form as "There exists an unmarried
male", and so the

latter is a definition of the former.

We do speak of

defining words; ultimately, however, it is
the word in
the context of a sentence which is given
meaning through
definition.
The sentence, i.e., is defined by giving
the word clear (articulated) meaning in that
context.

Wittgenstein clearly realises one consequence of
his theory of definitions.

Language is strictly inde-

pendent of the world; definitions occur only in language.

Hence ostensive definitions are merely ostensible definitions,

Under certain conditions one can be driven to

an ostensive definition, 1 ^ but this is not a real definition,

If it were

—

if the sequence of definitions

could or would need to end in an ostensive definition

then meaning would depend on truth, i.e., one sentence's

meaning would depend upon another sentence's having
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successful reference to the actual
world.
But as he
often points out, even false
sentences, sentences which
fail across the board to have
reference, have meaning.
Thus meaning cannot be reduced to
any reference which
can fail or succeed, and the phrase
of traditional
grammar, ""ein Wort bezieht sich auf
ein anderes wird
hier beleuchtet ". 20 The words of a
definition
,#

are

bound to other words, not to things in
the world.
Our examination of the sentence-world
has brought
out two important traits it has.

The first is that it

is independent of that to which its
sentences refer*

success or failure in referring, or even lack of
intent
to refer, does not affect the facts of this world,
the

sentences, at all.

Likewise, of course, it is indepen-

dent of the world of objects or things, that is, it
can

and does have meaning without them.

In this respect it

is like logic and must care for itself.

But,

secondly,

we have seen that the sentence-world is not independent
of man,

of language speakers.

Man is a created being

in the world of objects, and therefore, Wittgenstein

notes,

subject to the feeling of the presence of an alien

and more powerful will.

But he is a creator of the sen-

tence-world? he sets up the (syntactic) rules of that

world and can do with them as he pleases.

The sentence-
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world,

in other words,

is dependent on man,

.

but only

on man,

Wittgenstein's -right linguistic turn" thus helps
him escape the difficulty he felt at
the very beginning
of the Notebooks.
Logic and its problems cease to be
of central philosophical importance for
him.

takes its place

~

Language

language which, while independent of

the world, depends still on man to use it, and
is there-

fore amenable to philosophical analysis.
If Wittgenstein were interested solely in linguistics,
or even linguistics and epistemological problems, he

could have stopped here.

He was not.

He also, even

principally, held that the questions of metaphysics are
important.

Since metaphysics asks questions about the

world, and yet language is independent of the world, a

major problem recurs again herei

what method can one

use in philosophy to answer metaphysical questions?

By

what method can one justify a move from language to the
independent world of things?

With that question we once again run afoul of Russell
and his philosophical method, for the obvious way to do
so,

to one acquainted with the philosophy of the early

twentieth century, would be analysis, either of the form
Moore gave it or in that of Russell.

And indeed,

it had
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.

already enjoyed what appeared to be considerable success
at the hands of both these philosophers.

Yet we have

already seen that, despite its successes in their works,

Wittgenstein was dissatisfied with the tool, and felt
the need to revise it.

He was nevertheless impressed

by it, and did not want simply to reject it out of hand.

Analysis could be saved, he felt, if it could be corrected so as to fulfill two requirements.

It must not be

allowed to overstep the boundaries of what can justifiably be done in philosophy, and it must show clearly the

necessary connections amongst the things which are analyzed (in his version, these are sentences, of course).
One type of analysis fulfills both these require-

ments.

"Es ist doch klar, dass Bestandteile unserer

Saetze durch Definitionen zerlegt werden koennen und

muessen

....

der Analyse

*'
.

21
‘

Jedenfalls gibt es also einen Prozess
Here,

in the underlined sentence, Witt-

genstein finally achieves a clear view of the method

which sustained his work through the Tractatus

.

Analy-

sis by definitions stays, as we have seen, completely

within the realm of language, so it cannot confuse or
overstep the boundaries of what can justifiably be done
in philosophy, as Russell does in applying logical ana-

lysis to the world.

And definitions are tautologies,

4 ?.

each side of which (the definiendum
and the definiens)
has the same logical form.
In this way the necessity
of the connections between the two
parts is preserved.
So Wittgenstein does not feel impelled
to give up analysis as a philosophical method.
He simply learns and
takes much from Russell and Moore, but
also excludes

much from each, replacing it by his own
original method.

Wittgenstein's method shows further traits which, if
not absolutely unique to him, were certainly
used in his
own way.

The first of these is that, though definitions

must always be tautologous

,

the definiens must be more

complex than the definiendum.

That is, the "zerlegte

Satz redet von mehr als aer unzerlegte"

.

The require-

ment is of course necessary in order to account for the

clarity gained in definitions.

A difficulty with it

arises from Wittgenstein's claim that the subject and

predicate of a definition share the same specific logical form (see above).

A full solution to the problem

must await our discussion of internal relations (Part II,

Chapter IV), but a sketch of it can be offered here.
Following Russell, Wittgenstein would hold that any unanalyzed term or phrase would have a hidden logical form

which analysis can bring out.

The subject of a definition

is unanalyzed (or not fully analyzed)!

it thus has a
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more complex form than it shows.

.

The predicate simply

shows that form explicitly (or, more
explicitly).
A full analysis of the second of these
traits must

also wait, for it involves us in problems
of reference.
Briefly, howeveri

lessly complex.
not use it.

"Zerlegung"

,

analysis, cannot be end-

It must stop somewhere,

or we could

When the process stops, we are left with

simple sentences, which are themselves composed of ele-

ments (words).

It has been argued that, at least for

the Tract at us

these simple sentences are comprised of

,

nothing but names in immediate conjunction with each
other.

And one could argue that late in the Notebooks

,

at least, Wittgenstein ought to have taken a similar

position.

He does not do sos

instead he introduces an

entirely original element, one not found in any other
theory.

He claims that sentences-analysis leads to an

"Urbild" which "ist dann wirklich kein Satz (hat aber die
.

Gestalt ernes Satzes)",

24

The Urbild (as Anscombe trans-

lates it, the protopicture) appears in the analyzed sentence as unanalyzed.

Even though it appears in the an-

alyzed sentence in an unanalyzed form (and is therefore

strictly unanalyzable )

,

it must have some structure.

That Wittgenstein held the Urbi ld to have structure is
shown by his debate over whether it is the Urbilder or
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the sentences themselves which actually
picture facts.
In order to picture facts, the pictures
must, he claims,

have some structure.
sider Urbilder

,

If,

therefore, he can even con-

racher than sentences, as the real pic-

tures, he must be thinking of them as complex.

This is

also why he claims that they have the form of a sentence

even though they are not sentences.
All this still leaves Wittgenstein far from the

central philosophical goal towards which his thought is
aiming?

the metaphysical analysis of what there is.

He is still faced with the problem of what there is.
He is still faced with the problem of the move from lan-

guage (sentences or proto-pictures) to objects or the

actual world.

In the Tractatus

,

of course,

he handled

this problem in large part through the famous, if not
infamous, picture theory.
it in the Notebooks

,

too,

There is some development of
but far from the detailed ex-

position allotted to it in the later work.

Rather than

trying to piece together the bits of what is obviously
an as yet undeveloped sketch,

I

shall develop several

claims which give us the foundations for the picture

theory -- a proto-picture-theory, the theory WittgenHe holds that each

stein works with in his Notebooks.

meaningful sentence has a Bedeutung

,

which we may
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translate as reference or referent.

2 -^

.

Between the

sentence and its referent there is a logical
identity
of form, though the referent may be
and normally is

more complex than the sentence.

In addition, a meaning-

ful sentence may also successfully (or
unsuccessfully)

refer to the real world, to what actually
exists.

When

the logical form of the sentence matches the
logical

form of some portion of the real world (Wittgenstein
says, when it "besteht"
true.

),

the sentence is said to be

When, although the speaker intends for there to

be such a match,

there is none, the sentence is said to

be false.

Before substantiating my claim that this is indeed

Wittgenstein

*

s

position, let me present two reasons in

favor of his maintaining so complex a theory of the re-

lation between language and reality.
guistic.

The first is lin-

There are many groups of words, phrases or

subordinate clauses, which one calls, in perfectly or-

dinary German, "Saetze",

which nevertheless do not

have independent meaning.

We today might not be willing

to glorify them with the name of "sentence", certainly

not in English.

Wittgenstein had no such scruples.

One normally would have called them "Satz"

,

so he did.

Such Saetze as "While John was washing clothes" or

51

.

"Although Mary can press 350 lbs."
do have meaning,
though they are misused when uttered
alone. They cannot be said to picture the world
when used without
a

principal clause,
or not it obtains

picture it.

it is a reference the Satz
has whether
(

besteht ) in the world, and can thus

When completed it may also have another

reference, this to the actual (bestehende)
world, gained
without losing the first.

Furthermore, a perfectly ordinary sentence
can have
two or more different meanings depending
on how its user
uses it.
For example, "Every man loves his wife" can
be
taken to mean that someone has a wife whom
every man
loves,

or that each man loves his own wife.

Either of

the meanings is fully intelligible by itself
without

connection with the real worlds

what it refers to is

complete in either case, even though the reference to
the actual world may either be intended and present,

in-

tended but absent, or neither intended nor present.

It

too can be gained, without loss of the original reference.
In any case, many sentences do manage to refer to

the world.
tences.

There are, to put it another way, true sen-

And in the account the Notebooks gives us, it

is not the sentence alone which refers,

but the sentence

along with its meaning which finally refers to the world
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and is true or false,

2

'’

.

So meaning is a function of

reference! the meaning of a sentence
is its referent.
But this does not mean that the
meaning of a sentence
is the world, or that part of
the actual world to which
it might refer (which, so far,
is simply that which
makes a sentence true or false). Whatever
the reference of a sentence is, it must be separate
from the
world, in order to preserve the ability
of a sentence
to mean without being true.

So the next section will have a relatively
straight-

forward task,

I

shall show first that Wittgenstein

actually does hold in the N ot ebooks that the meaning
of a sentence is its reference.

Then

I

shall show that

"reference" has at least two distinct meanings for Wittgenstein.

Reference^ has nothing to do with the actual

world (even though it is the reference of the sentence).
Reference^ is the reference of the sentence to the world,
the reference which makes the sentence true or false.

Interwoven with these two senses of "reference"

is,

course,

will

the kernel of the picture theory, and

try to bring out,
the later.

in passing,

Then in conclusion

I

of

how the earlier leads to
I

shall discuss the

nature of reference in general, or that which both
reference-^ and reference^ have in common, which allows

„
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them both to be significantly
seen as varieties of the
same action or process.
This will then give us a fairly
complete view of what I have called
the proto-picturetheory, the picture theory insofar
as it is contained
in the Notebooks

.
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of his thought continued after
he wrote the Tractatus
as one can see in his introduction
to the p
Ph
niios
Uoso
_o
phische Bemerkungren
.

»
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CHAPTER

.

V

THE PROTO-PICTURE-THEORY
FROM LANGUAGE TO REALITY
does seern to present a theory of
reference.

Wittgenstein distinguished between 'Sinn*

and 'Bedeutung'

('sense* and 'reference', respectively)

in that work, following Frege though
modifying the lat-

ter's v/ork to fit better with his ovm
approach.

As

Anscombe comments*

Wittgenstein follows Frege in the use of the
words ^Bedeutung* and 'bedeuten*. Generally
in the Trac tatus they ought not to be
ren,

dered ... by ‘'meaning* and 'mean*, but
rather by ‘reference* and 'stand for*. Wittgenstein's conception of sense may be called
the same as Frege's, if we are careful to
add
that Wittgenstein had different theses about
its
for he held that names had no sense but
only reference, and propositions no reference
but only sense and also that propositions
could not have sense without being either true
or false.
Further he uses the sense of ‘direction* that is contained in the word 'sense',
.

•

i

M
,

,

,

A careful reading of the Tractatus shows Anscombe to
be correct,

and

'

in general*

bedeuten

*

he does indeed limit

'

(and their derivatives) to names

two very important exceptions.

Bedeutung

—

'

with

'Sinn' and its derivatives

are limited to sentences (Anscombe called them 'proposi-

tions').

If one assumes,

as

I

do,

that the Notebooks and

the Tractatus do not contradict each other on this point,

such usage in the later work throws the entire purport

,
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of this chapter into question.

show that,

For here

.

propose to

I

in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein
held that the

meaning of a sentence is its reference
or Bedeutung
while in the Tractatus sentences cannot
have Bedeutung
:

but are limited to Sj-nn,

Wittgenstein*

s

.

sense.

usage of the word

1

Bedeutung

in

*

the T ractatu s is not as straightforward
as Anscombe makes
it seem,

however.

in general

I

If we translate it as 'reference'

(and

agree with her in doing so), we must be

aware that the term is a technical one of Wittgenstein's

philosophy, and by no means the same as

*

Bedeutung

common German or ’reference* in common English.

'

in
'

The

mere fact that Wittgenstein so consistently restricts
his use of the word to names should alone make this clear,
for the normal usage in neither language is so restricted
(i.e.,

one can properly ask,

"Was bedeutet dieser Satz"

or "What does this sentence refer to").

linguistic oddity in his use of

’

There is another

Bedeutung

’

’
,

bedeuten

'

and their derivatives.

They occur 54 times in the Trac -

tatus

or 14.8% are uses of

;

of these only 8,

’

bedeuten

and its derivatives (i.e., verbs or verbal forms).

*

In-

stead of saying of a word that it refers to something
(

*

es bedeutet

*

)

has reference’,

he constantly uses the expression,

,

'

es hat Bedeutung

*

.

While there is

'it
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nothing grammatically
incorrect about this, it
is odd,
and should again warn
the reader that he is
using the’
word in a technical manner.
A third, final, indication
that the words do not mean
the same as their ordinary
language counterparts comes
in the two exceptions
to
the general rule that
'Eedeutunp is correlated with
names alone.
In 5.6 Wittgenstein writes,
"Die Grenzen
g&rache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt".
1

Not

only is the correlation of

'

bedeuten

1

here not (at

least not obviously) with names,
but it would be most
strange to translate the passage as
"The limits of my
language refer to the limits of my
world". Limits, or
boundaries, do not after all refer to
anything, words,
perhaps, or sentences or people can
refer, but not
limits.
'B ede u ten* here is better read
another way (as
also in 5 62 which is a similar statement).
.

,

So we can use ‘reference* as a translation
for

'Bedeutung* only if we so to speak flag it as
a termin us

technicus of Wittgenstein*
holds of course for
the two words)

,

the term entirely

*

s

philosophy (and the same

bedeuten

*

and all derivatives of

It might even be preferable to drop
,

and thus avoid any misinterpretations

which may result from confusing the technical with the
non-technical senses of the words.

For the Tractatus

6o.

despite its agreement by and
large with the Notebooks
does not develop a theory of
reference, at least not in
any traditional sense,
,

Wittgenstein is prevented from developing
anything
like a traditional theory of
reference by considerations
we have already seen,
His first insight was
that logic

must take care of itself, and
therefore cannot become
entwined in philosophical issues. We
have also just
seen that he maintains that language
too must care for,
itself
that is, language must somehow function
independently of what is or is not the case.
The independence
i

of language,

like that of logic,

is an ontological inde-

pendence, and is shown clearly by our ability to
know

what a sentence means without knowing whether it is
true
or false

»

"We assume

t

£ is NOT the case*

does it mean to say, "it is good, that p"?

what then
We can quite

obviously say the state-of-affairs p is good, without

knowing whether "p" is true or false ." 2

A little later,

his language strongly implies not only that our know-

ledge of the truth-value of the sentence, but even the

actual truth-value itself, is irrelevant for its being
a meaningful sentence*
_iert)

"The sentence designs (konstru-

a world with the help of its logical framework,

and that is how one can see in the sentence, how everything

61.

logical would be, if it were
true,
sions from a false sentence,
etc ." 3

one can draw conclu-

In brief, the inde-

pendence of language means the
independence of meaning
from truth or falsity, i.e.,
the independence of language from things in the world.
This is why, in his
final and most consistent
presentation of his theory

(in

the I raptatus )

>

the picture theory replaces
anything

like a theory of reference.
But although the picture theory
stands proxy for a

more ordinary theory of reference in
the later work, the

where Wittgenstein's thought is still developing and changing, gives us a different view.

In the

earlier work he still tries to approach the problem
as
one

of reference,

even at times speaking of the refer-

ence (Be deutung ) of sentences:

logical picture of its meaning
the unbiased eye."^

"That the sentence is a
(

Bedeutung

)

is obvious to

The importance of the theory of

reference, very great at first,

is progressively lessened

as he pruned it to take the shape the rest of his theory

requires it to take, but he still feels the need to
speak of it throughout these notebooks.

The beginnings

of the picture theory are exactly what Wittgenstein's

central insights forbade them to be:
theory of reference.

sketches of a

7

•62.

I

That Wittgenstein actually intends that
the meaning
of a sentence be its reference
is shown by his use of
the word 'bed eut en' (and its derivatives).
It also can
be shown by five arguments.
A

Consider the following passages from the Notebooks

!

(i) Die triviale Tatsache, dass ein
vollkommen
analysierter Satz ebensoviel Namen enthaelt als
seine Bedeutung Dinge ... .5

(ii) Man kann geradezu sagem
statt, dieser
Sabz hat diesen und diesen Sinm
dieser Satz
stellt diesen und diesen Sachverhalt dar. b
.

.

(iii) Der Gegenstand, von welchem die allgemeinen Saetze handeln, ist recht eigentlich

die Welt.
Now,

there are only two words which philosophical German

uses,

or can use,

—

for the English word 'meaning'

'Be-

O

deutung

*

and

shows that

'

'

Sinn

The first of these quotations

'
.

Bedeutung

'

is used in the sense of 'refer-

ence', the things to which the names in the sentence

refer being its Bedeutung
that

'

Sinn

'

.

The second quotation shows

is used similarly.

For 'this sentence has

this sense* is said to be replaceable "right away" by,
'this sentence presents this state-of -affairs'

states-of-af fairs

,

j

and

for both the Notebooks and the

-
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—

tatUS-’ consist of thi
"es in conjunction with each
other.
Hence no matter which term we
see fit to use to
translate -meaningthe meaning of a sentence
lies outside the sentence itself, in
its reference.
.

One might still feel inclined
to object to this in
a way which often disturbed
Wittgenstein himself throughout the Notebooks.
It may be true

for sentences which

purport to refer to individual
objects that their meaning is their reference
but what about sentences which
purport to be general, i.e., not to
refer to individual
objects or states-of -affairs? The
third quotation above
simply serves to remind us that even
for general sentences, the meaning lies outside the
sentence in its

-

reference.

In their case, as the quotation shows,
the

reference is the world in general.

There is a direct argument for the identity of

meaning and reference, along the same lines, from later
in the Notebooks

«

When

I say, this watch is shiny, and that which
intend by "this clock" changes the way it is
put together seine Zusammensetzung in the
slightest then not only the sense (Sinn) of
the sentence changes according to the content,
but also the statement about this watch also
changes its sense immediately. The entire
form of the sentence is changed.?

I

(

,

)
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A little later he adds*

.

"It is thus clear to the un-

biased mind, that the sense

(

Sinn ) of the sentence, "the

watch is lying on the table" is more complicated
than
the sentence itself". 10

While it is unquestionable

that the Bedeutung either of a sentence or of
words
lies oucside the sentence or words, these two
quotations

show the same for Sinn even late in the N otebooks

The

.

second shows also that the Sinn of a sentence is more

complex than the sentence itself, and must be independent of it.

The first quotation then links the Sinn

directly to the meant object ("that which

I

intend by

"this clock""), claiming that as the reference to that
object changes, so does the Sinn

,

and as the Sinn changes,

so does the entire form of the sentence.

As soon,

in

other words, as the reference of a sentence changes,

absolutely nothing in it, not even its form, remains
the same (compare Tractatus 2,021 and 2.023).
C

We can derive a third argument from a problem which

puzzled Wittgenstein throughout the Notebooks

i

"A pic-

ture can present relations which do not exist!!!

this possible?"

11

How is

Why does this seem a problem to him?

Surely there is no mystery about how a picture can
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"present relations which do not
exist"
the artist can
paint them, the writer tell
about them
even the photographer, by pasting together two
pictures of what does
exist, can present a relation,
a connection between them,
which does not in fact exist.

—
-

In all these cases, the picture
can do so because
all it presents is simply itself.
Its meaning (insofar
as one can speak of the meaning
of an art work) is inde-

pendent of its having any actual reference.

were true of sentences, in Wittgenstein'
should have been no difficulty.
obvious problem for him.

s

If the same

theory, there

Nevertheless it is an

That can only be because the

meaning of the sentence lies outside it, as its
reference.
To present relations" entails having those
relations
exist

—

but then they cannot not exist.

In fact two problems which occupied an overwhelming

amount of Wittgenstein'

s

time and interest can be traced

directly to this identification of meaning with reference.

These are the questions of the nature of negation and of
false sentences.
way.

Negation becomes a problem for him this

If meaning is reference, then what is referred to

by a negated assertion (and thereby said not to exist)

obviously somehow must exist if the sentence is meaningful.

Falsity is a problem for much the same reason.
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If meaning is reference, then
if the false sentence is
meaningful, it must have a reference.
Yet
this,

Wittgenstein's theory, is forbidden,

on

sentences are

false when and only when they
have no reference. As
we shall see below (Section
IIA), his theory of negation,
coupled with his concern with the
referent of a sentence,
is instrumental in his
affirmation of the existence of
negative facts.

D

We can demonstrate a weaker point, too,
about sen-

tences and reference, namely that,

reieience

(1)

an appropriate

is a sufficient condition for meaningfulness

of a sentence

,

and (2) reference is a necessary condition

for meaning.
(1)

That an appropriate reference is a sufficient

condition for a sentence's having meaning follows from
comments Wittgenstein makes about how sentences get

their meaning.

The earliest passages about this are*

A possible sign must also be capable of signifying.
Everything that is possible at all
is also legitimate.
Let us remember the explanation why "Socrates is Plato" is nonsense.
That is, because we have not made an arbitrary
specification, NOT 'because a sign is, shall we
say, illegitimate in itself, 13

Frege says: Every well-formed sentence must
make sense; and I sayj Every possible

s

,
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sentence is well-formed, and if it does not
make sense that can only come of our not
having given any meaning to certain of its
par us.
Even when we believe we have done so,

.

,
"

'

(ihese two passages are reflected in Tractatus
5.^73 and
5 .^ 733

,

respectively.)

meaningful but

i

Since,

in order to give a possibly

actually meaningless sentence meaning,

all we must do is to correlate the referenceless
elements

with some "arbitrary specification", reference is a sufficient condition of meaningfulness.

That reference is a necessary condition of

(2)

meaningfulness can be seen by examining Wittgenstein’
conception of the task of a sentence.
we put together things -- so to speak

"In the sentence

—

as an experi-

ment, as, however, they do not need to be related in

reality

.

.

.

This we can do "only because objects

are arbitrarily coordinated with its elements”. 1 ^

These

two quotations speak of sentences prior to a discussion
of their meaningfulness, truth,

or reference.

They des-

cribe simply what it is to be a sentence, and show that
that requires having a reference.

So a necessary con-

dition of being a sentence is having a reference.
E

Not only language and linguistic concerns offer us

evidence of Wittgenstein's identification of meaning

•

with reference.
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We can also see the position from
the

role he ascribes to philosophy,
the way philosophy is
supposed to fill the role it is to
play.
We have seen
that he rejects both Russell’s
and Moore's methods of
doing philosophy, but that he still
clings to some version -- his own
of analysis.
This begins with analysis through definitions.
In order for this kind of

analysis to achieve its goals, he claims, "the
chain of

definitions must indeed once have an end.
analysis finally "have an end"?

1,1 ^

Where must

"Analysis makes the

sentence more complicated than it was; but can and
may
not make it more complicated than its meaning

was to start with.
its meaning

(

(

Bedeutung

)

When the sentence is as complex as

Bedeutung

)

.

then it is entirely analyzed." 18

Philosophical analysis, in this version of it, presupposes
as an end, that poiiiu at which the sentence fully reflects
its meaning

(

Bedeutung

and no more so.

That,

)

by being just as complex as it,
of course,

entails that meaning

be something independent of the sentence, which the sen-

tence can match more closely, less closely, or not at
all,

in complexity.

II

The work in which Wittgenstein is involved in the
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N otebook s is predicated on
the belief that the meaning
of a sentence is its referent.

Yet that belief, like

his original insight into the
nature of logic, was more
problem than solution to him. We have
already glanced
at three of the issues it raised,
how can negation or
denial operate, how can a sentence be
false and yet
meaningful, and how can a sentence represent
relations

which do not exist.

Close to the last two was yet another

question.

Meaning must be independent of truth and falsity, yet how can it be, since meaningfulness
is reference? Reconciling the independence of cleaning
with the
referential view of meaning he held proved a challenging
task,

one which he did not complete until the final 1 ^

version we have of the Tractatus

.

The beginnings of the reconciliation do appear in
the Notebooks

,

of course.

They take the form' of a dis-

tinction between two types of reference which a sentence
may,

or perhaps must,

have.

Every meaningful sentence

certainly must have one reference, which
ence-^’

,

which serves as its meaning.

I

call "refer-

Perhaps every sen-

tence, but certainly every actually true or false sentence,

must have another reference, "reference^"

.

This second

reference, which is to the actual world, is what makes
the sentence true or false.

It is independent of the

.
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first reference.
In this section

I

shall examine reference^

The
examination falls into three
main divisions. The first
shows that there is such
a thing as the reference
of a
sentence which nevertheless
is not a part of the
actual
world.
In the second 1 examine the
development this
reference undergoes in Wittgenstein's
thought.
Here I
concentrate on two changes which
took place in the Notebooks.
The first chronicles the change
in ontological
status of negative facts, the second
the changes in the
ontological status of reference^^ itself,then,

third section,

in the

examine briefly the idea, from late
in
the Notebo oks, that the world is
somehow uniquely my own
world,
1 here I point out that his
idea is simply a
I

straightforward development of his earlier thought
on
reference
I

must make two warnings before

I

begin.

Wittgen-

stein does mention the picture theory in these
notebooks,
and even develops it to some degree.

In the subsequent

discussion (particularly in the first part) it may
often
seem clear that what is actually being discussed
is
that

theory, and that

I

am needlessly muddying the waters by

not directly saying so.

As

1

In fact that is not the case.

remarked earlier, the picture theory is not fully
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developed until the Tractates.

.

What we will see developed

in the No tebooks is a
,
proto-picture-theory, a line of

thought which will later cul
m inate in the picture theory,
but is not yet that far
advanced.
Furthermore, clarity of presentation
forces me to
oversimplify a little as I present
this theory.
I com-

pensate for this principally in the
second portion of
Section B. There, after we have first
developed the
rudiments of the theory, we have a chance
to stand back
and look at it from Wittgenstein's
point
of view,

to see

what he felt needed to be done with
it.
A

.Exploring the function or role of a sentence
led us
to the conclusion that meaning is
reference.
It leads

also to the conclusion that meaning is a
reference that
is independent of the actual world.

Three quotations

from the Notebooks will make that quite clear.
In the sentence a world is put together experimen21
tally. "
(1)

(2)

"In the sentence we put together things

—

so to

speak -- as an experiment, as they however do not have
to be related in reality." 22
(3)

"The sentence designs a world with the help of its

logical framework

....

•.

23
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Quotations (1) and
(2) belong together
the second developing
the first.
In the first „ittgenstein expresses the
idea that in a
sentence we put a
world together
experimentally
Thi<wo aao by putting
y
lnis we
words Which stand
for things together
experimentally in
a way in which the
things for which they
stand need not
he.
So we end up with two
independent worlds,
that put
together experimentally
in the sentence, and
the actual
world, which may or may
not be different.
Yet this so
far leaves the two
worlds at least possibly
connected in
this way,
the elements of one
(presumably, the actual
world) might be used to
build the other. The
total independence of one world from
the other still needs
to
be demonstrated.
‘

’

>

The third quotation begins
one demonstration of this.
From its central thought, that
of designing a world, come’
three arguments for the
independence of the

referem^

from the actual world.

The first of these is based
on

the notion of designing (k
qnstruieren )
a partial independence,

.

and shows only

though one greater than we have

yet seen,

Anscombe translated

rather than

designs".

"

koristruieren " as "constructs"

In fact it has a meaning midway

between the two English words; we
design/construct a
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world,

v/e

do so as,

e.g,

.

an architect plans
a house,

,

The architect (to use
Wittgenstein's vocabulary)
conducts a world, the house-plan.
In doing so. by means
of the logical structure
of those
plans, he is at the

same time designing a
house.

separate acts involved here

There are then not two

-

making or constructing the

Plans, and then realizing
that they do design a
house,
ty doing one we do the
other, it is, so to
speak,
one

act under two different
descriptions.
of course,

for language.

a world we design a world

The same is true,

In linguistically constructing

-

one act, two descriptions

Of it.

But if this is so, the design
itself must be independent of the designed. To deny
this would be tanta-

mount to claiming that we construct
a house in constructing the design of the house. Thus
the very notion of

design (Kon^truier^

Wittgenstein uses leads to the

conclusion that although the elements of
the design and
the designed may perhaps be of the
same world,
the ele-

ments of the design are not the elements
of that which
is designed.
(This is strengthened by the realization
that our two-dimensional sentences design the
three-

dimensional actual world.)
the design may

—

And that the elements of

or perhaps even must

—

be part of the
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same world as that of
the desip-n^n
<
signed is
a position Wittgenstein held even in the
Tractatue (see 4.0 ll,
3
and
2.141 pi us 3 3.14).
Nevertheless they equally
well
*ust be part of something
different, in Wittgenstein’s
terminology, a different
world.
,

A fourth quotation, however,
gives us sufficient
grounds to claim that
reference.,. must be of
a totally
different type from the actual
world.
(4) ..The sentence
is coordinated with a
hypothetical state-of -affairs.
This state- of-affairs is
given through its description." 24
The problems here stem from
the fact that, as the last
section showed, the sentence is
correlated with something, its reference, as its
meaning.
Here Wittgenstein
explicitly tells us that this reference
is not an actual
but a possible ("hypothetical")
state-of-affairs. What
exists in the actual world exists
actually, not hypothetically, but the reference of the
sentence is a hypothetical state-of-affairs. Wittgenstein
then reinforces
what he has said by telling us that we
do not experience
this state-of-affairs.
It is given to us through its
'

description

—

through the sentence.

Our conclusion then is that Wittgenstein*

s

theory

of what is involved in designing or modelling
the world

shows that he postulated the existence of a world
inde-

pendent of the actual, experienced world.

This world,
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which wc construct in
constructing the reference
of our
sentences, is coordinated with
them, not to make them
true or false, but simply
to make them meaningful.
Argu
ments based on two other
considerations lead us as well
to the total independence
of reference from the
actual
world.

The first of these is the relation
Wittgenstein
posits between meaningfulness on
the one hand and truth
and falsity on the other.
He develops three arguments
on this basis.
The first (which appears also in
the
Trac tab us) begins with what he claims
to be the prerequisites for being able to say anything at
all.
"in order to be able to make any statement at
all, we must

—

in one sense -- know how it would be
if the statement is

true (and this is precisely what we portray
(copy, abhi_ld^n)

.

"

Wittgenstein points out three things which

are necessary to make any statement at all.
is a sentence,

the second the thing which we represent

(copy or portray, abbilden )

.

i.e.,

the state of affairs

which exists if the statement is true.
course,

The first

The third,

of

is that we need to be able to understand the

second adequately, i.e,

with the actual world.

,

to really be able to compare it
If we deny that reference is

independent of the actual world, we are forced to admit
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one of two things.

We might he forced
to admit that
the referent is identical
with the actual world
but
then we are simply saying
that all sentences must
be
true, if they have any
reference at all. This>
as we
saw in the immediately
preceding section, Wittgenstein
rejects.
Or we might be forced
to claim that there simply is nothing literally to
compare with the actual world
as this quotation requires
us to.
Either way we violate
what Wittgenstein himself
says here (and often elsewhere
in the Notebooks
e.g., "it is clear that
the most
exact examination of the
sentence-sign can not yield
what it expresses
but indeed, what it can
express .") 26
The second argument on this
basis stems from Wittgenstein's use of 'Sinn’ and ' Bedeutung
the two words
he uses for 'meaning'.
Both, we have seen, mean also
'reference'.
If they mean reference to the
actual world,
however, Wittgenstein would be forced
to admit some undesirable conclusions. He would be forced
to conclude
that a sentence has meaning if and only
if it is true

-

-

-

'

(but he explicitly rejects this).

.

And he would be forced

into the position that the truth-value of
a sentence is
prior to its having meaning -- another conclusion
he

explicitly rejects,

Meaningfulness is independent of

truth or falsity, and since meaning is reference,
so is

™

,
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reference independent
of what actually
is the case
ThE
ar§Ument 1 WU1 S-e
to buttress my
conclu .
sion that, for
Wittpenstc n >, Q-Terence
is independent of
the actual world, is b
ased on the nature
of philosophical
(Wxttgensteinian) analysis.
I have argued
that meaning
must be reference for
him because as the
meant object
changes so changes (and
must change) the entire
form
of the sentence.
In the following
passage he clearly
separates the meant object
from the actual object
(in
terms of the example to
follow, the watch as I
mean it
from the watch actually
on the table )
.

-r

i

'

•

*

,

If

say for example,

I

this watch is not in
L0GICAL
FOLLOW
from
” that°°that
h
°h
ha
Wheel
whioh
is
in
the watch,
s not ? '+
is
the storage room, for
perhaus
I din
not know at all, that a wheel
was in the
ld th
al
not have meant
“
"this ’watch" °aa coraplex ?°
which the wheel
occwsTt?
a

t d

m

,

V

“

S

~

T

-

In other words, whatever object
to say,

^

m

I

mean (one is tempted

intend) may well not be like the
object in the

actual world which it is assumed
to resemble, for
not know the latter well enough to
mean

I

may

(intend) the

necessary parts.

This does not change the fact that
the

intended object is the reference of the
sentence, therefore the meaning.
Nor does it change the
fact that that

meaning is and must be complete, i.e.,
bestimmt
or definite.

It simply implies that,

.

sharp

for Wittgenstein,
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there is a realm of
meant or intended
intends objects
,
between
e sentence and
the actual world.
•

B

This talk,

m

the last paragraph,

of intensional
objects, a meant world
of hypothetical
states-of-affairs,
reaches beyond safe limits,
however.
Wittgenstein did
content with his theory
in such a simplistically
Platonic form.
It changed perceptibly,
and its change
03,1
S6en in thS IMobooks by
observing

^

Wittgenstein's

development of two problems,

that of negative facts,

and that of the relation
between sentences and
reference
1
The former occupied his
mind for a while but had
definitely ceased to bother him
by the Bemerkunaen
(traces of
it, mainly terminological,
remain in the Tractatus ). The
latter did not come to a
conclusion which really satisfied him until he worked out
the philosophy of his last
period.
Still, his struggles with it in
the Notebooks
are themselves very interesting,
and it is on their
basis that his method in his last
period is developed.

Wittgenstein's belief that meaning is
reference.^
early made negative facts attractive
to him.
Though he
himself gave no reasons for asserting
their
1.

existence,

one can easily see why he would
do so.

A straightforward

.
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or affirmative sentence
refers to a straightforward
fact
A sentence which contains
a negation then would
seem to
refer to a fact which
contains a negation
a negative

-

fact (this fits in with
his earl* theory of
logic,
as,
e.g.,
"Roughljr speaking,
before any sentence can
make
sense at all the logical
constants must have reference. ..28
This is naturally very different
from his later theory
of logic.)

That he simply accepted the
existence of such facts,
on an equal footing with
regular or positive facts, is
shown in several places in the
Notebooks
He comments,
e.g.:
"One could also present a negative
fact in a picture, in presenting what is not
the case." 29 Yet by the
time of the Tract atus nothing was
left of this acceptance but the use of the words "negative
Tatsache" (as
.

m

2.06).

He had by then come to reject the
existence

of a separate type of fact, negative
facts,
he continued to use the term.

even though

His reasons for rejecting

them form one of the clearest examples of
the development of his thought, and are of especial
importance in

understanding how he treated his identification of

meaning with reference.
He has three reasons for rejecting the actual ex-

istence of negative facts.

The first of them arises

,
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from his insight into the
nature of logic.
As we saw.
negative facts presuppose that
the negation sign represents. a position which he
first accepts and later rejects. as he realizes the
inconsistency of it with the
insight that logic must fend for
itself.
The negation
sign does not represent, it has
no reference.
If a negative fact is really negative (and
not just called that),
it must be a fact with negation,
so to speak, built into
it.
But this cannot be the case, if
logical constants
do indeed not represent or have any
reference.
Thus

Wittgenstein’s commitment to the independence
of logic
from ontological problems commits him to the

denial of

negative facts.
•

One reason explicitly stated in the Note
books sur-

vives into the Tract at us

.

His first statement of it isi

"In order for there to be the negative state-of-af fairs

there must be the picture of the positive.
is apparent,

Here, as

he still accepts the existence of negative

facts, but what he is beginning to realize (and what

appears again in Tractatus 5.5151) is that he has no

reason for doing so.

Everything one says, including

negative statements, is said using positive sentences
(or as in the passage above, positive pictures).

To

that all we need to add is the negation sign, which does
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not represent.

needed at all,

No new fact,

or new kind of fact,

.

is

(But of course,
Wittgenstein did not

reach this conclusion
immediately.

Three weeks later,

for example, he still
accepts the existence of
negative
facts, and is still bothered,
albeit unclearly, by this
same argument against them,
"Must the sign of the negative sentence be built with
that of the positive?
(I
thonk, yess'I) Why should
one not be able to express
the
negative proposition through a
negative fact ?.'")^ 1

These two arguments are reinforced
by an "insight"
into the way in which a sentence
is constructed.
He
expresses this perhaps most clearly ini

"The feared

dualism between positive and negative
does not exist,
for _(x)^x, etc,, etc. are neither
positive nor negative,

That is, according to this way of viewing
sentences, they are divided into two componentsi
a)
a

neutral central component which can be either
affirmed
or denied; b) an affirmation or denial,

i.e.,

an affirm-

ative or negative component.

This can perhaps best be clarified through an
example.
(i)

Consider the sentence

1

All knights wore shining armor.

Is it positive or negative?

"insight"; it is neutral.

Neither, according to this
(i)

becomes positive when
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amr,” ed

’

negatiVe

or denial is neither.
(ll)

denied

.

**

Prior to affirmation

Thus,

U

15 indeed the oase
that all knights wore
shining armor.
_

is positive and on
the theory of the
Notebooks has a
"positive fact" as its
reference.

Likewise,

(in)

It is not the case
that all knights wore

shining armor.
is negative.

It can also be said
to have a "negative

fact" for its meaning.

But the claim would no
longer

prove disturbing to Wittgenstein,
for "negative fact"
has become merely a convenient
way of speaking about a
fact (i.e., (i) ) which in
itself is neither positive
nor negative.
,

The struggle with negative facts
ends by reducing Wittgenstein* s ontology
sizeablyi
one entire type
of fact, negative facts, is
dismissed.
The problem of
the relation between reference,
and sentences, on the
2.

other hand (see above, p.
77), even throws into question the need he felt for a certain
kind of positive
fact.
In the course of his work in the
Notebooks Wittgenstein periodically questioned the existence
of that
kind of fact that made up reference^.
As I pointed out,
.

he did not pursue this line of thought
to its conclusion,
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but it is intriguing
to examine where
his work could
have led him.

At several points in
the Notebooks,
Wittgenstein
seems to speak as if
sentences lack a reference,.
That
is. he seems to claim
that there is nothing
which (a)
serves as the referent
for sentences, (b) exists
independently both of sentences
and of the world.
At those
points where he seems to
deny the existence of
reference
however, he does not simply
replace it with

reference^

^
and leave the
meaning-is-reference theory intact.
Rather, he joins reference,
to the sentence itself,
thus
in a way destroying the
sense of the very theory
with
which he had started. As he
says at one such point,
'

Tins theory treats of sentences
exclusively, so to
speak as their own world and
not in connection with
that which they present.
Although he does not explicitly reject reference, here
(indeed he still seems
to be committed to it, since
that which they present
(darstellen) would still have to be
independent of what
makes the sentence true or false), he
comes close

to it.

For if sentences can be treated so
radically "as their
own world”, there should be no need
for the middle
realm of reference to give them meaning.
JL

Wittgenstein even gives a clear indication of how

I
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the sentences would
have (or gain) meaning
under this
»
new theory.
T he reality, which
corresponds to the
sense of the sentence,
can indeed not be
anything else
hut its elements, for
everything else indeed
we do not
know."
The sentence, then, must
somehow be its own
meaning.
This, of course, foreshadows
luiebnaaows the
thr course Wittgenstein took later, first
in his Blue and Brown
and then in the
ghUogoBhloal. nvestigations and
a
as to one thread of
continuity amongst all his
works,
the slow development of
meaning from referenee
1
to the use of sentences
alone.
'

*

,

.Be that as it may, neither
the Tractatus nor the

No tebook s does more than merely
hint at such a course.
In these earlier works the
conclusion of his thought
was quite different.
For both developed the position

Wittgenstein called "solipsistic"
world alone.

i

the world is my

Indeed, most of the last 21 pages of
the

Notebooks proper are devoted to an exposition
of this
theme and its ramifications.
That the world is my world seems a very
puzzling

thing for Wittgenstein to maintain, at first
glance.
For one expects that what is my own is somehow
subject
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to my own control,

obedient to my own will
or power.
Yet in the very passages
where he presents his
doctrine,
Wittgenstein stubbornly refuses
to lose track of
the
fact that the "world is
independent of my will-,35
or>
as he puts it a little
later, "the world is
givln to
me, that is, my will
approaches the world entirely
from
outside, as something finished. "3 6
In view of these
passages and those like them,
it seems clear that we
are the world’s, not the
world ours: how does Wittgenstein manage to reverse things?
’

The clue lies in one of the
most famous passages he
ever wrote.
"Die Grenz en meiner Sprache
bedeuten die
Grenzen meiner Welt. "37 The world
which ig mine g
world of my language
my sentences together with
their
reference-^ their meanings.
Another way to phrase this,
and a very important one is this.
The world is mine,

^

.

—

insofar as
struiLer^n)

I

construct for it a plan, as

it.

This

I

I

design

can do only in language.

(

kon -

It is

reference^ which is most properly called my
world, for
the actual world, which makes my sentences
true

or false,

is independent of me and therefore is
not mine.

Perhaps the first question faced by any theory
embracing a non-actual world (or at least, non-actual
ob-

jects)

is "Where is it?"

Plato of course faced this
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question, as far as we can
tell without giving
more than
a highly symbolic
answer.
Meinong did i argely the
same>
Wittgenstein, perhaps alone
in philosophy, provides
an
explicit non-symbolic answer
for it, one which he
develops more in the Tractatus
than in the Notebooks
Sentences and the world of
reference (so goes the limited
answer in the portion of his
notebooks we have) are
found in logical space.
"The logical framework
around
the picture (of the sentence)
determines the logical
38
space."
Any sentence must determine
a place in logical space. -"In order for a
statement to be possible,
the logical coordinates must
really determine a logical
place u ^9
.

,

logical space is a complex one,
which
develop more fully when considering
the Tractatus
•

I

.

Here what we see is that it, like
sentences themselves,
is made of two elements, one
constituted by the sentence,
the other by logic.
This is implied in the first passage quoted above, and more explicitly
stated ini
"What
the devil is this “logical place"?
The sentence and the

logical coordinates, that is the logical
place.

in

logical space as a whole the sentence picks out
coordinates, creating a logical place.
(Wittgenstein does
not explain what he means by these 'coordinates'

in the

,
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Notebooks,

that too is left for the
Tractatus

.

S o my
)
world, the one governed by
my sentences, is in
some
Place in logical space, and
it is the sentences
(i.e.,
the meaningful sentences)
which carry in themselves
the
coordinates necessary to make up
logical places.
.

Another question which always
rears its ugly head
for abstract-object theorists
is that of the relation
between the abstract world and
the actual concrete world.
To this, too, Plato seems to
have given no viable answer
at least if we trust Aristotle's
criticism of the choris mos or gulf between the two realms.
Wittgenstein,
how-

ever,

for whom the problem seems more
complex to start’

with, did.

The problem is more complex in his
philosophy

because it is double.

Not only must he relate the ab-

stract world to the actual one, but,
within the abstract
world itself, he must relate one segment,
sentences, to
a segment of a different type, reference^

Here again,

what he does in the Notebooks is somewhat
different

from what he does in the Tractatus
section,

on referenceg,

.

And since the next

concerns relating meaningful

sentences to the actual world,

I

shall here briefly con-

cern myself only with the relation between sentences and
reference-.

His solution seems simple.

Sentences are related

.
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to their reference,
through the logical
identity of the
”'
tW0
I he
l0gi ° al ider“tity of
symbo i and
'

symbolized
\
consists of this, that
one may get no more
and no less
the SyMb01 than in
symbolized
De spite doubts
(Page 19. for example)
and some changes
(see also page
19)
this answer remains
fundamentally the same through-

"

,

out Wittgenstein’s early
works.

The chorismos with which

Aristotle faulted Plato is
avoided by the claim that
the
sentence and its reference,
are logically identical,
in
some manner! that is, they
have the same logical form
(as Wittgenstein puts it in
the Tractatus)
This does
not mean that a sentence and
its meaning are, strictly
speaking, the same thing.
As two things, a sentence and
its meaning are nevertheless
in some way identical.
In
what way? This remains a mystery
in the Notebooks
.

,

though, as

I

shall show in Part II, Chapter

V,

Wittgen-

stein could answer the question.
III

Wittgenstein himself suspected that the
nature of
truth and falsity was very closely related
to his work
on reference^ or meaning:
"In the sentence a world is
put together experimentally.

(...)

From that the

essence of truth must follow immediately (if

I

were not
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blind)
is

^

'"

.

o
I

HiS suspicion proved
true.

Just as meaning

reference^ so the truth-value
of a sentence is deter-

mined by reference

-

but a different reference,
a reference to the external world.
It is precisely the
same
sort of relation as that
obtaining between the sentence
and its reference^
The most important difference
between the two is that in each
case the objects to which
the sentence is related are
different. The similarity
of the relations makes them
easily confused, as Wittgenstein himself acknowledges.
"We readily confuse the rep-

resenting relation which the proposition
has to its refer
ence, and the truth relation.
The former is different
for different propositions, the
latter is
one and the

same for all propositions."^

However such the former

may change while the latter are unable
to, they remain
essentially the same kind of relation.
It would be useless repetition to show
here that

the truth-relation is really different from
reference^
the meaning-relation.

We have seen this clearly sup-

ported in the section in which
tence of reference-^

I

established the exis-

The arguments lead Wittgenstein

to a conclusion which, by itself,

sounds unexcitingi

"Truth is only the actual existence (Bestehen) of a
44
relation."
This is why, while the meaning relation
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changes from sentence to sentence,
the truth-relation
stays the same for all sentences,
and why, too, the truth
relation as it is in the Tr^ctatus
is, in a sense, simple
and inexpressible. We can
express any relation

—

but

the truth-relation is precisely
not a different relation
from the one we express.
It is a relation which we
find

not only in our thought but
actually in thw world as well

Another way of expressing this (one
closer to Kant’s) is
that in saying of a relation that
it is true, we add

nothing to

it,

change it in no way.

truth should be stated asi

If the problem of

what kind of relation do

true sentences have to the world that
false ones lack,
then the problem of truth vanishes from
the Notebooks
.

We saw that Wittgenstein slowly moves away from
the
theory that the meaning of a sentence is its
;

reference,

though he does not complete the move until well after
he wrote the Trac tatus

.

Here we see a parallel move,

involving truth rather than meaning.

Truth is no longer

any relation, not even that of correspondence.
the bestehen of a relation,

of any relation*

It is

and the

bestehen of a relation is not a new relation.
So the first move Wittgenstein makes to avoid chor -

ismos between the abstract and the non-abstract

—

in terms more suitable to Wittgenstein’s philosophy

or,

—
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between reference-, and
reference
It:enc e
1
2
they are different sorts

—

of things,

.

h
i c
*
is
to deny
that

m

a sense he even
denies that there is
anything to be different,
truth,
as a special relation,
does not exist. The
same relation, any relation, may
be true (bestehend)
or not (nieht
bestehend
But what Xb
is xnis
thic? i'c
or,-^u
Bestehen
emer Relation",
or actual existence of a
relation? Is it not simply
another word or phrase under
which the same old difficulty, the same chorismos,
subtly reoccurs? Does this
theory not leave the relation
between our sentences and
that which makes them true
quite as mysterious
)

.

as it
was, giving only a surface
appearance of clearing the
mystery up?
,

•

It WOuld d0 Precisely that if
Wittgenstein were

trying to smuggle in a new kind of
relation under the
term bes_tehen.
He is not*
instead, the picture theory,
with its reliance on the notion of
identity of logical
form between the referring and the referred
to

takes its

place.

(And identity is not relational as far
as Witt-

genstein is concerned.)

Because the picture theory is

so prominant in the Tractatus

.

the temptation to think

that he is developing a theory of reference is
less there

than in the

N

otebooks

.

In the earlier work he is just

developing his theory and the terminology he needs to
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express it, his thought
is
of truth and confusion

cXo„ r

is easier.

to a

.

relation^ theory

The first step of his

development is the conclusion
that reference is not
a
unique act or thing, hut
that

it is of the same
type as

meaning.

Instead of needing and
developing both a theory
of reference and a theory
of meaning, Wittgenstein
relies
on the latter alone.
The former is then
replaced by his
answer to the question,
What is it to mean truly?
This
too conflicts with the
theory that meaning is
reference
but is only resolved much
later.

-

To the question, “What is
it to mean truly?" Wittgenstein might well reply as
follows.
To mean something
is to say something.
What we say is the meaning of
our
sentence.
Thus saying (sagen, aussagen
ausdruecken
,

)

is

the linguistic presentation of
the linguistic world (that
of reference^)
But we accomplish more in or by
saying
.

something than merely presenting an
item from the linguistic world (merely accomplishing
a reference-^.
Even
to be able to say something, we must
know what the world
will be like if that statement is true 45
But obviously
I cannot say that!
my saying anything at all presupposes
.

it.

I

do not say it,

I

show it.

Showing

(

zeigen

)

is

thus the presentation by the linguistic world
of what
lies beyond it.

Of particular concern here are objects.

,
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can, as Wittgenstein says
at one point, 46 talk about
(s£rechen von) them, but I cannot

I

express

them,

(

aussprechen )

can and do express, or say,
what I mean, i.e.,
the reference^.
By doing so I show what the
objects
must be like, if my saying is
true, and I do so through
the logical form of what I can
say.
When 1 also find
precisely that logical form in the
actual world, 1 can
say, e.g.
the relation is true, it actually
exists, es
besteht
I

.

Thus Wittgenstein manages to avoid
any difficulties,
which might arise if there were a gulf
between two worlds
here,
Sentences with their meanings (reference-^
,

one hand,

and non-linguistic facts in the
actual world,

on the other,
i

*

e

•

*

on the

have

are all facts which can share logical
form,

'the

same logical form.

Both, however,

exist;

the important difference between them (in this
context)
is that we can say

(

aussprechen

.

sagen ) our sentences

with their meanings, but not non-linguistic facts.

The

sentences show us what extra-linguistic facts can be like
(and hence are said to design a world), through showing

us

(

ze

igen

)

a logical form.

When and if we recognize

that form in the actual world, we can say the form also

exists actually

,

es besteht

.

The difficulty vanishes,

and we see that the theory does not amount to simply
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another phrase under
which the
thp
.

-Li

<>
sarae

.

Problem sneaks back

1 #

As this last
paragraph points out,
sentences with
etm * neS ar ° alS °
fa ° tS
Their facticity
(which
will b 0 dlscu ssed
again in the next
ext chapter)
puzzled
...
Wittgenstein, for fart
acts (or, more
broadly, things in
general) just do not
have many of the
properties that
sentences have.
For example, it makes
perfectly good
negate a sentence, but
it seems to be
nonsense
to speak of negating
a picture.
Yet on his theory
sentences are pictures,
how can it be that
it makes sense
to negate them, as
it must?
-

\

<5

To this

Will indicate only
the beginning of wittStem s reply. The oddities
of sentences make
sense
and are possible because
of the fact that they
are made
up of two parts, as it
were.
That is, Wittgenstein believed that every sentence
is built of two elements
disfunction.
The first of these we
may call
I

the

Picturing, the second the
affirming, function.
We have already seen briefly
what I here call the
Picturing function of the sentence,
Wittgenstein calls
it the Urbild (proto-picture).
It alone is not a sentence foi one reason,
it is neither true nor
false as
it stands.
Nevertheless it does, as we have
seen, have
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the form of a sentence.

To paraphrase this,

.

merely

looking at what we suppose to be
a sentence cannot tell
us if it is a sentence or the
proto-picture of

a sentence.
But the proto-picture cannot
be negated or affirmed, as
it stands, and in that is
more like regular pictures, it
is, like a painting, merely
what it is, and does not push
beyond itself as sentences do.

In part the proto-picture is a
linguistic entity.

Wittgenstein speaks of the proto-picture
as occuring in
a sentences

occur

m

''Although all logical constants already

the simple sentence,

its own proto-picture must

also occur in it entire and unanalyzed.

And laters’

"In the sentence we place a proto-picture onto
reality.

" /|8

Since the proto-picture is a linguistic entity
it can be

spoken (aus gesagt ) and become part of a sentence.
is accomplished by what

tion,

I

have called the affirming func-

i.e., the activity of saying a given Urbild

it it adds one important things

way things are.

That

it says,

.

To

this is the

With that simple addition, the proto-

picture, without changing its visible (i.e., written or
audible, etc.) form, becomes a sentence.
This, however, reflects back on the distinction

between showing and saying, as
far.

I

have developed it so

It points out quite clearly that something is

,
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lacking in my presentation
of
a 1X
it
speak,

an

*

.

w
n
WeB can only
say, or

Wild,

for it is a linguistic
entity, as is
shown by its having the
form of a sentence 4 ?
and because it can be spoken or
said, it must show
something
which cannot be said, namely
its logical form.
Earlier
it seemed that the full
answer to the problem of
truth
and falsity lay in that
simple thought, and that the
idea of truth as a relation
could be replaced satisfactorily by that of the identity
of logical forms.
Now
we can see that that is not
entirely true (at least, not
for Wittgenstein's theory).
The proto-picture must have
the same logical form as that
which will make it, when
turned into a sentence, true.
But it, nevertheless,
cannot be true or false. The problem
of truth, the prob
lem of meaning truly, requires
something more to answer
it than the logical identity of
forms.
It is at this point that the analysis
in the Notebooks

breaks off, though Wittgenstein carries it
further in the
Tract at us. The attempt to explain how we can
say true

things about the world, without recourse to
the notion
of referring, brought Wittgenstein to the
distinction

between showing and saying.

We may say sentences, but

not the facts of the actual world which make them
true,

yet both sentences and actual facts can show the same
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logical form.

Yet to say this is still
not enough, for
statements can purposefully
be said and yet not
have any
relation at all to the actual
world, have no concern with
truth or falsity (as, e.g.,
an assumption in a logic
problem).
Wittgenstein would hold that
such a statement
would not be a genuine
sentence, something must be
added
to it to make it one, and
thereby able to be true or
false.
What is added to them we will
see first in the
Tractatus.
Until then, the problem of how
we can mean
something truly must remain in
its present unsatisfactory
state.

IV

.

My goal in this chapter has been
simple

to take

j

Wittgenstein up to the point where he can
develop his
ontology within the confines of his method

and the stric-

tures he establishes in the Notebooks

.

This

I

have done.

After showing how the independence of logic
is guaranteed (and thus introducing his first stricture,
that

logic cannot be used to solve ontological
problems)

I

considered language.

Language too must fend for itself

(a second stricture);

that it can do so is guaranteed in

the Notebooks through the use of reference^ a reference

separate from the actually experienced world, as meaning.
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This leads to the conclusion
that the world is my
world
and the problem of
relating my world to the
world in
general, to the actual world.
Wittgenstein accomplishes
this relation by using
reference,,
and at the same time
shows, without, it seems,
being explicitly aware of

-

it,

that he no longer has any
need of a theory of referencl
at all, if this theory is
viable.
But it, as it stands,
has genuine weaknesses which
he does not correct.
Overlooking these, however, Wittgenstein
can at last allowhimself to work on the genuine
problems of philosophy,
those of ontology.
For while logic, language and
reality
may be independent of each other,
may each have to care
for itself, the last two at least
are able to show the
same thing, the same logical form.

,,,,,
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CHAPTER

VI

OBJECTS

The genuinely philosophical
questions are the
metaphysical and, particularly,
the ontological questions
such in brief is
Wittgenstein's position in
the Notebooks (and in
the Tractatus. as well).
However
genuine and philosophical
these questions might
seem to
him, his approach to
philosophy, bordered with
the many
stringent requirements we
have seen, left precisely
these
ontological problems in limbo,
without any apparent way
to find answers for them.
Not only did there seem
to
be no convincing way to
answer them, as was also the
case with Russell's philosophy,
but they seemed to lack
even the necessary
prerequisites of receiving an answer,
for they seemed to be nonsense.
Thus one of the first
questions Wittgenstein faced was how
to make sense of
them*

-

'

philosophical

question
namelv th?e
ly
this one
is a point
our field of vision
simple, object, a thing? Up till now
I have
§
always viewed such questions as the
genuinely
philosophical ones -- and that is indeed
what
they are, in a sense
but once more, what evidence could decide such a question?!

m

1

.

.

.

—

And this same doubt is reflected many
times throughout
the No tebooks
"The expression, "not further analysable"
t°° is one of those which, together with
"function",
t

!

,
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thing"

,

etc.

.

are on the Index",*
and even later>

„ Again
and again the question
seems to make sense,
Are there
simple things? And
yet this question
simply must be
senseless

By the time he
compiled the Tractates
from his
earlier notebooks, he had
settled these differences,
he
knew how to ask ontological
questions and how to answer
them.
In the Not ebooks he
is simply in the
process of
working out justification
for his procedures, a
justification which cannot simply
be shrugged off as
Russell
tried ten

r

all

witJ

t

•

13 the fact

^t,

after

What Cannot be
thus suggestsceptical
reader
that
possibly
thfr may \be some
..there
loophole through a hierarchy
languages, or by some other
exit
The
whoie subject of ethics, for
exampl^, is
placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in
the mystical
mexpressable region. Nevertheless^
he is
capable of conveying his ethical
opinions.^
That he was “capable of conveying
his ethical opinions"
was certainly true and acknowledged
by Wittgenstein;

tl

'

t0 xh€

1

>

’

it

did not serve as a "loophole" (or
the sign of one) but
was fully explained by his theory.
One is even justified,
in view of what we have seen so far,
in reading the Tractahius as,

in part at least,

tify this, and, e.g.

precisely the attempt to jus-

the third passage above as asking
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thS qU6Sti0n!

h ° W iS

* **

.

one can convey

Ms ethical
opinions when the sentences
conveying them are and
must
be nonsense?
His answer was known to,
but not appreciated by,
Russell and is recognized
by most other
commentators on
the gra ctatus
we convey those
opinions in nonsensical
sentences which show what
they cannot say.
But Russell
found that answer
unsatisfactory
and so did Wittgenstein, at first.
It posed a question
to him as great as
that which it served to
answer,
concluding the second
quotation above he writes,
\
how will that
,

-

m

.

.

be shown,

which we wish to express through
it?" We show what we
cannot say
but how in the world do we
manage to show
anything? The genuine problem
of ontology, as Wittgenstein sees it, is not found in
a question such as "What
exists?" or "Are there simple
objects?" (although he answers these questions, too).
It is rather.
"How is it
that we can understand, and be
understood, when making
nonsensical statements about objects?"
The most pressing metaphysical question is therefore
not strictly
metaphysical, but transcendental.

-

Although this

is,

so to speak,

his root question,

he does not answer it explicitly, but
rather through

the way in which he answers the more concrete
questions
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also asks.

.

After our immediately
preceding examinatl0n ° f hiS thSOrieS °
f
and language. we can
easily
foreshadow his answer to
his basic question.
There is
no way at all in the
world by which we can
show what
cannot be said.
Showing, in this sense,
literally takes
Place out of the world.
What is shown, in other

^

words,

is shown transcendentally

,

and for Wittgenstein as
for'

Kant, transcendental
statements literally are
nonsense.
It is (if I may anticipate
something which becomes clear
only later, in the Tractatus)
precisely because these
statements are nonsensical that
they are able to serve
as means to ease our discomforts
about ontology.
Non .

transcendental arguments simply
add to our original discomfort because, even if they
seem reasonable or sensible,
they are not.
So in examining the arguments
Wittgenstein
educes in this field
particularly concerning the muchdiscussed one of the nature of objects
I shall direct
my attention to the transcendental
arguments

—

—

he constructs.

Thus my work here may well look even
less like traditional interpretations of the Tractatus
than what I
have done

before.

At least,

virtue

it is precisely the kind of nonsense
Wittgen-

i

stein wrote.

if it is not traditional,

it has this

.

107

.

Before actually examining
the arguments, we
will
look at how he uses two
of their key terms,
"thing"
(or "object"
"Objekt", "Ding" or
"gegenstand" ) and
"simple".
The more approachable
of them is "object",
so I shall begin with
it.

-

In his early thought
in the Tr actatus

—

-

and, as

1

shall show later,

the words "thing" or
"object" refer

to three fundamentally
different types of object.
5
The
.difference in reference is,
however, systematic, and
one can distinguish three
fundamentally different uses
for the words, each of which
is exclusive of the other
two.
The first two are given us
in a contrast between

what Wittgenstein might well
have called 'scientific objects’ and ordinary objects.
The distinction is made
quite clearly in the followingi
Yes, the mathematical sciences
differentiate
Ve
;f>rorn
non-mathematical
in this
+
?
that the former
treat of things about which
the ordinary language does not talk,
while the
abou1; things that are generally

,“

known^^^

This contrast, though it appears again
in the Tractat us
is not developed further in the Notebooks
He speaks of
.
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it explicitly in
fact in only one
other
her P lace ,(pages 66
67), and has nothing
decisive to say about
it there,
elther
1 WlU f ° ll0W
M, in
^ant attention to

m

‘

•L

o

\

Wing

f

The third kind of
object
J0ct (or
(° r third use for
the word
"
3eCt
alS ° b6St tbtroduced
through a contrasting
Pair, though it is harder
to pin a name to.
On the one
side of the contrast
stand ordinary objects
again; on
the other stand simple
objects.
Under the rubric "ordinary objects" Wittgenstein
understands a vast array
of things
everything, in fact, which
has ever been
or could ever be called
an "object"
ujecx
Complex spatial
things,
relations and characteristics
or qualities
(e.g
•Eigenschaf^. which can mean
8
both ), even the
movement of physical objects, 9
can all be called "thing"
and, he often affirms
are really things.
Of the last
case, in which he claims we
are entitled to say that
the
motion of an object is also
itself an object, he has an
interesting comment,
"Here it seems clear to me,
that
in this reification
nothing else is
present but a logical manipulation
the possibility
of which, at any rate, could
be highly significant."

^

-

•

;

,

,

-

(Vej^g^

—

What he is saying here is this.

Our ability to

reify or to accomplish this Verdinglichung
is most
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important

-

.

and also entirely
unlisted.

Absolutely
anything can be made,
or seen as, a thing
or object,
and it is never
wrens to do so, any
putative object
is indeed an object.
But our very ability
to do this
is founded on
"nothing but aa logical
manipulation", not
an ontological
characteristic
eris bic of the
tto objects
k(processes,
thoughts, etc.) themselves.
That is to say, we
manipulate these things into
being objects not
because of what
they are, but because
of what we are and
can do.
t

,

That any complex object
has its status as an
object
as the result of such
a manipulation can
easily be seen
the fact that we can
equally well deny that it
is an
object
(Here the word "manipulationshould

m

.

not be

taken in a negative or
perjorative sense, or to imply
that the results of such are
not really what they seem
to be.
As I have just stated, and
as becomes clearer
throughout this section, they are
really objects
the

—

only objects,

in fact, which we have in
our experience.)

On the other hand, there are
objects which have that
status even without our manipulation.
These are the
simple things or objects, the
existence and simplicity
of which Wittgenstein makes so
much effort to prove. We
can, and often indeed do, identify
them with the other
kinds of objects, with either ordinary
objects or

'

»
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scientific ones

Thn<^
inus

,

.

for example

it seems to me
entirely pos^ibln +\
th t s P ecks
in our field of
^
vision ainl
i’
le
ob Jects, particularly since we never
i)P r!!lve a single one
ol these specks
?
seoara+niv
Of stars even seem
1068
*.

certa^'to'brsiSpl^lO

Yet all such identification
he ultimately
rejects, hecause of the nature of
simplicity.
B

All of these share the
name of "object" or
"thing”.
To some it belongs, as it
were, intrinsically,
apart
from anything we might do
to give it to them
(the simple
objects), to others it belongs
as the result of a native
and highly important human
faculty (all complex

objects),
and to some amongst these
it is given as a result
of
highly complex theories
(scientific objects),
view
of this difference in
reference, a question naturally
arises,
is there a basic sense to
the word "object"
which makes this variety of uses
philosophically significant (unlike e.g.
the ambiguity of the word
'division')?
Or is it unimportant
or is it, perhaps, to borrow
a
phrase from Wittgenstein's later thought,
merely the result of family resemblances amongst
the terms, but without any common core sense to them
all?

m

,

—

There is indeed more than a family
resemblance
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.

amongst these various
uses of tho
Uses
the word "object"
here.
_

^
r
'

-*

-

concept o, the object
m
h
me
best one could sav
it means,
y is,
m+u
ich lo (or appears
to be) given",
that which is
or appears to be
independent of our will.
The world Qf
course, not only
appears to be but is>
(Gegenstands)).
.

,

.

u

"- 11

.

,

independ(;nt

ur will,

^

as we will see more
in detail shortly,
"object"
by itself picks out
that which
appears tQ be g vgn
as independent, while
"simple object", the
object which
Ires outside any possible
description we could give
it.
Picks out that which is
really independent of
our wills'.
fojec", again, in all
three cases, refers
to that
which is, or is assumed
to be
theorv
uneory Car,(description- or
language-) independent,
and free of our will.
.

.

There is a problem involved
with his notion of an
object, of which Wittgenstein
seems to be unaware
that
is, he is unaware of it
as a problem.
We ordinarily say
we can and do learn about
ordinary objects.
If (to anticipate the example in the
forthcoming quotation) we do
not know what watches contain
springs (or that a certain
watch does), we would say that
we can learn that it does
indeed contain a spring.
The object itself remains
one
and the same, despite the
change in our knowledge of it.

-
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For Wittgenstein this
is by no means
clearly the case,
S

roL^t

^

thi " "<*<*
not *”in he ^storage
ily LOGICALLY FOLLOW
which is in the watch,from that that a " heel
is not
the st °rage
room, for I perhao- dirt
f
^11, that
there was a wheel in thn
&nd
C0 ld
not have meant by "this
watch" 'n complex Vin
which the wheel occurs?12
-t

in^ f TT'
*

~

If we take this suggestion
seriously, each time we
learn
or forget something about
an object, or each time
the object itself changes in such
a way as to change what
we

think of it, it ceases to
exist, and we are faced
with
a new object.
Taken to its logical
conclusion, this
line of thought leaves us with
a thoroughly Heraclitean
ontology, but one with a new
twist,
it involves only
objects of the first two types,
of ordinary languages
and scientific theories.
Real objects in the actual
world, being totally independent
of us to start with,
would not be affected by it.
'

And,

so far as

I

can see, Wittgenstein develops no

way out of this puzzle, at least in
the extant notebooks.
Perhaps because he did not explicitly
recognize this as
a difficulty, he provided no explicit
solution.
At any
rate, the important case in both the
Notebooks
and the

—

Tractatu s is that of simple objects
which really are theory-independent

.

those objects
Once we have

understood that Wittgenstein is using "object" in this
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way. much of wha t
he says becomes
much more clear
gain, for example,
a definition of »
s i rap
city

u

..

.

We

u

lg

that which is literally
not describable,
because it necessarily lies oulsidc
any
posaib'i^ conceptual
y Possible
scheme.
Ordinary objects are
simple
Pie too,
too in a sense
(and Wittgenstein often reminds us
of this)
u
in +
in
the
sense that they
are, so to speak, the
last outreaches
itdcnes oi
of +the
h
conceptua]
scheme within which they
are objects, they lie
precisely
at the point where
the conceptual scheme,
reaching out
to the world, vanishoo
T
+„
ishes.
its
composition ( Zusammenset?un£) becomes entirely
Indifferent.
It disappears from
our eyes.'
The complexity of
ordinary
-

,

—

-

i.

.

.

from our eyes; actual
n mi nAl „
object*jecio, r
,
genuinely
simple
objects,
never had that complexity
to begin with.
«

.

Another point that becomes
more clear now is a different side to Wittgenstein's
transcendentalism. Since
genuinely simple objects must lie
outside any possible
conceptual scheme, and can not be
described in it, how
can one talk about them? Again,
one simply cannot.
We
know that there are simple objects
(for we know that the
world is independent of our wills)
but we know equally
well that it is nonsense to say that
there are, because
of the nature of simplicity 14
The only way we can talk
of or argue about them is the way
which avows nonsense
.

,

.
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(as Wittgenstein did
in the Tractatus)

,

.

.

transcendental

"Thus,. although a turn
of speech is nonsense
(unsinnig)
one can indeed still
15
use
it

••

•

•

•

•

There are times in the
N otebooks when
objectclearly refers to only one
of these three types
of objects, and there are many
other occasions in which
Wittgenstein himself seems
unclear about which reference
•

is

intended,

On page 6?,

e.g.

,

he writesi

"The analysis

of bodies into material
£oints, aS we have it in
physics,
is nothing more than the
analysis into simple elements ."

Here he clearly means a
theory-dependent sense of "simple".
Whereas on page 69
"The simple sign is essentially
sim£lc.
It functions as a simple
object ( Gegenstand 1
(What does that mean?)
Its complexity ( Zusammensetzunv l
becomes entirely jji^ferent.
It disappears from our
eyes." A confusion he felt between
two unclarified
senses is apparent, as it also clearly
is in a slightly
earlier passage:
,

Wh a t is my basic thought, when
I talk about
the simpie objects 7 In the final
analysis,
do not
put-together objects' suffice precisely for the requirement, that I
apparently
piace on the others? If I give this
book a
name N and talk then of N, is not the
re^
put-together object', to
that form and content, essentially the
same
as 1 thought only between name and
obiect
J
16
( Gegenstand )?
*

11 5.

The unrecognized
complexity of the phrase
••simple
object in the Tr a c tate
s has done much
harm to discussions of Wittgenstein'
s ontology there.
Having seen it
clearly in this earlier
work, we will be better
prepared
to find and compensate
for it in the later.
Now, however, we will turn to
the arguments he
advances in the
I!2iebooks specifically for
the existence of genuinely
simple objects. These
arguments, as one could
expect,
break into two parts, and
Wittgenstein often handles
each independently.
The first we can treat
as assuming
that there are objects of
the third kind, i. e
., in the
actual world and not dependent
on our conceiving

of them.

These arguments then show that
those objects must be simple., Then there are arguments
of a second kind which
actually attempt to prove that
there are objects independent of our conceptual schemes.
The most striking of
these, as Black pointed out, 17 is
the argument from the
definiteness of what we mean, an argument
which demonstrates both that there are objects
independent
of our

languages and that these objects are simple.
also,

There are.

three other proofs of the existence of these
objects.

The natural order for me to take would of
course be
to prove first that there are objects
independent of our

conceiving of them, and then prove that these objects

,

^
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SlmPle

‘

1

.

reVerse this ^der.

My primary reason
for doing SO is that
the argument from
definiteness of
-nse is by far the longest
and most complex
argument I
shall have to deal with,
and it is both easier
and more
intelligible if presented
after, and therefore
with the
basis of, the others.
And for the saKe
sale of onh
cohesiveness,
the other arguments
for the existence of
objects are
left until that point.
•

II

A

The preceding section
already hints at several
arguments for the simplicity
of actual objects.
Here I
shall review one of them to
make it more clear, more cogent, as the first argument
in this section.
To begin
it clearly, we need two
premises*
1.

(i)

The world is independent of my
will, and

(ii) Language (i. e
sentences with their meanings)
^
is dependent on my will,
.

That Wittgenstein actually holds both
of these should be
clear by now.
The first one he states directly,
"The

world is independent of my will." 18

And the second,

that language is dependent on my will
is clear now from
the arguments advanced in the second
chapter.
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That the world is
independent of one's will
means
that one cannot effect
a change in it
simply by willing
that change.
Objects and events or
occurences in the
actual world (assuming
there
16 are
c>
arc such ) are what
they are
whether we will them to
be or not.
objects, however
which gain their object-status
through our language or
theory
through, in general,
general
rri
a given
conceptual scheme
are dependent on our
will for their object-status,
for
by deciding to change
our w ay of seeing them,
we can
change what they are. Thus
only language-dependent

—

objects can be described in
language; real objects cannot
be described (as they really
are ) in any language or
given through any conceptual
scheme.

^P e

0j

-

argument reminds one strongly
of what

Kant says about the "Ding an
Sich" in the Critique of
Pure Reason.
it is open, too, to the
same kind of objections.
That such objects cannot be
described in
language does not entail that they
are simple.
The argu
ment needs something more, something
to the effect that
all qualities are indeed
language-dependent.
In Kant's
version of the argument it seems that this
premise, or
one like it,

however,

is sometimes simply assumed.

Wittgenstein,

explicitly states precisely what is needed.

That is, he supplies us with an argument that
all

i
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qualities are language-dependent.
types stand in hierarchies.

.

"And one can say, all

And the hierarchy is
possible

only through being built up
(den Aufbau )
through the
operation.
(...) The hierarchies are and must
be
1
independent of reality." ? A11
types> then> anything
which is a type, whether of
color, sound, shape, etc.,
"stand in hierarchies" which
"are and must be independent
of reality
They exist because we bring
their, into existence, because we perform the
operations from which their
existence arises and on which it
depends.
But since all
types depend on our will, the
objects which really exist
independently of our conceptual schemes
(and thus of our
wills) can have no traits, no
characteristics. They
must therefore be of no type whatsoever.
To say they
are of any type, to attribute any
quality to them, is
,

.

nonsense.

The only thing we can say of them isi

they

are simple (and this is not to type them
but to declare

their independence of any types).

For any form of com-

plexity leads us right back into the hierarchies
and
"types

01

our conceptual schemes or languages.

To sum up this argument briefly
(i)

The world is independent of my will.

(ii) Language is dependent on my will.
(

iii) Therefore linguistic objects and actual
objects, if any such exist, are different.

i
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(iv) All traits or auali-H^c

Sndent
language or
ooneeptual°schemesf

(V)

qualities.

a °^ Uad ° b3eots ha

-

°n

traits or

For those who still
would feel1 xnat
o+ +
tint *a statement
like (v)
IS too strong, it
might be rephrased as.
Iv '’

In faCt> th0Ugh

1

believe

to be too strong.

I

see no

reason to think that
Wittgenstein did.
A second argument can
also be developed against
the background of (i) and
(ii).
P ar t of the force of
(i)
can be expressed in the
Humean claim, also explicit
in
Wittgenstein's works, that we cannot
predict with any
certainty the course of events
in the world.
The world
goes its way, independent
of any characteristics or
laws
by which we might try to
bind its course.
As a result,
no scientific theory is
metaphysically any better than
any other. All of them are
equally on the surface of
2.

reality, equally far removed from
the actual world and
necessarily bound to thought and language.
As Wittgenstein himself comments
At bottom the whole Weltanschauung of t.hp
moderns involves theTIlusion that the socalled lav/s of nature are explanations of
natural phenomena.
-

In this way they stop short at the laws
of
nature as at something impregnable as men of
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former times did at God
and fate.
And both are right and
wronp
The older ones
are indeed clearer in +v,t

^ »i^
n

IhiSS had a foundation.1o

‘°

look as lf

Wittgenstein thus denies, in
the notebook as well
as later in the Tractatus,

that states of affairs
in the

world are necessarily
connected (see Tractatus
5.1361 5 1362 ).
it follows that the
future cannot be predicted
(with certainty, by logical
means) from the past.
.

In

this Wittgenstein finds’
himself close to Hume
sect.

IV,

part II),

(

Enquiry

,

nature, for them both, is
strictly

unpredictable.

But Wittgenstein goes beyond
Hume, at
least by implication, in the
above passages.
The "laws
of nature" do not explain
phenomena,
they are no better,
as explanations, than "God and
fate" of the "men of former Limes"
indeed, they may even be inferior.
Since
"both are right and wrong", I believe
that Wittgenstein
1

intends to point out here what one could
call the ultimate metaphysical equality of all
explanatory systems
(of natural phenomena).

That is, all systems which pur-

port to explain do so by pointing out necessary
connections,
but there are no such things in nature.
Ultimate
ly all systems of explanation are metaphysically
(i.e.,
as far as reality is concerned) equal because
they all

121

.

are wrong.

On the other hand we
can predict what we
can
Put in parallel terms,
the actual world
cannot be
advance, the linguistic
world can be. We know
latter because,
"The fact that it is
possible to
general form of propositions
means

say.

known
the

erect

nothing but,

every possible form of
proposition must be FORESEEABLE ." 21
This implies that, while the
objects of the actual world
cannot be foreseen, predicted
or known a priori
those
objects which depend on language
or conceptual schemes
can, indeed must, be.
This in its turn simply means
that everything which allows
the latter to be predicted
or known a pr i or i must be
absent from the former. What
we know a priori is of course
what we construct ourselves,
items or elements of the linguistic
world also,
a ° we have just seen, qualities,
characteristics and all
types.
Therefore again, those objects which are
independent of our conceptual scheme have and
can have no qualities.
They are simple.
,

This argument can be summed up as follows
(i) The

(ii)

i

world is independent of my will.

Only what is dependent on my will, through
being constructed, can be predicted or known
a priori
.

(iii) Therefore the world cannot be predicted or
known a priori
.
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allow us
a priori.

tr P redict

V

.

U
e
WhiC '"° uld
things aDout
aboit it or know
f
it
-

(V)

Therefore it has nothing
constructed (by us)
(vi) Therefore it has
no properties.
B

The above argument might
be called the argument
from
what we cannot do. We
cannot predict the course
of nature
Another argument can be
developed from looking at
what
we can do.
This argument from what we
can do concerns
more particularly the notions
of ability versus inabillt; y
rathe) than those of foresee?)) }! li-Hr
„
luxioceaDiiity versus unforeseeability which concern the above.
*

-

;

What can we do?

As is clear by now, we can
build,

change or destroy types and
hierarchies of all sorts.
I
can do anything my language allows
me to do; as Wittgenstein expresses it*
We represent the things, the
relations and
characteristics ( Eigenschaften by means of the
variables and in doing so show that we
possess
these ideas, not out of particular
cases which
happen to us, but rather somehow a priori 22
)

So ideas of things (whereby he obviously
means "thing"
in the first or second sense), relations,
and character-

istics (qualities) are possessed by us "somehow
a priori",
and because they are ours in this manner, we
can do with

+
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them as we like, without
being bound

by-

of us.

And what can r not

from the above section,
diet or know a

Eiori

(in'?

I

.

something outside

.

£

JS equally clear
by now

cannot construct

the actual world.

_

controli

^

-j cannot direct

the happenings of the
world according to my
will, but
rather am entirely powerless.
So we are faced with
the same kind of
contrast we have seen
above.
I can
create and know a priori
the Mfienschaften
(traits, characteristics, qualities) which
1 attribute to the
world.
But 1 cannot know the
objects in the actual world
(if
there are any) in this manner.
So such objects must be
simple, since they can
possess no qualities at all.
.As Wittgenstein develops
this argument, he also
hints at another version of
it.
It is not only possible,
but unavoidable, he claims,
for one to use what he calls
2
"individual forms"
in logical notation.
These forms,
such as "x" or "z", are not
themselves necessary or essential to logic.
But our ability to use them in
writing out logic problems is essential.
Yet if "the individual forms are, so to speak, given
me in experience,
then I surely can't make use of them in
logic; in that
case I cannot write down an x or a ^>y,"
The simplest

reason behind this comment is this*

if the individual
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for ras are experienced,
then the signs
representing them
are, in effect, names.
Then the signs will have
reference, as all names do.
But then either logic
represents
something, and we can
properly use that representing
notation, or it does not,
and we cannot use such
symbols.
Logic, on Wittgenstein's
later logical theory, does
not
refer or represent anything,
and we do unavoidably use
the symbols.
So the premise must be wrong.
Individual
forms are not and can not be
given to us in experience,
From the fact that we can use
the forms in logic, it
follows that- they do not
characterize experienced reality,
or anything which is given
to us by something other
than
ourselves.

.Needless to say, it does not follow
from this alone
that actual objects have no forms
at all.
All this argu
ment has shown is that they lack
a certain type of form,
logical form (and that despite
Wittgenstein's comments
on the logical form of facts, logical
space,

etc.

—

comments which must remain largely untouched
until we

reach the T ractatus )
oped,

speak.

.

A parallel argument can be devel-

however, to include all qualities of which we
can
It is based on the independence of language,

precisely as the above argument is based on the independence of logic.

.
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Consider a statement of
the form*
(i)

a (an object)

is red.

The purport of this
argument is to show that
that form
cannot characterize actuality,
and allowing redness to
be synecdochical, no
form can. At first
glance such a
purport seems, if not
nonsensical, at least confused.
After all, (i) is a statement,
its form is a linguistic
form, while red itself
is not.
No one pretends that
purely linguistic forms
characterize reality.
It is

less bewildering, however,
if we recall what it is
for
a.
sentence to be truei

(n) Any sentence

S is true

=

‘

the logical form of S
is identical with that
of something found in
the experienced world
(one which besteht
)

So for Wittgenstein,

(i)

either has or, in some sense, is

a form which can characterize
the actual or experienced

world.
But can it therefore characterize
actual objects,
the objects which exist independently
of language or con-

ceptual schemes?

The answer to that is "no".

The form

given in (i) is linguistic; as such it is
dependent on
one’s will (as we have just seen).
It is therefore of
a totally diiferent type from any forms
which could char-

acterize the actual v/orld

—

or,

as

I

said before, actual

.

,

126

objects are simple.

To claim that the
form given

^

,

.

(

}

characterizes actual objects
is. in effect, to
make the
actual world dependent
on our sentences
and thus on our
wm. But Wittgenstein has no
inclination at all to put
forward any such claim as
this 25
.

Wittgenstein's position here
does not seem to be a
comfortable one. and he does
not pretend to himself
that
ft is.

All we can ever know from
»
experience
a us der
25
Anschauung "
as he puts it.
are complex objects.
We can never experience the
simple objects.
Precisely
this observation, while the
source of much of his discomfprt, is also the source of
a short proof of the simplicity of objectsi a proof as
old as Zeno, criticised
by Aristotle, and adopted in
another version again by
Leibniz

-

-

From experience, then, we know

acquainted with) complex objects.
they are complex.

(

kennen

.

are directly

We can also know that

For if we analyze them, each part may

be more simple than that whole of which
it is a part

but it too is still complex.

maintains,

—

Ultimately, Wittgenstein

in order to make sense of the notions of

complexity and simplicity, we seem forced to sayi

there
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are simple things which

I

do not perceive

th a t they do exist and
are simple.

-

yet

X

know

The example which

Wittgenstein gives:

U

dlways com P lex even
though simpler, etcT
t i a
nabl
that WS
for
? *
see
that
8
l ? the
?i
joints
S-ffii §11
of a surface are yellow
wi Lhout seeing any given
single
surface? It almost seem S -I^7 point^oTTh 3
.

-

,

^ple -

~

\ «*

We may overlook the tentative
"almost" of this conclusion.
This was in fact Wittgenstein's
position, even though he/
was not, as 1 said, fully
comfortable with it.
If we do
so, 1 uhink we can learn from
a comparison of this argument with the similar argument of
Zeno's which Aristotle
criticizes in his Physi cs VI,
a
2, 233
.

Hence Zeno's argument makes a false
assumption
in asserting that it is impossible
for a thing
a s ° v r or severally to come in
'?
contact
,P ?
?
with
infinite things in a finite time.
For
there are two senses in which
anything
continuous (is) called 'infinite':
either in
respect of divisibility, or in respect of
their extremities,^
.

.

.

So Zeno, arguing against the possibility of
change,

begins with the fact that everything is infinitely
complex,

He continues with the assumption that complexes

must be made of simples, which, he assumes, are actual
simples

.

Wittgenstein seems to make precisely the same

moves (though not, of course, in arguing against change).
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Every perceived thing is
complex, and complexes
are made
of simples
despite our lack of
experience of such.
It would thus seem
that Aristotle's
,

reply, if effec _
five at all against Zeno,
would also he equally
effective
against Wittgenstein here.
That reply would be that
he
(Wittgenstein) confuses what is
actual with what is potential.
Objects are potentially
infinitely complex, but,
since we are finite creatures
and the objects are our
objects, they are actually only
finitely complex.
He
might even point out that
Wittgenstein himself seems at
times inclined to agree with
such a thought
at such
times as he seems to maintain
that "our simple ISi
the
simplest that we are directly
acquainted with ." 29 Beyond
that it sometimes seems that
Wittgenstein feels nothing
more is, or should be, needed.
.

—

But something more is needed.
are not real simples.

The simples we know

They can and do change their

status as we change the way we look at
them.

If these

were the only simples, then anything would
change as we
change the way we view it.
But something does

not change.

Reality is somehow independent of us, and its
objects
really are what they are no matter what we may think.
These simple objects, however, should be called neither
actual (in Aristotle's sense) nor potential.

They lie

1
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outside our conceptual schemes
and our experience
therefore cannot he called
anything at all.

.

and

D

The above argument is close
to another argument
which Wittgenstein develops
more thoroughly, one we could
call the argument from the
complexity of analysis.
"Analysis- (to review briefly)
does not mean logical analysis a la Russell, nor yet
linguistic analysis as it was
later developed by, e.g.
Ryle or Malcolm.
It is transcendental analysis, and therefore
fitting that out. of
it should come an argument
which attempts to prove the
simplicity of transcendental objects.
The first appear,

ance. of it is very early in the
Notebooks

,

page eight,

though a better statement of it comes
on page 50
But this too seems certain, that we
know the
existence of simple objects, not from the
tence of certain particular simple objects,exisbut
much rather know (kennen) them as the end
result of an analysis
so to speak through
their description
which leads to them.'

—

—

But what is this process which leads to simple
objects

which are not known "from the existence of certain
particular simple objects" not even themselves?
,

The insight on that comes later (page 60
the essential passage first

j

)

.

To quote

?

^“

It seems
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that "the ides. of thp otmpt t? j _
^
d COntai ned in
an d ?n
and
in the
t°r idea
rt
of, analysis, and in such a
way
*
W reallze the existence
of the
illV V- e ° *b
as a
~

b

f

-

necessity

”

,

c^lex^

^al

~

So it looks as if the existence
of the simple
objects were related to that of
the complex
ones as the sense of
p is to the sense of ps
the simple object is prejudged
prae judiziert )
in the complex.
(

But what is the relation of
p to

p here?

We have already seen that one of the
reasons Wittgenstein rejects the existence of negative
facts is that
they are not needed to explain meaningful
false statements or negations. His reasoning there is
that the
sense of the negative statement includes that
of the

positive, adds to or subtracts from it nothing
at all.

lhe negation simply changes, so to speak, the
way in

which we read the sentence, without thereby changing
its
content.

The negative statement

positive,

p,

^p

is related to the

let us say, as clay is to a container!

the

negation sign or the container shapes the content, without being either new content or part of the old content.
It is not part of the content at all.

This is precisely the relation between the complexes

which are analyzed, and the simple objects reached at the
end of analysis.

And that is also why simple objects are

said to be prejudged in the idea of analysis.

Complexes
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are,

to speak metaphorically,

.

the containers which
give

shape to simple objects!
the visible (or otherwise
perceptible) result of this
shaping are the complexes,
which
we can then, if we will,
name and think of as
simples.
Yet any such experienceable
simple is already actually
a complex, precisely
because made up of form and
content.
Form, however, is found in
our creating it, not in
reality independent of us.
To be really independent
of us,
then, the actual object must
be simple (free of qualities),
as, to be independent of
ontological implications, the
negation sign in '~p* must be free
of any objects which
could constitute p.

Ill

The four arguments above all presuppose
that there
are actual objects, objects which
depend on no conceptual scheme, language, special theory,
etc, for their
existence as objects. The next four arguments
do not
involve this presupposition: they try to
demonstrate
that there must be such objects, and then
that they must
be simple.

While the first three of them are fairly

straightforward, the

.last

also the most important.

one is very complicated; it is

s
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A

The first proof of the
existence of external objects
is directly connected with
the last two proofs above of
their simplicity. These arguments
rest on Wittgenstein'
fundamental insight that logic and
language both must
care for themselves, and that
therefore no kind of analysis can lead directly from either to
the actual world,
no matter how far the analysis is
taken.
Our analyses,
to use the terras above, lead us from
one shape of reality
to another
but never to what is actual in itself.
That
has no shape to which analysis could lead

—

us;

at all,

if it is

then it must be simple.

So our philosophical tool, the analysis of
language,

can settle no ontological problems directly
(and in this
its independence is like that of logic).

however,

Unlike logic,

our language proceeds by talk of objects.

People speak in terms of this thing and that.

Thus any

analysis of language, despite its ontological impotence,

will show this mucht

the notion of things that exist

independent of us and our language is prejudged

(

prae -

judiziert ) in any language and in thought (which is a

form of language) as well.
of actual existences,

Thus not only the simplicity

if there are any,

is prejudged in
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language.

Their actual existence
is, too.
the form of this
argument given in Section
II
does show that the
idea of simples
-Linpies is indeed
a
prejudged
in our language, then
we can argue in yet
another way
that their existence
also is.
All the objects with
hich experience or direct
vision ( Anschauung )
acquaints
ns are. as Wittgenstein
points out again and again
(cf.

II c),

complex.

Nothing simple in the
relevant sense
occurs within the empirical
world.
Yet analysis

shows
that there is a demand
built into the very nature
of
language but their existence
cannot be the same as. that
of everyday physical objects.
They must lie outside any
possible experience of them.
;

B

The first three arguments for
the existence of
things independent of language, the
one above, this and
the following, are transcendental
in this sensei
they
all argue that such objects are
presupposed by
one or

another element of our experience, and
cannot be denied
without making unintelligible that element.
In the

above, the argument was that analysis
and ultimately
the nature of thought in general
presupposes (Wittgen-

stein's word,

of course,

is "pre judged"

)

actual simple
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objects.

This second of his
arguments reflects
is based on the nature
of objects in

B,

X

and

general.

The important passage,
again,

is

this one,

"That

which seems to us a
priori' is the concept,
This. ..
Identical with the concept
of a thing ( object
"3° As
)
we saw. this means for
Wittgenstein that "object"
represents or picks out that
which appears to exist
independent of our language and
the descriptions
.

we give it.

"Object", though a word in
a language, leads to the
boundaries of the language and
points beyond it to something which is simple and given
extralinguistically.
What happens if we then deny
that there are actual
objects? 31 We deny that the
word "that" ultimately has
the ..demonstrative force we
otherwise attribute
.

to it.

We claim that the "that" of
pointing ends at language,
without pointing beyond it at all.
This amounts to denying that a whole family of terms,
the demonstratives, has
any sense.
That alone might not be so terrible,
but more
is involved.
For the word "object" certainly has
a demonstrative sense, even if we do not consider
it
to be as

close to demonstratives as we have seen
that Wittgen-

stein does.

So if we deny that demonstratives make

sense, we deny also any sense to any talk about
even

ordinary objects.

But we do in fact make sense when
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we talk about such
objects
things, living things,
etc.

.

physical objects, red
That there are actual
ob-

jects,

objects independent of
our conceptual scheme,
is
presupposed by our ability
to make sense of
talk about
objects at all.

C

The third proof is
closely connected with
this
second.

^

The world is given to
me, that is my will
enters
° utsid
as something

finished^
From that we have the
feeling
pendent on a foreign will. 32

i

that we are de-

This one might call the
proof from feeling or the
proof
from the nature of our will,
it i s stated beautifully
again in one sentence at the
end of the above passage,
"There are two deities,
the world and my independent
I.
We undeniably feel that we
are independent of the
world, and that the world is
independent of us.
The
most immediate manifestation of
the independence of both
of these comes with our will.
As Descartes long ago
realized, we can, in theory, will
anything, only our
ignorance limits our ability to will.
Even this is no

hard-and-fast limitation on us, for it even
seems that
we can transcend the bounds of intelligence
or even

7
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intelligibility, and will
nonsense or the impossible.
Our will makes us a
divinity,
Cut,

as Descartes also
reaj
reali
p^
-ized,

W

different when we come to
action.
us that we can will
anything

the case is entire-

Our experience tell,

but that the world
goes its

way perfectly independently
of such mere willing.
Action
at least is necessary,
and translating the
will into action can be treacherous.
Even when we act, it is
often
not sufficient to change
the world.
The world too is a
divinity as independent of
the I as the
I

ability to will, from the
world.

is,

in its

This then is the way

we feel about the world
(to emphasize one form of
the
argument).
If there were no world
at all independent of
us, such a feeling would have
no. source (and might
well
thus be impossible).
For then everything would
depend
on us and our will; there
would be nothing to run its
own way, so to speak, apart
from or contrary to our will.
To emphasize another form of
the argument.
if there
were no actual world, the nature of
the will which we have
would be senseless and impossible.
For the will as we
have it has two principal qualities.
It is unlimited
in its sheer ability to will,

but severely limited in

its ability to accomplish what it wills.

If there were

nothing independent of me to serve as a limit to
what
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"y will can accomplish,

such limitation would
not only
hot make sense, it
would plainly be
impossible.
For if
there were nothing but
the I, there would
be nothing to
hinder the existence of
whatever it would wish.

Die Forderung der einfachen
Dingen ist die Forderung dor Bestimratheit des
Sinnes." 33 "Man koennte
die
Bestimmtheit auch so forderm
wenn ein Satz Sinn haben
soil, so rnuss vorerst die
syntaktische Verwendung jedes
seiner Teile festgelegt sein,"-^
In this section we shall
examine one of the most

important, yet most seldom
mentioned, concerns Wittgenstein had both in the No tebooks
and the Tractatus
This
is the concern for demonstrating
that ordinary language
.

makes sense

-

or rather, his concern for
justifying

philosophically the perfectly obvious
truth that ordinary language is (somehow often)
intelligible.
In par-

ticular, we shall examine why he
felt that the requirement of definiteness of sense is the
requirement for

simple objects.

We shall do this in two parts.

In D 1 we will con-

centrate on language as spoken and as used
in scientific
theories.

This involves objects of types one and

tv/o,
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the concept-dependent
objects.

We could well call
this
ordinary definiteness,
definiteness that suffices
for
ordinary, non-critical
purposes.
Then in D 2 we shall
examine what could well
be called metaphysical
or transcendental definiteness,
that which is sufficient
for
critical, philosophical
justification
of the first,

it

involves us, of course,
with simple or
concept-independent^ objects and, if
we accept Wittgensteins reasoning,
provides full Jiustilfication
-p
f pp-tfor
our ability to understand
one another.
,

i

i

The keynote of the first
section is expressed in
this thought,
A
that I want is indeed
complete analysis of my sense (Sirmes)
"35
only
tQ
dicate the vagueness of ordinary
sentences, for it lets
itself be vindicated.' .36
Ordinary sentences, for Wittgenstein, are the sentences one
uses in ordinary circumstances, the sentences of the
individual alone. The
intersubjectivity of language, which
he considered an
essential feature of it in his later
philosophy, has not
yet made its appearance here.
The problem, then, can be
recast in this subject-oriented form,
how can 1 justify
my personal confidence that my
sentences have a perfectly
definite meaning?
1.

..

n

;

;

^

^

There was no doubt at all in Wittgenstein's
mind

^
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that our sentences
have meaning.

.

our ordinary sentences,
do indeed
As he says,
,

x his is indeed
clean f'hn+ +w,_
enC
which
mankind uses exclSSwIy
??
tta?
?h"!
lh
ese
will
',
a sense (Sinn) exactlv si
have
y as lhe y are and not
wait firsFTw- ! 1*
future ana lysis to contain
a
sensed'/
,

t;

And furthermore
,

he felt equally certain
that each one

had a full meaning,

"Every sentence that has
meaning
(Sinn), has a COMPLETE meaning
.".38 At
time, he is acutely aware
of the potentials for
ambiguity, vagueness and
misunderstanding found in language.
Let rne present just one early
expression of that awareness as an example here:
.

.

^^

A sentence such as,

"This stool is brown" seemsomething enormously complex,
for if we"
wanted to express this sentence
in such a wav
that no one could raise objections
to it which
spring from its ambiguity then
it would have
to become endlessly long, 39
® ay

.

But how can he reconcile these two
sides,

the complete

and definite sense of the ordinary
sentence, and, at the
same time, its ambiguity?

Wittgenstein’s solution returns us to something
we
have already seen (in I B)
but there as a problem.
,

sentences are as definite as are the objects of
v/hich

My
I

speak.

But each sentence, as we saw there, has its
own

object,

fully determined within the context of that

14 0

sentence.

.

It may indeed be
the case that not
every

tence is fully
determined when we look
at it intersubiectively
Wittgenstein often implies
that this is
the case, that no
sentence is full*
unambiguous.
But at
the same time, looked
at from the standpoint
of the sublet, every meaningful
sentence is fully
determined, insolar as its own
particular meaning goes.
Wittgenstein
sometimes uses the simile
of black dots on
white paper
To illustrate this thought
one might extend the
simile
to that of a paper with
black, -white, and gray
areas.
Any sentence means something
subjectively definite
it

-

-

quite distinctly.

At the same time, there
are certain

things a meaningful sentence
clearly does not mean and
these too are distinctly
marked, as the white areas.
But
Wittgenstein adds, each sentence
also has certain things
it neither quite means nor
quite does not mean.
These
grey areas are indefinite
but the sentence makes clear
and definite also which areas
these are. Thus a sentence
may bo ambiguous yet its meaning
nevertheless clear and
sharp because it unambiguously marks
out its ambiguities.
This is the line of thought which
lies behind many
comments on meaning in the Notebooks.

-
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meaning of a sentence,
as we have seen,
is its reference.
A sentence has a
clear or
••sharp- meaning,

a definite meaning,

if it has a clear,

reference^

i

e

sharp or definite

Every sentence does,
every sentence has a
fully determined object
to which it refers.
Wittgenstein
seems unaware of the
ontological problem here,
that
neither object nor knowledge
of object could change
and
still leave us with the
same object.
Thus in the example
we have seen of this,
if I say -this watch
is on the
table", I may not necessarily
mean or imply, -Some spring
is on the table," for
I may not know that
the watch
,

has

a spring.

In spite of its problems,

it does allow Witt-

genstein to defend definiteness
of sense the way he
wishes to defend it. The meant
object or reference-, is
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fully determined as
a spring,

mean it, whether
wnexne r

I

not to have a sarins
s f' rj n K
'

-

given it no P
prior thnurrVi+
thought,

—

T
1

.

m
mean
it to have

or even whether,

hav-

t
I

neither mean it to have
nor not to have a r)ri no°pnng. TLet me put the
point
in terms characteristic
fnr win
u
genstein much later,
jyjy
conceptual map is a
alwavs
iv. ays at
least a map, even if
it will
not guide me out of d
iff 5 pin t
<
aiiiioulties
(or even if it guides
me into them).
^

c,

,

•

i

The upshot of this is
not surprising,
considering
Wittgenstein's theory of meaning
as reference,.
The sense
of my sentence is
definite if its reference,
is.
Wittgenstein's analysis goes
further however, in attempting
to
answer the next question
which is, when is the
reference
determined? It is fully determined,
he says, when “the
syntactical employment of each
of its parts" is “settled
advance.
I 0 is
e.g.
not possible onl y subsequently to come u£on the fact
that a proposition follows from it." 42
terms then of the objects
themselves,
they are fully determined when
it is not possible to find
out later that they have or do
not have certain properties,
that certain sentences are or are
not true of them.
The
complete fixity of the objects of
reference, is presupposed
by the definiteness of our
ordinary language or our scientific theories.
,

m

,

14 3
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So far we have dealt
with objects of types
one and
two, those dependent
for their object-status
upon some
conceptual scheme.
In aomg
doinp- oo we u
have seen how Wittgenstein felt he justified
the perfectly definite
sense of
sentences, the sentences
of my language (or even
idiolect), without appeal to
intersub jective criteria.
The
justification has followed the
over-all pattern of many
transcendental arguments. We
begin with a known, if
puzzling, fact, one which must
somehow be accepted and
explained, and we ask. How is
this possible? Our
known fact is. we do mean
something definite when we
speak, our sentences (to take
an example) have a definite
sense.
But how is such a definiteness
of sense possible?
What guarantees its possibility?
That guarantee, for
Wittgenstein, is provided by the
definiteness of the
objects about which I speak.

K

2.

This obviously does not guarantee the
definite-

ness of sense in general.

Yet that too is a basic fact

about the world in which we live, a fact
needing perhaps
skilled philosophical justification, but
undeniably a
fact.
so,

For all the difficulties we often have in doing

we do understand each other, we often know
what

another person is talking about, and can agree or
disagree with him.

Even when two different languages are
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being spoken, we can
frequently understand
each, other.
But the justification
of the fact that
my (subjective)
sense is clear to me
entails little or nothing
to help
us see how such
interpersonal and even
inter-linguistic
communication can be justified.
iusti-fioH
r?
For precisely what seems
clearest and least ambiguous
to me may seem
full of am-

biguity to another, and
often does.
here with the same problem

We then are faced

as just occupied us,

an inter-subjective scale,
that,

on the one hand,

only on

how can we justify the
fact

sentences are full of vagueness

and ambiguity with the fact
that, on the other hand,
understanding and being understood
requires full definiteness of the sense of our
sentences?
As we would expect, Wittgenstein
turns for a solution
the same direction as he turned
before:
to objects.
This time, however, the kind of
objects he considers above can be of no aid.
For those objects are
such precisely because they are
given the status by a
language or theory, and we are now
concerned with com,

m

paring languages or theories.
independent of language:
f>rima f ac le

,

But actual objects are

this enables them, at least

to serve for inter-subjective or inter-

linguistic purposes, but seems at the same time
to strip

Wittgenstein of the tool he used to get at the other

i

1^ 5 .

objects (and the only
n
1 hp
y tool
be boo
has allowed
himself )
language.
ihe deprivation is
real but
i+cs importance
^
Dut lt
only
apparent.
For his ardent is
transcendental and strives
to examine, not language,
hut the roots'of la
n g ua g e
not
so much what language
is (which is a
matter for some factual science or another),
but what is presupposed
by
;

(H^lHdiziert

in)

language.

The proof of the claim

that if there were no
objects in the world there
would
be no definiteness of
sense needs to use language
only
as something to wonder
at, only as part of
the question,
not as part of the solution.
Each sentence we use vacilates (^.onwankt)
in its meaning, ana
does so at our
command.
As we have seen, it can
do this only as its
meant objects also vacillate.
If this were all there
were, these subjective objects
open always to change at
the subject's command, the
idea of a known steady world,
one which does not itself
vacillate as do the objects
of our sentences, would make no
sense.
But we are faced
with the fact that it does make
sense, and that its making sense is derived in part from
our certainty that we
do communicate with others.
If nothing could or did set
limits to the changes of meaning constantly
occuring in

language, the (or one) presupposition of
our ability to

146

.

understand each other
would he lacking
-acKmg.
p
Por
we would
uhave no way to
check on how the
object,
J
“ of
Of the
th sentences
u.ert
y 4-phe other person
are chanp-in/r
angmg, compared with
thp
way our own might
be changing
w could
,
e g.
Ue
not possibly
dVG mutual
understanding
atanomg. ptven more
than
,,
idea of„ mutual
understand
rwr
standing
would be nonsense.
Ihere must then be nn+noi
0 jects
independent of our

W

.

^^

i

•

standing nor that of
a world which
is itself stable
(unid6aS ab ° Ut U)
dependent of us is nonsenB 1 Ca1
° f °° UrSe SUCh
aCtUal ob ^ts “ust
be simple.
.
1
qualities or characteristics,
we have seen Wittgenstein claim, stem from
language.
Since actual objects
must be free from
language in order to
fulfill the role
they must, they cannot
be said to have any
properties

^
^

«

'

.

•

at all.

IV
A study of the Notebooks
is itself interesting
and
profitable, but its main value
lies in the connections
we can make between them
and his much more mature
distillation of them (and others),
the Tractatus
The preceding chapter has given us
much important
.

background
with which to approach and
better understand his picture

theory in the later work,

m

this chapter

I have brought
out three main points
which characterise
both works.
The first is the way
in which Wittgenstein
uses the
word ••object" (Objekt,
Gegenstand, Ding).
lt

is ambigu .
used in three significantly
different ways. All of
these are important to
Wittgenstein in the Tractates
and confusing two senses
or failing to realise
that 'there
are these three senses
can lead to serious
error in interpreting its ontology.
A i on g with this we
have also
seen that, as "object"
is ambiguous, so is
"simple".
Its less important senses
(for ontology, at least)
are
found in speaking of simple
perceptual objects.
Its ontologically important sense is
transcendental, in speaking of actual simple (though
never perceived or experienced) objects.
ous,

have also pointed out, secondly,
that Wittgenstein
develops his position in ontology
by means of an argument
which divides into two main portions,
each of which may
be treated independently as I
have done here.
The first,
though 1 have presented it second,
is the existence of
actual objects. The second is the
argument (or arguments)
for the simplicity of such objects.
Almost independent
itself of all his other arguments is
that from the definiteness of sense, which I examined last.
While some of
I
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these arguments are not found
word for word in the
Tractatus, their general form,
the way in which Wittgenstein presents and develops
them, will be repeated there.
Last, and perhaps most important,
1 have brought out
the transcendental character
of the arguments.
That too
is not only found in the
Tractatus but determines the
nature of the arguments there.
Having made these points
clear, we are ready to turn to
the Tractatus.
.

^
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WIiTGENSTEIN'S ONTOLOGY IN THE TRACTATUS
PART II
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CHAPTER

.

I

SUBSTANCE AND SIMPLES IN THE
TRAC TA T US
Three propositions underlying
Wittgenstein- s approach
to ontology in the
Tractatus have already come
to light in
our examination of his
notebooks
They are,
.

1.

2
‘

Logic and ontology are
mutually independentRussell erred fundamentally
when he mixed
the two in the P rlncipia
IMathn mll
1
W iCh 11 ke logi0 is indepeng
dent of ?hft'o
^ 10
fac ?
ts
somehow shapes our world
, v
the worid we perceive.
How it' does
Wittgenstein does not state, but one this
thing
th Gnd ° f the
sages
we
Studied.
otudiedj
language is not related to the
wor.
any straightforward manner.
No
ef rence at least no traditional
theorv of l
theoiy
reference, ?2 will be or can
quate to relate language to reality. be ade'

'

'

•

'

,

^

-

m

J

3.

.

•

.

We are, Wittgenstein felt, forced
to the
conclusion that objects which have no
qualities at all3
absolutely bare objects^ -must exist.

~

This specifically ontological proposition
occupied
us last in our examination of the
Notebooks it will be
?

our central concern with the Tractatus

.

It is also,

chronologically at least, Wittgenstein's first major
concern there.

Appropriately enough, however, he does

not begin by telling us what his ontology is:
it to his readers without comment.

he shows

Propositions 1

of the Tractatus have one principal airm

-

1.21

to present a

sketch of the ontology which he then develops much more
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.

fully throuehout

*<**, but especially
in the eariy
° f thiS
devoted to a small

Th °

*

°f

argUments

-

2 -°* - 2.02X2.

.

simple objects.

for the existence of

In order, however,
to fix these arguments more preci^piv in +u
n the general
y
context of

stein's metaphysical
thought,

Wittgen-

shall begin with a
presentation of his own
sketch of his ontology
in 1 - 1-21>
I

There are three terms
which play a key role in
Witt
genstein's ontological theory,
and he introduces all
of
them by the second
proposition of the Tractates,
ll
The world is all that
5
is the
case

1,11
-

iS the

of\hi°ngs.

t0taUty

°f

fa0tS

’

World, facts and things
are thrown together here
more
closely and more starkly
than anywhere else in the
Tractates, and in spite of the
unclarity necessarUy inyolved
a beginning passage, where
nothing has yet been defined
or explicated, we can already
see quite clearly that no
ordinary metaphysics is in the
making.

m

Proposition

1 is not only striking,

it is also gram-

matically odd, if not simply
ungrammatical

sem" (like

6
.

"Der Fall

the English "to be the case") is
ordinarily

used with a subordinate clause
beginning with “that" (dass)

+

^

WUh

3 Si
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^

as subject,

grammatically proper and
normal to say,
a)

xt is thus

It is the case that
Pegasus exists.

It is grammatically
y odd
b)

i r
11

’

y,~
not

grammatical, to

say,

Pegasus is the case.

Wittgenstein, however
Ver
'

’

intends more than just
this

grammatical point here, as
such propositions as
3.142, 4,024,
l3.sis

.

and 5.1 3 6 2 show.

of these P
dpi sages,
rmo

"

2

.02h

Der Fall sein", on the

can provisionally n7 be
read as

"exists".

In reading it so, we
avoid trivializing 1 and
1.1.
Proposition 1, then, can be
more simply restated
a:
l’i
The world is all that
exists,
(As yet,

of course, we do not
know clearly how Wittgenstein uses the words "world"
and "things".
Both become

clearer as we read further,
but a brief thumb-nail
sketci
of the kind Wittgenstein
gives us here is no place
for
detailed clarification of
these concepts.)
If we read
the "is" as "is identical to"
(and the text seems to bear
no other reading), 1.1
becomes,
:L

'

:L,,

not

mngs!

1

^5

iS

^

t0talit y of fac ^-

Two more important undefined
terms are added
"facts"
and "things"
and an important puzzle comes
to light.
Why does Wittgenstein say, "is the
totality of facts"

-

—

rather than "are fact s" or "are the
facts"?

.

i
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PUZZl6S aSide> thS tW0
P assa ges make two points
clear.
Objects (or things, Din^e,
Objekte, or Gegenstacrdc
are
not an the world, and,
not being in the
world, do not
exist,
our world is (or is
comprised of) facts, which
are all that exist;
obiects
ar P laterally
ii +oy,
J cx " are
out of this
.

l

v/orld

Propositions 1.11 through
1.21 then briefly indicate
a few consequences of
this fundamental position,
hinting
at some of the more
important points Wittgenstein
will
develop later. Thus, for
example, 1.11 and 1.12
together
preclude the possibility of
what one might call superfacts, and might be restated
as

lai ''

faats are the Pacts is not
itself another fact.

With this Wittgenstein also
hints at his rejection of
Russell's theory of types as a

useful philosophical tool

(3.331

-

3.332), as well as at his (Wittgenstein’s)

theory of universal quantification
(4,1272),
Likewise,
proposition 1,21 seems to express what
many consider to
be Wittgenstein's logical atomism,
and seems to be ref-

lected throughout the Tractatus in such
passages as 2.061
or 2.062.

But these details,

important as they are to

an adequate picture of Wittgenstein's
ontology, are

merely mentioned here in passing.

The fundamental con-

clusion one can glean from Wittgenstein's own
sketch of

.
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his ontology is this*
4
-

ZllluTiTAUl 11

un y°’
.-

(somehow) different from
the world, and do not
exist?

3

'

-

t. ie

lch are
116 ° Utside

"ll

.‘

The hard, dogmatic sound
of his outline is,
however,
deceptive.
Our examination of the
Notebooks has already
shown that, however
counterintuitive his conclusions
are,
they are preceded by much
incisive analysis.
His presentation of that analysis is
far from straightforward,
and differs from that of
most subsequent analytical
philosophers in three ways which
severely complicate
the Tractatus
1

.

concentrates almost exclusively
highlights of the argument, leaving on the
out
important details,
(What is left out the
Noteb ooks fill in to some extent.)

Even these. highlights are stated
aphoristically with little attempt to
interrelate
them.
As a consequence, the exact bearingone argument may have on another
is often"

obscure and exasperatingly difficult
to
perceive clearly.
3.

Instead of beginning with what is prior in
the argument, Wittgenstein often begins
at
his conclusion.
As we saw in the Notebooks
he arrived at his ontological position
through reflections on his theory of logic
and language.
In the Tractatus although
the theory and its reasons are ’basically
the same, the order of presentation is reversed, and we proceed from ontology to
language and from there to theory of logic,
.

.

Wittgenstein realizes with a vengeance his threat

that

this book will be
understood only by someone
who
has himself already
had the thoughts that
are expressed
an it
or at least similar
thoughts." 8 To understand
the beginning, the reader
must already clearly
understand
the v/ h o 1 e book,

-

m

One could scarcely
explicate the entire Tractatus
a work of less length
than Max Black- s Companion to

Wittgenstein's j'ractatus

(386 pages of text alone),
and

do not propose to write
anything of that length.
We
•mist, therefore, settle
for less than absolute
comprehension of his ontology.
I shall aim for a
clear, though
not entirely adequate,
exposition of the basic themes
that constitute his ontology.
Its main features will
thus be brought to light,
though many of their consequences
or reflections in other areas
(most importantly, in the
theory of logic) will either be
left unexplored or be
touched on inadequately.
I

Unlike many examinations of Wittgenstein's
ontology
(including the two that are book-length,
A. Mueller's
O ntolo ^ie—jfL -Vittgenstein' s
"Tractatus and H, Finch's
Wittgenstei n
The Early Philosophy 9 ). I shall begin
with the problem of what Wittgenstein
meant by "object".
There are two major reasons for choosing
this as the
*1

—

starting point.

The first, and lesser,

is that this is
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where Wittgenstein
himself begins
6
The
ihe second, is that
many of the problems
in interpreting nhis ontology arise
from either an
unsympathetic or an
on ^sufficient
inc.r-rconsider_.
J
a ion of what he
meant by the term.
Once this point in
his theory becomes
clear, many apparent
confusions vanish
and the rest of the
theory becomes far
more easily
accessible.
•

•

Because this question
has received much
attention
in the literature on
the Tractatus, and
my answer to it
is different from any
of the positions
normally assumed,
d6V0te three chapters to
presenting it.

W11

first two

m

the

develop my own views, with
relatively little
attention to the views of
others
uxners.
Tn +h*
in
this way IT can proceed in a much more
straightforward manner, avoiding
extensive (though necessary)
tangents.
The third
I

is then

devoted to a criticism of
three main opposing views. 10
II

A

Any attempt to discover and
clarify Wittgenstein's
use of the word "object" in the
Tractatus must acknowledge a fundamental fact, Wittgenstein
uses the word,
throughout his entire work, to refer to
several funda-

mentally different types of things.

This alone would

)

.
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not be a severe problem

.

hut

seri °usness is compounded
by the fact that
Wittgenstein
wxnsxem n-r+^v,
often seems unaware
that he
uses the word in more
than one sense, and he
seldom gives
his readers a clear
indication when he changes
senses.
Although he acknowledges
that changeableness in
one place
st least (4.123), in
general he slides from one
use of
the cord,
which it refers to objects
with some sort
of complexity, to the
other, in which it refers
to things
totally without any complexity,
namely, absolutely simple
'

m

objects
thus,

on the one hand, many
of Wittgenstein- s comments

throughout the Tract^tus seem
unintelligible unless objects are the sort of things
which
have some sort of

structure, and hence some sort
of complexity, built into
thorn,
As examples, one could quote
such passages as:

or

2.012t

In logic nothing is accidental*
if a
thing can occur in a state of
affairs
the possibility of the state of
affairs
must be written into the thing itself,

2.0123j

If I know an object, I also know all
its possible occurences in states
of
affairs,
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the
object

i

.

On the other hand, Wittgenstein seems on
other

occasions

io

state flatly that objects have no structure

or complexity at all.

He writes*

161
2.0^'j

.

Objects are simple.

Ho does not claim hero
that objects are
simple in comloon to this or that,
P
or simple by
reference to
one

rather than to some other
standard; he claims that
objects are simple without
11

a^mcation.

And,

of course,

much of what he argues
in the section from
2.02 to 2 0272
(for example) either aims
at proving, or depends
on the
assumption, that the objects
there referred to are absolutely simple.
Yet obviously an object
cannot be both
simple (as this and related
passages demand) and complex
(as many propositions
from, e.g., the 2,01's,
including
those above, seem to demand.)
In a sense, the key
to the

solution of the entire problem
of Wittgenstein' s ontology
lies in the resolution of
these contrasting and apparently contradictory passages.

If objects are absolutely

simple, how can we speak of
something being "written
into the thing (object) itself"?
Yet if they are complex,
what does Wittgenstein mean when
he explicitly calls them
"simple" and states no reservations at
all to that claim?
It is "object" in this first
sense,

the sense in

which it refers to objects which are
simple, which will
occupy me in this chapter.
I shall
argue that several

passages strongly support the conclusion
that "object"
often referred to something absolutely bare,
something

’
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with no qualities at
all
j n d01r,
In
g 30 I shall postpone
any consideration of
object"
<„ +>,
“eject in
the other sense, that
WhlCh ° bjeCtS ai e Said
complex until after
I
developed my arguments
and considered their
alternatives.
•

••

^

*

'

,

Throughout this and the
following chapters, I
shall
principally use the word
••object-, though
occasionally
'•thing-.
They are for me as
for Wittgensteini
synotxymou;
There is, therefore, no
significance attached to
changes
between terms in English
or in the German
,

text.

for Wittgenstein "Objekt"

Indeed,

"

Gegenstand " and "Ding" all
share the different referents
pointed out above
,

(as do

"object" and "thing" as

use them here.)

I

B

The first, and certainly one
of the clearest, sections in which Wittgenstein
argues for the simplicity of
objects is the sequence of
propositions which begins
with 2.02 and ends with 2.0272.
In 2 - 2.0141

—

section immediately preceding
2.02

—

the

several proposi-

tions imply the irreduceable complexity
of objects.
Yet
2.02 Wittgenstein, as if starting
afresh, states that
"objects are simple".
He immediately argues for his
c3aim»
in 2.021, 2.0211, and 2.0212 he
gives us his

m

•

.
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first, and perhaps most
important, argument for it.
2 0211

Son?f
world
2

2

•

.

S

VP the substance of the
That is why they cannot be
composite

•

02111

11 the world had no substance,
whether a proposition had sense then
would
8
n Whether another proposition
was true

0212

In that case we could not
sketch out any
picxure of the world (true or

i

false).

The argument, as is clear at a
glance, follows the inverted order of presentation I have
already suggested as
characteristic of the Tractatus
It could be rephrased,
with great gain in simplicity, ass
.

2.021*1

2.

0211*

Objects are simple because they make
up substance.
s

*

There must be substance because
otherwise sense could not be fully
independent of truth.

2.0212's If sense were not fully independent
of truth, we could not make pictures
(truly or falsely) of the facts.

Thus only the first of these passages directly argues
for the simplicity of objects? 2.0211 and 2.0212 support
it.

In explicating the argument,

I

shall follow Wittgen-

stein's order.
The central notion of 2.021 and 2.0211, and thus of
the whole argument-chain,

is that of substance.

The

whole argument, in fact, rests on the peculiar interpretation Wittgenstein gives the notion, and my primary

164

task

win

bS d ° ne

'

be to make that clear.

But.

.

before that can

lt 13 nece ssary to
consider two possible „,is-

interpretations of this

ardent, arising

from alter-

native (and wrong) views
of the role substance
plays in
lt
° ne ° f these would
misinterpret the notion in a
fairly straightforward
manner, and the other
(represented
by Max Black in his
ComEanion to Wittgenstein's
Tractatusl
would simply ignore it.
*

The argument compressed into
2.021 lends itself
particularly easily to misinterpretation
based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of
"substance".
It is
natural to assume that Wittgenstein,
whose philosophical
training and interest concentrated
on philosophy since
Descartes, would mean by it what it
had come to mean in
that tradition.
Locke’s definition Essay
1.

(

II,

23,

particularly clean
oo if any one will examine himself
concerning
n lon of pure sub stance in general,
•?-.
2^
will find he has no other idea of it, but he
only
a supposition of he knows not what
support of
such qualities which are capable of producing
simple ideas in us; which qualities are com-'
monly called accidents. The idea, then, to
which we give the general name substance,
being nothing but the supposed, but unknow n,
support of those qualities we find existing
which we imagine cannot exist sine re substantie without something to support them,
we call that support substantia / which,
according to the true import of the word, is,
in plain English, standing under, or upholding.
r

'

,

2)

is

v

1
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follows from this thot qhKc.+
-t oubstance
cannot be or have
qualities (at leastL not
nnt in the
sense in which an
object is said to have
them)i r-L
precise]
ecioeiy because its
entire function is to
underlie, to tie
together, all
qualities.
it is, therefore,
for Locke (who continued
to accept its
existence) something
totally qualityless.
assume that Wittgenstein
understood "substance"
this manner, his
argument becomes both
clear and simple,
though probably fallacious
Obicot- he
h* claims,
UDjecfcs
"make up(bilden) the substance
of the world.
That substance itself must be qualityless
therefore, the objects which
">ake it up must be
qualityless as well
else the substance would have at least
those qualities possessed
by
the objects. 12 Whatever
the merits and lacks
of such an
argument are (or would be if
further developed), it will
not do for Wittgenstein.
Its fundamental assumption,
that Wittgenstein means by
"substance" something very
similar to what Locke meant by
it is wrong.
On Locke's
theory, form and content are
traditionally viewed as
opposites; substance is identified
with content, i. e .,
that which has form, or that
which is formed or shaped.
It can not, therefore, be
form.
Wittgenstein, however,
identifies both form and content with
substance
I't

^

1

’

m

•

‘

’

,

-

i

2.025>

It is form and content.

’
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Ihus we must abandon
any
* effort
11 tn interpret
ini
Wittgenstein's substance along
Lockean lines.

Perhaps

2.

apparently

,

however,

it is possible to
avoid the

dimcult

question of what
Wittgenstein mea nt
"substance", at least at
this point.' One
might attempt to construe the
argument without recourse
to the
notion of substance at
all.
Max Black, in fact,
does
precisely that. Hiss vprdnn
verE10n of the argument
is worth
quoting fully:

^

f
1
t
re i red e a
C ° mpleX cofrtin '
ge nfo ompL xes i e
if t h^
0
1mate objects iA
d^it^oSeriorjitS

^

e°

could say

'

if there "were no
the a PParent complexitv off a
" Proposition would have
no
terminus
°f
would
be
dependent
upon “he tru^h oi^some other
fl
(affirming the existence of a sentence S?
complex aooar
in s i) and the sense
"; entl ° ned
o/s?
wSuld depend upon the truth
would
of some other^S-a
'
and so on without end.
^
This would be a
ipj^ous regresst. we could
never know what
e sense of^a given
Si was without first
£££ lHigoss_ibile, knowing an infinity
oxner
y of other
propositions to be true. 13

ob Veits

'

anW^at’an!'
2 0 1
^hfr 1U
? ! ° n 0f
'

•

•

•

J

^

This indeed is a tempting
interpretation.

It is simple,

avoids the problem of the meaning
of "substance", and
seems at first glance to fit the
text smoothly.
Yet,

whatever its virtues are, it is not
the argument Wittgenstein gives us here. Wittgenstein
was not needlessly
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verbose (quite the opposite').
opposite.); his
introduction of the
word "substance" at this
iS point
noint 13 n ot,
without
•

<

4.

.

reason;

substance has a vital role
to play in Wittgenstein's
argument which Black's
construal of it ignores.
The
way Black continues
the passage quoted
above shows how
far his conception of
the argument is from
Wittgenstein's,
"More simply
unless some signs are in
direct connection
the world (as names are
when they stand for objects)
no signs can be in
indirect connexion either."
Black
has us arguing from a
presumption about language to
objects in the world.
Wittgenstein, on the other hand,
simply asserts that objects
make up substance, and
argues
from the independence of sense
from the truth of other
sentences to the necessity, not
of objects, but
t

of sub-

stance.

It might be defensible to
construe this argu-

ment as concerning objects rather
than substance, as
Black does.
But even if it is, he makes no
defense at
all of the move,
he scarcely seems aware that he
makes
such a substitution.
Furthermore, Black seems committed
by his argument to an indefensible
misinterpretation
of

Wittgenstein's notion of an object.

Wittgenstein, as we

have already seen in our brief look at
propositions 1
1.21,

-

has explicitly denied objects a place in
the world,

yet Black equally explicitly accords them
a place there.
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Thus Black- s version
of the argument,
whatever merits it
may have as an argument
in its own right,
does not represent Wittgenstein's
argument
igument fairly or
accurately.
3 What
th6n d ° eS "ittgenstein
mean by "substance"'
According to 2.0211,
substance is that which
enables a
Proposition to have sense
(Sinn), reg ardle ss 0 f
whether
"another proposition"
(which must be taken
here to mean
"any other proposition" 14
were true. The substance
)
of
the world is thus
connected somehow with the
sense of
sentences, but not their
truth.
As Wittgenstein expresses
it slightly later*
’

.'

Z

'

02k

''

’

a

6
S Wi at su »sists
inde?
pendently
pendent?v of
o? what
£ + is
the case.

We catch echoes here of
the ontological independence,
not
only of logic, but as well
of language, which Wittgenstein has discussed in his
Notebooks
substance relieves
any given sentence s from
any dependence for its sense
2
on the truth of any other
sentence s
Thus in the Trac
2
tatus the notion of substance
ceases to be a purely meta
Physical one, and becomes tied to
language.
As in many
other cases, what Wittgenstein
does here is reminiscent
of what Kant does in the Critique
of Pure Reason
Much
as Kant took the traditional,
metaphysical definition
of "substance" and reinterpreted
it as one of his categories,
Wittgenstein makes it necessary for language
,

.

.

169

.

rather than, as it had
traditionally been thought
of,
necessary for things. Thus,
just as for Locke things
have properties (which
other things can

be said to share)

which inhere in substance,
so for Wittgenstein
sentences
have a sense (which other
sentences may also quite

proper.
ly be said to share)
which requires a substance
which
itself has no sense at all.

This way of looking at
substance seems to fit the
view of the l^actatus well,
but it leads to puzzling,
even startling, consequences
if taken seriously.
Consider the sentence*
Some cats are black.

a.

According to Wittgenstein, this
sentence has sense even
if no other sentence is true.
The minimum that
he in-

tends to accomplish by this claim
seems quite clear. The
sentence has sense, at least, even
if such apparently
integrally connected sentences asi
b.

There are some cats.

are false.

Again,

one of his most important aims
here

is to do justice to our belief
that we understand false

sentences (and that they therefore have
something which
we are able to understand, i.e.,
sense).
Most discussions
of this passage, such as Black's bring
out this
point,

and stop.

-

j
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Wittgenstein, however

.

seemc? +
m
seems
to~ mean
more than just
this.
His claim also entails
that a's having sense
is
independent of the truth of
Euch claims ag(
o.

.

Black" is not a number-word,
° f thin S «»*•

on

be black

or e would involve,

not the

(S'o"S)“*
*'

“-""‘S.'

Sf.f; r ‘;r S3

the falsity of c, d,

falsity of a, but rather its
nonsense, its simply not
having meaning. For if c
were false, a would have no
more sense than?
Some cats are four.

f#

Likewise, were

d

false, we would be faced
with a parallel

toi

Virtue is black.

g.

Were

false, a would perhaps sound
like

e

h.

i.e.,

Hana ha cat

—

strictly nonsense.

These three cases can be de-

rived from the negation of a single
more general claim,
which one might well feel must be true
if any sentence
at all is to have

(make) sense.

One way of phrasing it

would be*
i.

For any sentence S to make sense, all
sentences
which are (or express) its presuppositions
must
also make sense.

i
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Thus

i

would seem to be a

i Pa r
c "‘
C
ear

exc eption to the
claim
Which Wittgenstein
wants to establish.
,

.

''ittgenstein himself
seems to point out
another
exception to his thesis
when he speaks of
the ..general
Propositional f orm"
s

5 '* 7

"

SUSW.WSSK “ “
f

,h *

Later he even tells
us what
hat +v,„
the general form
for proposit ions is

S^reral form of

P.5, N(T).
of

l

a

T his is

proposition^

-p
t-m+K
t
th_f
on is
i h«
°P form
general
,

•

6 ' 0011

Uon

^thf^ulVSf
Plications

.

SVery
C

? roposi *
1V? ?P '

to eleLntarv o?nn
+
Positions
of the operation
N(|T

So it would seem to
follow that, for a
proposition to be
a proposition (and
therefore able to make
sense), some
version of the following
must be truei
j
'

result^?”

08 S is either elementary,

one or more

.

elementary^ences.

or the
}

If A is false, then S
is meaningless simply
because it
is not a sentence:
its meaningfulness (having
sense)
depends therefore on the
truth of j (or a claim like
it),
and we are faced with
another possible exception
to the

claim

I

attribute to Wittgenstein.

No sooner have we arrived at
the notion of substance
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in the Tractatus,

than we find it has
given rise to a
severe difficulty.
To review the above
briefly, the
blern is this.
P
Wittgenstein wishes to argue
that objects, which make up
substance, are (must be)
simple
Precisely because of what
substance is.
To understand
the argument, therefore, we
must first understand what
he means by “substancea task in which

-

Wittgenstein
imself is not very helpful,
since he uses the word in
only five places. ? Yet those
passages show fairly
clearly that Wittgenstein’s meaning
differs markedly
from the traditional.
It also shows that substance
is
that which enables sentences to
be meaningful (have sense),
even though no other sentence at
all is true.
But this
now_is seen to be too strong a claim.
There
are,

seems,

at least two exceptions to it,

it

and it would also

seem that Wittgenstein is committed
to acknowledging
both
those we have seen in i and

—

filled,

If

i

is

no t ful-

then the linguistic prerequisites of the
sen-

tence's making sense would not be fulfilled
(as, e.g.,
when a category mistake occurs).
If
is not fulfilled,
then,

for Wittgenstein,

sentence at all.
some,

the purported sentence is not a

That is to say, the sense not just of

but of all sentences seems to depend on the truth

of at least

i_

and

)
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° ne Way ° Ut 0f
thiS diff iculty for
Wittgenstein

qtuclcly suggests itself

is translated as

_

We couid

'proposition'

mn
i

Um
+v
the

.

t

<gajif

(which

v.
above
quotations)

here to mean 'elementary
sentence' or 'elementary
propoThis is similar to
what many feel tempted
to
do with other
passages in the Tractatus,
for example,
2 061
a ^ rS
“dependent of
one ^another f^

^

‘

'

Here,

~

the argument would go,

StatSS

it is surely impossible
that

°f

affairs are ^dependent
of one another.
My
mg in my office is, e.g. not
independent of my being
Decatur, Georgia, the town
in which my office
is
located,
view of this kind of
difficulty, one feels
tempted to interpret 2.061
to claim independence
for
atomic (elementary) states
of affairs only.
( There
are
of course, similar passages
elsewhere in the Tractatus
See, e.g., 1.21, which
seems, prima facie at
,

m

m

,

.

least, to
be simply another, more
mysterious, way of stating what
2

.

06l states,

Whether such a move is correct for
the interpretation
of 2.061 and similar
passages or not, it is at
least not

sufficient to answer the problem
the present passages
seem to raise. The independence
of all (and only) atomic
states of affairs from each other
may be a thesis of

Tractanan metaphysics, 18 but

to claim that meaning is
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independent of truth for
all and onljr elementary
sentences
is Plainly inadequate.
Wittgenstein wants and needs
the
independence of the sense
of ordinary. C ompl
ex sentences
from the truth of all
other ordinary, complex
sentences.
His concern here is
ic- wi-t-h
with the sentences of
ordinary language, and with our
ability to understand
them even when
they are false or their
truth-value not yet fully
determined.

Even if Wittgenstein's
interests allowed one to
interpret "sentence" here as
"elementary sentence", the
difficulty would not be overcome.
For both i and
j would
still have to hold true, even
for elementary sentences',
if they were to have sense

-

i

vacuously, and of course

only the first disjunct of
Thus they would still seem
j.
to constitute objections
to Wittgenstein's thesis
even

reinterpreted to hold for elementary
sentences only.
It would seem then that
there is no way to avoid the
exceptions to this claim pointed out
in

in other words,

i

and j.

Perhaps,

it could be seen to say that
all sentences,

simple or complex, are independent
of the truth of any
other sentence, except for precisely
those sentences (or
types of sentences) seen in i and
Here we limit, not
j.
the type of sentence (as we tried
to do above), but

rather restrict the range of independence of
all sentences.
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In doing so
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of course, we make
Wittgenstein's original
claim much less startling,
and bring it more in
line
with the way Wittgenstein's
intentions are normally seen.
This kind of solution,
however, leaves far too
much
to be desired.
It seems, first of
all, entirely ad hoc,
and thus very clumsy.
Even if there were direct
textual
evidence that Wittgenstein
meant to restrict his claim,
this way of doing so bears
so little resemblance to
the
eruioe sharp, piecise thought
of the Tractatus that
it becomes suspect on
that ground alone.
But there is
no visible textual evidence
that he intended to allow
the possibility of such
exceptions.
Even though j is
based directly on passages from
the Tractatus Wittgen,

.

stein did not seem to see it as
an exception to the claim.
5. Our puzzle and our inability
to provide a solution
to it have both arisen through
the consideration of meaningful sentences.
If we cannot provide a solution that
way, perhaps we can if we change the
approach:
what is
it that,

according to Wittgenstein, makes (what appears

to be) a sentence meaningless?

Both in the Notebooks

and in the Tractatus he gives the same
answer:

a non-

elementary sentence can be defective (lack sense)
through
our failure to give some of its components
meaning (i.e.,

reference, see 5.^733).

That is, it is a necessary
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(though as 3.1h

.

-

3.24 show not^ a suf
8U „.
P
ficient)
condition
of a proposition*
s having
o P +u 4
senoe
g sen
that each of its
element
or names, have a
reference
Thr>
fa i
Phe failure
of what appears
,
t
„
Xo be a sentence
to actually
actual lv be one,
and thus to have
meaning, i s not, that
is
n failure
on the part of the
it is a failure
on our part, we
fail to do
something (even if we
think we have done
it).
we do
our job, then all
the components of
the sentence have
reference, and the kind
of failure i (or
something similar to it) points
out cannot occur,
occur
The
ihe presuppositions
of a sentence,
in other words,
are actually part
of that
sentence.
To use a Tractarian
phrase (as in 2.012),
they are prejudged in
the sentence.
Or, looking atit
another way, the sentence
has no presuppositions
external to It to Which i
(or something like
it) could refer,
if it is a meaningful
sentence it contains its
presuppositions as part of itself.
To generate c through
h,
we must think of the
presuppositions of a sentence
as
somehow independent of
the sentence itself,
Wittgenstein
however, refuses to do
so.
on his theory, the chain
of
,

'

•

’

„

presuppositions culminating in i
could not even have
been begun, for to begin
it would have been nonsense.
The criticism brought
forward by j, however, remains,
and cannot be entirely
disposed of here.
It
is a
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Huguisl'ic law
g

s am 0

as

,

me
"tlio

.

and its relation
rpi o+i
to sentences is much
rpl
i n>^
rv-p
i
relation
of a law
of physics to physical

Phenomena.

Exactly what that relation
is must await
further discussion, but
we can see immediately
that it,
like all alws on
Wittgenstein's
theory,

strictly speaking.

It cannot,

is nonsense,

therefore, be affirmed

of sentences strictly
or in any straightforward
manner,
and thus cannot constitute
a genuine objection
to the
claim above, which can be
directly or straightforwardly
sfi-

irmed of sentences.

Thus our apparent exceptions
are not exceptions! each
sentence is fully independent
of any other sentence, and

it still is

(according to Wittgenstein)
substance which
enables them to be thus
independent.
In considering

the

objections raised by

i

and j, we have come to realize

that sentences, as Wittgenstein
thinks of them, are very
different entities from what we
ordinarily hold them to
be.
Each sentence has, built into it,
its own form and
presuppositions,
these are, so to speak, integral
and
inalienable parts of it.
6.

With this understanding of what Wittgenstein

meant by "substance" and "sentence", let
us return to
a direct consideration of the argument
involved in
2.0/.1

-

2.0212.

Each of these propositions requires
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and will receive further
discussion

.

uuc that discussion
but

not touch on two vital
v-Locu. ptoutvgroups nr
of questions which
underlie the argument-chain.
The iirsx
first 01
of tho
these centers
on the problem of the
relation between objects
and substance.
It involves such
questions as. Why are
objects
necessary
addition to substance?
Must there be a
Plurality of simple objects,
and, if there must,
does
i-his not violate
Leibniz principle of the
Identity of
Indiscernables (or would Wittgenstein
care if he did
violate it)? Some of these
have been discussed and
I
think, already correctly
answered
as, for example,
the problem of Wittgenstein
s acceptance or rejection
of Leibniz* principle, 19
others, such as the question
of
the reasons for claiming the
existence of a multitude of
objects, have not even been
raised, let alone discussed.
The other important but undiscussed
group of questions
affecting this argument-chain involves
our ability to
make pictures,
does Wittgenstein's concept of
picturing
make sense, and is his claim that
we make them justified?
Both groups of problems lie beyond
the chain of the argument, the one on the one side, the
other on the other.
v-ill

.

,

.

m

1

,

-

1

7

.

Ihere are two ways to understand
2.021.

2.021i

Objects make up the substance of the
world.
That is why they cannot be
composite.

.
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^

Our selection will dpnpnH
depend on our
interpretation of -make
up" (“Widen"), and
this wiu in turn affect
our understanding of the central
notion
on ln
»».
in th»
the argument,
that of
substance

^

The simpler of these two
ways is based, again,
on
the. attempt to understand
Wittgenstein's notion of substance in as Lockean a
manner as possible.
As I have
out above, Locke's view
of substance is very
different from Wittgenstein's.
Nevertheless, if we begin
with that view, we may be
better able to understand
Wittgenstein's actual position more
clearly, by way of contrast.
That is, by Showing why we
cannot accept for
Wittgenstein what the Lockean view
would imply, we will
more clearly understand what
Wittgenstein actually accepts
and why he does so.
On this approach, we would
interpret "make up" in
an ordinary manner;
nothing is implied about the way
in

which elements make up something.

As substance must be

simple for Locke, so also (it would
be argued) for Wittgenstein.
But if objects are complex, then if
objects
make up substance, substance would
have at least that
degree of complexity which could be
attributed to the
objects, and could not be simple.

must be simple, not composite

(

The objects, therefore,

zusammengesetzt

)

-- and
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6d abS ° 1Utely Simple

.

for oven the most
elementary
quality would preclude
substance from being
"

^

guarantees sense of every
sentence, independently
of the
truth of any other
(precisely as having any
quality
would prevent Lockeian
substan^ from serving
suDstance
as the
substitute for all other
qualities).
As before, however, the
simpler interpretation
does
not do full justice to
what Wittgenstein actually
intended.
The word translated here
as "make up", bilden
is used later in the
Tractates in at least ten
passage! 20
(where Pears and McGuinness
translate it by "construct"
and its derivatives).
Two of these propositions,
5 5 01
and 5.503, express very
clearly what Wittgenstein intended by the word in these
later
.

.

uses*

5,5 °1‘

^e can distinguish three
kinds of
description
1 direct enumeration,
h
Can sim P 1 y substitute
th^ ,variable the
for the
constants that
ltS alue ?‘ 2< S ivin a
function fx
g
whL
y
whooe values
for all values of x are
the propositions to be described;
giving a .formal law that governs 3
the
construction of the propositiosn,
which case the bracketed expressionin
has as its members all the terms
of
a series of forms.
*

.

.

It is obvious that we can easily

express how propositions may be' constructed with this operation, and
how they may not be constructed
with it ...
.

181

Thus

.

"to construct", bildcn,
implies two things at
least.
it implies the presence
of
,

non-constructed
elements, and a "formal law"
or "operation " 21 by
which
to bring them together
to make up, construct,
the final
Product.
Construction, to put it briefly,
implies lawful order of elements.
If this is so, of course,
then
substance (assuming consistency
in the use of the word
on Wittgenstein's part 22
), as Wittgenstein sees
it, is
not totally simple, but has
structure.
Nevertheless, the argument goes,
the objects which
make up substance must still
be simple,
if not, substance could not be substance, i.
e ,, that which guarantees the meaningfulness of
sentences apart from any considerations, especially considerations
of the truth of
other sentences.
For let us suppose that the object
o
is complex in possessing exactly
two qualities (any sort
of qualities
q

2 23

—

logical, color, etc.

Sentence S

.

x

—

will do),

1
q

and

has its (supposedly independent)
sense

guaranteed by the substance, which is a
relation of ob-

—

jects

for simplicity's sake, let us say three
objects.

Thus, where G = 'guarantees the sense

of, and

C

= 'is

constructed of, and T = the substance:
k

‘

T ^C

.

°1 °2 °3^ G s i-

Letting a superscript represent a quality, and assuming
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.

(for simplicity’s sake)
o
and n°3 to be simple,
,
'
°2 ana
we havei
qiq
k'
T(C o
2 q
o^)
G S

.

1

Where

q 2 and o

q^

sense of

2

S;L

x

.

could be related in one way,
the

is fully determinate,

determinate sense.

o^ q l,

that is,

But suppose that

be related in two ways,
1.

1

i.e.

^

S;L

has a

q 2 and

^

could

j

or

<12

1'.

o

x

q 2.

ql

In this case,

k*

is ambiguous,

written either as

1,

it can,

so far as we know,

or as 1', would suggest,

is

therefore not fully determinate,
as it must still be determined whether the relation
suggested in 1, or that in
1’,'is intended.

S

1

does not have a determinate sense.

But a proposition, according to
Wittgenstein, must be

determinate (3.23, 3.251, and 6.124).
words, we must know whether
q;L

in one way only,
one way,

or,

and q can be related
2

if (as in 1 and 1'

then in which

v/ay

)

in more than

they are related.

Now let us assume, in k and k'
ably complex.

Somehow, in other

,

that

0]

is irreduce-

This is to make the assumption that, in

terms of this limited example, substance
itself is made
up of irreduceably complex objects.
The paragraph im-

mediately preceding this one has shown that the relation
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between

q 1(

q2

and
0;L

must be determinate
if s,

have sense.

.

is to

What that determinate
relation is could be
expressed in a sentence
to the effect
that,

m

'

q l’

q 2 and

°X

arfc

related in a given

($) manner
This could then be
expanded as appropriate,
either, on
the one hand, to claim
that
and
could onl feo
lated ln one way or on
the other hand, m could
pick
/
out precisely which of
several possible relations

^

'

’

^

>

held.

Every meaningful sentence,
i.e., every sentence with
a
determinate sense, presupposes
the truth of m or an
analogous claim.

We have seen, however, that
the role of substance
is to avoid precisely this
situation.
Substance, that

is, .is

what guarantees the meaningfulness
of
independent of the truth, in each
case, of m
analogue of it. Thus the objects
which make
must be simple.
If they were not, substance
play the role Wittgenstein assigned
to it,

of the meaning of sentences,

sentences,
or some

up substance

could not

the guarantor

independent of the truth of

any others.

Proposition 2.0211 is, in a sense, a
definition
of "substance" (and v/as so used in
section
8.

2,

above).

p.

166

Yet it can be equally well treated as
an argu-

ment in its own right.

If so,

two questions arise.

.

;
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Why (reversing the antecedent
and consequent of the
stated version) does it follow
from the fact that "whether
a proposition had sense"
does not depend on "whether
another proposition was true"
that there is substance?
And,
secondly, why should one hold
that "whether a proposition’
had sense" does not "depend
on whether another
proposition was true"? Wittgenstein
simply ignores the first
of these questions, and
concentrates on the second, to
which proposition 2.0212 is
his answer.
An answer
to

the first can nevertheless be
indicated briefly before
we tun, to 2,0212, although not
discussed or fully developed here.

Let us reformulate and clarify the
first question
as follows.
Why do the following three propositions
involve, on Wittgenstein's view, a
contradiction:
(i)

(ii)

The proposition p has sense;
Its having sense depends on the truth
of
no other proposition p'

(iii) There is no substance.

If (iii) is true, then language stands over
against

reality directly:

if it refers, the only things to refer

to are objects as they are in the world,

make up facts.

We have seen,

i.e.,

as they

in section 5 above,

that

the correlation of each of a proposition's ultimate

elements with things is a necessary, though not sufficient,

.

185

.

condition of its having
sense.

.
If p io
is to
lo ha/e
meaning
3.11
"then each cr
+°
o
t
elements must
in connection
with reality, with
the oojects
obiectq that
+ho+ make up
the facts.
Bu c then, in order for r
r
IOr P t0 have
sense, a further proPosition must be true,
namely one such as,

^

i

,

,

'

(iv) The elements
of

r>
arc inHoni
specific objectslin
specif

^
..

Let me draw an analogy
at this point.
Fld ° 15 3
one.

tMn

d °g

’

but

There are two ways

1

ed to

Suppose that

to picture him as
a fat

can do so.

I

The first of thes
analogous to the way which
seeks to deny the
existenc,
of substance.
I take Fido, and
put him in front of'
one
or more trick mirrors,
in

-

the last one the image
is that

of a fat dog.

If there is no substance,
sentences are
ultimately this kind of picture,
just as the false image
of a fat Fido depends on
there actually being a
Fido (on
the truth of something
other than the picture).
so the
sense of a sentence depends
on the truth of other
sentences

Alternatively

can simply draw a picture of
a fat
dog and represent that as
Fido.
From this we cannot
conclude that Fido exists
indeed we cannot conclude
that anything but the
picture exists.
(If we acknowledge
it as a picture, then we
must of course acknowledge that
someone made it
but this is not relevant to the
I

-

-
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present case, Where we are
concerned with the relations
between the picture and what
it pictures.)
Here the
sense of the picture does
not depend on anything
external to the picture; on the
parallel theory of sentences
their sense would not depend
on the truth of any other
sentence.
ihis analogy undeniably has
its weaknesses, as do
all analogies.
One such is that I have
not shown how
the second way of falsely
picturing Fido involves substance.
In spite of this, however,
the analogy makes
clear the way in which that theory
which denies substance
is forced also to deny (ii).
(ii) is bas ic to Wittgenstein's thought; no theory which rejects
it may be
attributed correctly to him.
Thus, presupposing the ultimate
determination of

sense independently of truth-value,
objects cannot serve
as the sense of sentences:
substance is necessary, and
we have answered the first question.
But, what about
the second question:
why should one presuppose the ultimate independence of sense from truth-value?
There are
two ways immediately at hand to answer this
question:

Wittgenstein’s own in 2.0212, and another, not directly
given by Wittgenstein but easily culled from what we
have already seen of the Tractatus and the Notebooks.

)

,

,
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Let us turn to this one
first.
If "whether a proposition
had sense" did "depend
on

whether another proposition
was true", then there
would
bo two possibilities.
The first of

these is that £n _
Visioneo by Black in the
passage quoted above 2
(
pase
166).
As he claims there,
sentences would be unable
to
reier, or latch on, to
the world at all.
If this were
the ease, we would indeed
be caught in a vicious
intralinguistic infinite regress,
as he points out.
Realizing
this, one might attempt
to maintain a theory
such that.
,

W
)

0

na!” eS

analysable?

'

Sii names are

heref °re any sentence presupposes
for
meaningfulness the truth of some
other sentence;

'?

,

iL.s

(^)

The objects to which these
names refer are
like the names, irreduceably

complex.^

This second possibility is already
cast under suspicion by the line of reasoning used
in k, k» and 1,
owing to its avowal of irreduceably
complex objects.
Even if it were not, we could still
show that it does
not represent Wittgenstein’s intentions.
Let
us take

three sentences,
(i)

S

S',

and

presupposes S',

(ii)

S'

iii

S

(

S,

S",

such that

?;i

presupposes S'',
*

is

true

the world)

(i.e.

does indeed refer to

,
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(iv)

,

not refer sucoessfull
y

to

Since (by assumption) the
meaning of sentences depends
on the truth of (some) other
sentence(s), and S" is
true, S', though false, can
be meaningful.
But what of
S? Since its presupposition
is false, however meaningful, S itself cannot have
meaning (though it may appear
to).
However much this conclusion might
satisfy Strawson and those who think of
26
presuppositions
as he does,

it would not do for Wittgenstein,

meaningfulness of a sentence

(S)

since it makes the

depend on the truth of

others
I

he attempt to make sense dependent
on truth-value

is seen here to fail for one of two
reasons.

Acceptance

of that dependence either a) forces
propositions ultimately to be unable to refer to anything at
all,

that they can refer to ordinary,
objects.

or b) holds

irreduceably complex

Neither of these positions, however, allows

Wittgenstein to claim many other things he explicitly
wishes to claim.

Thus the independence of sense from

truth is shov/n to be a fundamental, and irreplaceable,
part of Tractarian theory.

The third in this series of arguments, that con-

tained in 2,0212, stems of course from 2.0211; it
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defends the existence
of substance by
defending the
independence of sense from
truth-value, through the
notion of picturing,
if "whether a
proposition had
sense” did indeed depend
on “whether another
proposition was true”, then
”we could not sketch
out any picture of the world (true
or "false) »
tiK
Lihe +Vl
the preceding
argument, but unlike the
first, this is a modus
toilers’
we can "sketch out” a
picture of the world, so
the sense
of a proposition must
be independent of the
truth of any
other proposition,
since the notion central
to
,

this

particular argument is that
of picturing, it might
seem
appropriate at this point to
examine that perennial
favorite topic of d^ctatus
explicates, the picture theory.
'

.In fact,

such an examination is not
necessary.

is sufficient to realize
that,

It

for Wittgenstein, we can

picture reality (the world), and
that we can do so truly
or falsely.
Then we must ask. Why or how
would the dependence of sense on truth-value
entail our inability to
picture the world?
As above, this problem divides
into two.

First,

along lines similar to those of
Black's interpretation,
where the answer is fairly easy,
since we become involved in a vicious infinite regress,
we can do nothing
at all, including picturing the
world.
So again
we

»
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might feel tempted to rest
content with the view that
we refer to irreduceably
complex objects which make
up the world.
But again, Black misinterprets
Wittgenstein's argument.

Wittgenstein himself mentions
no problem with an
infinite regress here,
in fact, the problem of
an infinite regress is not mentioned
directly
even once in

the Tractatu s.

When Wittgenstein hints at an
infinite
regress (most directly in 4 2211
), his attitude

is that

.

it constitutes no problem for
him.

In importing the

notion of an infinite regress into
this argument, Black
presents us with one which, whatever
its merits,

surely not Wittgenstein's.

Wittgenstein's argument con-

cerns -- not an infinite regress

—

but our inability

to sketch out a picture of the world,
or a false one.

is

It seems natural,

either a true one

then, to explicate

this final argument by seeking to answer
two questions
Vihy,

if there is no substance,

is it impossible to make

false pictures? and, Why, under the same
conditions,

would it be impossible to make true pictures?
The answer to the first question is presupposed
by
the second.

If there were no substance, then, as we

have seen, the meaningfulness of one sentence or
propo-

sition would depend on the truth of another.

Truth, as

^

.

a large number of
propositions in the Tractatus
show
(i.a., 2.223 2.225, 3.05, 4.022 4.024, 4 063 )
is a
matter of successful
reference, falsity a
matter If fall _
mg to refer. If there were
no substance, therefore,
a
.

sentence could be meaningful

»

i
1

‘

e .»

could be a picture,
.

only if some sentence
referred.

Either (E er impossible
or some other sentence
presupposed by it, would have
to refer tor it to be a
picture. Either directly
(througl
itself) or indirectly
(through its presupposition)
it
it,

would have to have reference.

Yet this contradicts Witt-

genstein's claim that false
sentences do not have
reference
Let me clarify this by an
example, and return to
Fido
"Fido is fat" must, on the theory
;
of the Tractatus, picture something.
If there is no substance, it
must picture the actual world,
either directly or indirectly.
But, since it is false, that
is impossible.
If we nevertheless hold to the
claim that there is no
substance, then "Fido is fat", since
it fails to picture
what is the case, simply fails to
be a picture
at all.

Since the same line of reasoning can
be applied to any
false sentences, we seem forced to conclude
that for

Wittgenstein if there is no substance we
could not sketch
out a false picture of the world.
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"Fido is fat" is a complex,
non-elementary proposition.
It might be thought
possible to claim both that
10 false and that it
pictures, and yet deny
that subexi-ts,
claiming that its component
propositions, the elementary
propositions, do refer, but
are
put together wrongly.
a_
"Fido
rxuo 1S
& J
is lat
f n +M is
a picture, but
a distorted one.

n

.

.

Even if this could be made
consistent with Wittgenstein's theory of truth (which
I doubt), it does
not account for the following claim:
4,23

‘

.If

an

elementary proposition is true
the state of affairs exists:
if an
elementary proposition is false,
the
state of affairs does not exist.

Elementary propositions, like all
propositions, are pictures:
yet they can be false.
They are also in direct
connection with objects (4.22 and
28
3. 203 ).
Either there
is substance, to enable them to
picture what is not the
case,

or,

if there is none, they simply
could not,

contradiction to 4 25
.

,

in

be propositions at all,

If we cannot make false pictures,
we cannot make

pictures at all, on V/ittgenstein'

s

theory.

"A proposi-

tion," he writes in 4.023, "must restrict
reality to
two alternatives:

yes or no."

It does not "restrict

reality" to one of those alternatives

.

If reference were

s
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a precondition of
meaningfulness

then the very fact
that a proposition was a
genuine proposition would
guarantee that it had reference
directly or indirectly,
however distorted. Merely
knowing that
4 i s a propoliwould, -ince false
propositions are impossible,
guarantee its truth, and
"restrict reality" to the "yes"
alternative.
,

-

'

9.

It has not been the purpose
of this chapter to

discuss the validity or convincingness
of Wittgenstein'
arguments in 2.021 - 2.0212.
Principally I have attempted
to state his arguments as
clearly as I could,
as clearly,

and as accurately.

This necessarily led into a discus-

sion of what substance is for
Wittgenstein, a discussion
which is as yet not fully complete,
though at least the
groundwork has been well laid. We have
seen that it,
(i)

is reinterpreted to be language-dependent,

(ii)

(

Hi

(iv)

guarantees the sense of any sentence
independently of' the truth of any other,
)

is niade up of simple objects (which
must be simple precisely because they
make up substance),

and is itself not simple, but has some
structure.

It is most of all this last point that
needs expli-

cation -- but not here, where the point has been
the
simplicity of objects, not the nature of substance.
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It turns out,

then, that,

.

for all the trouble
it
has taken to develop
it, Wittgenstein’s
argument is
really very simple.
Objects must be simple,
else substance could not fulfill
the role it must
play, could
not be what it in fact
must bp
T
f substance
vf
be.
if
could not
fulfill its role, we could
not make pictures of
the
facts.
Here the argument stops,
Wittgenstein seems
to feel that it is
obviously ridiculous to
think we
not do so.
Here too, since the major
point of
this chapter has been made
and defended as Wittgenstein
made it and defended it in
the Tractatus I will
also

^

4.

.

stop.

1
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Those five places are:
2.021, 2.0211, 2.0231, 2.024,
and 2.025.
In the last of these he does not, strictly
speaking, use the word:
he refers to it by "it".

*
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CHAPTER

.

II

FORM AND OBJECTS
The last chapter stressed
the role of substance in
the metaphysics of the
Tractatus.
Substance, as Wittgenstein interprets it, is not
a substrate for or of
objects
as, e.g.
Locke would have interpreted
it.
It is rather
something uniquely related to
language, though not
,

it-

self literally a part of language.

Objects make up the

substance of the world and must
be simple, without any'
complexity.
Ry presentation of Wittgenstein's
proof of the
simplicity of objects was built around
the realization
that Wittgenstein uses the German
word " bilden " (which
Pears and McGuinness translate in
2.021 as "make up")
more precisely than it or its English
counterparts are

normally used.

In particular, as its occurrences
later

in the T r a ct atus indicate, a,
U P (Hidden)

and

b,

c

are said to make

y when the following three conditions are

fulfilled
(i)

2
y can be (exhaustively

a,

(ii)

and c;

b,

a,

b,

)

analyzed into

and p cannot themselves be further

analyzed
(iii)

a,

b and c are related determinately
there is some definite structure

i.e.

which binds them.
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That, therefore, which is
said to be "made upsubstance, in this case
has both a structure, or
form,
and at least relatively
unstructured elements, or content.
Ihis is clearly 'the basis of:

-

2.025*

It is form and content.

(where "it" refers to substance).

Thus the nature of

substance constituted the first
proof that Wittgenstein
feels there must be absolutely
simple objects which do
not possess any form.
In this chapter

I

shall concentrate on the notion

of form in the Tractates,

to show that it, too, commits

Wittgenstein to the existence of simple
objects.
first discuss what Wittgenstein meant
by
"form".

I

shall

This

discussion, which occupies the major
part of this chapter,
consists of two major sections.
In the first I distinguish three different types of forms
(or three different
uses of "form"), and provide a provisional
account of

form

m

general.

The second part begins with some prob-

lems in the preceding account, and develops
the notion
of form more explicitly and thoroughly.

ing the notion of form,

I

After develop-

show that there are certain

important characteristics of all forms which preclude

their belonging to objects.

Thus again the conclusion

of the argument will be that objects are or must be

.
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simple

,

not possessing any
form or quality,

-

or

.

if

Possessing any, then certainly
none which can be known
to us

Wittgenstein's avowal of
absolutely bare objects
has historical precedence
in Kant's avowal of
a thing-inltoclf.
There is, however, no
evidence to indicate that

Wittgenstein was influenced
directly by Kant's work.
They both do assert that

bare objects exist, but
for

different reasons,

To avoid the danger of
assimilating

the arguments of one to
those of the other,

1

shall in-

dicate two differences between
their positions.
(1) Wittgenstein argues from the existence
of substance to that
of simple objects, while Kant
does not do so.
For the
latter, substance is a category;
objects cannot make it
up.
For Wittgenstein, substance is
something closely
associated with language, though not
part of it.
Thus
it is independent both of
reality and of the human mind
(see, e.g., 2.024 for the former;
reasons for the latter
are developed later in this chapter).
(2) Wittgenstein
is committed to the position that
to ascribe qualities
to objects 4 to claim that objects are
really

character-

,

ized by what we think of as qualities,

Kant,

on the other hand,

is senseless.

is by no means so clear.

Inso-

far as, e.g., space and time are forms of intuition,
they
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characterize the way in which
men must think and perceive.
Yet it seems at least
possible (i.e., at least to
make
sense to claim) that objects
could actually
be in space

and time, even though we
could never know they were.
Thus, consider the following
passage from the Prolegomena

^

faculty of intuiting a priori
affects
e

Ill

seLaUorIn
n
n
U
u

he
en0rnen n
L°V
for ^thls constitutes
°

1 ^’

is

'

that
bUt itS form name ly space
ana time. ^Should"^
and°time
Should any man venture to doubt
that
e
rG deter inations adhering
not to things
in thpf
T
J
63
the ir relation to our
sensibilftv
.
y* ! snail be glad
to know how he can
i
J
find it possible
to know a priori how their
intuition will be characterized
any acquaintance with them and before we have
before they a?e
9
ed t0
SU h however is the case
with space and
Titime. ?5
,

•

•

.

’

’

-

'

.

.

^

.

’

•

»

Kant does not seem to argue here
that it is nonsense to
say .that things are in space and time,
but rather that
if one does so,

he will not be able to account for
our

ability to predict certain spatio-temporal
characteristics of objects even before we perceive them.

Precisely

because we cannot know anything about objects
independent
of our mind, we cannot know whether they are,

or are not

characterized by the categories.
I

A
I

have identified substance as content with simple

.
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o^ects.

Following the ^vision,
in 2,02 5
Wh3t 13 SUbstance
from the

.

we now asK,

side of form, or more

-imply, what is form?

US

“

eXa '" ple of wh
2

‘

02i1
'

"-'his

^

Wittgenstein is not slow to
give
he is thinking of
here,

Sf^rms^o/objeol^

(being colored >

alone,

however, raises more
problems than it answers
In particular, there
are three problems which
I wish to
examine more closely here,
all of which are raised
by
passage
They are,
(l) How broadly should
"forms"
here be interpreted
i.e., what sorts of things 6
are
to count as forms?
(2) What is the meaning
of "Form"?
(3) Hew is the paradox found
in 2.02 3 to be resolved?
1. Copi could easily
answer the first question. 7
He would claim that these
three forms must be thought of
as synecdochical, that
Wittgenstein means them to, as it
were, stand for or represent
all qualities.
And indeed,
.

-

Wittgenstein seems to intend precisely
that in the instance, as is quite clearly brought
out in the first

passage in which he discusses space,
time and colon
2.013:

Each thing is, as it were, in a
space
of possible states of affairs.
This
space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the
space.

2.0131:

A spatial object must be situated in
infinite space.
(A spatial point is
an argument-place.)

3
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A speck in the visual
field, though
r°d
mUSt haVe some
colou^
colour
it is, so to speak
surrounded by colour-space'.
Kites must
- pitch objects of the sense
Of
t; some
of +e—
touch
degree of hardness, and
o U Oil,

^

’

i

1

'

Here he extends the list of
terms by including pitch and
hardness.
More importantly, he indicates
the incompleteness even of this list by tacking
on "and
so on" at its

end.

The particular examples which
appear in each of
these three passages ( 2 013 2
0131 and 2 0251 ) are
meant as merely the first steps
of a complete enumeration,
of all those qualities which we
normally think of as characterizing objects
of what we would normally call
material properties. However, since
Wittgenstein's use
.

,

.

,

.

—

of "material properties" is technical 8
,

I

will call them

ontic properties, to avoid confusion
in later chapters.

Our preliminary conclusion, based on
these three passages,
is that all ontic properties
colors, shapes, degrees

—

of cold or hot,

etc.

—

are to count as forms for Wittgen-

stein.
2

.

i

2

.

03

he most important proposition defining "form"
i

P

isi

orm is the possibility of structure,

The pivotal importance of this proposition in this con-

nection has long been realized,^ but the closeness of
its relation to other important notions in the Tractatus
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has not been made clear.

.

Give n what we already
know

about substance from the
last chapter, the
definition
comes as no surprise.
!t is merely making
explicit in
another way what Wittgenstein
has already said or
implied
when he called substance
form as well as content.
That
is, a given form
governs elements which
neither have nor
are that form themselves,
but which can be related
in

certain ways to give us
certain other definite forms
or
structures.
Ke does make more explicit
his departure
from a certain way of thinking
about, e.g., colors.
As
this way would have it, color
is something basic, unanalysable, given us as brute fact
through our experience.
Wittgenstein views colors, etc.,
as given us only in combinations of objects.
It thus seems clear that the
Plural form, "objects", der Gegenstaende
appearing in
2.0251, is necessary.
A weak argument for the simplicity
of objects might even be made
out of this point (though
I will just mention it in
passing)
A single object cannot be said to have a form, only
several (i.e., at least
two) objects together.
(In this light, see also 2.0122,
.

.

i

3.142, 3.144, 3.3, 4.024
One might,

-

4.026, etc,).

however, question whether there is any

significant gain in clarity in defining "form"
as the

possibility

oj

structure.

As we have seen, the
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definition amounts to little
more than what we already
kn ° W if "' e are ° learly
aware
how Wittgenstein defines
"substance". Whatever doubts
arise with the notion of
substance simply seem to recur
with that of
'

form, and

those that plague form are
seen to touch substance also.
Though this is the case, there
are nevertheless several
gams. One is that we are able
to free substance (insofar as it is form) from too
close a reliance on objects.
Structure, as 2. 032 defines it,
is the way in which objects are actually connected with
each other in states
of affairs, while form (by 2
033 ) is the possibility of
such structures.
If form is too closely assimilated
to
structure, it might seem that the
only possible propositions are those which are actual. 11
On the other hand,
if the relation of form to structure
is not clearly seen,
.

one is liable to attribute to
Wittgenstein a theory like

that sketched above,

in which properties are seen as on-

tologically basic rather than, as these passages
indicate,
themselves complex.
Besides helping us avoid such errors as these, a

clear awareness of 2.033 ensures that we interpret "form”
broadly enough to fit Wittgenstein's use of it in the
Tract at us

what

v/e

.

V/e

have seen by now that "form" refers to

normally think of as qualities.

His primary
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use of ..structure",
however,
and facts.

.

is for states of
affairs

We can broaden our
concept of form to include the ways in which
the efements of
propositions,
states of affairs, and
facts in general are
related to
each other.
That is, while ..form"
does include what we
normally think of as aualitieo ;+
qualifies, it also includes
structures which are by no
means usually so viewed.
-

i

As 2.033 also shows, the
notion of form is broader
than that of structure.
Structure, as 2.0 3 2 tells
us,
is tied down to given
states of affairs*
2.032«

.

The determinate way in which
objects
eC
d 1S the struct ure of
the
statp°o?
c?
state
of affairs.
-

Form,

however,

structure.

is not structure but the
possibility of

It is,

in other words, not the
"determinate

way in which objects are connected",
but the possibility
of that determinate way
the possibility that objects
would be connected in certain ways.
An actual green spot,
according to the theory of the Tractatus

-

.

is a structure,

the determinate way in which
certain objects have in
fact combined; green taken structurally
requires that

there actually be green present.

It follows,

of course,

that not all forms need be given (actual
or realized),

though they must all be actualizable

.

Or,

to put it

more simply, not all possible combinations of
objects
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(forms) must be actual
(structures),

.

though such struc

tures must always be possible.

Both Ramsey and

B.

F.

McGuinness have attacked the
problem of what ••form" means
in the Tractatus
and both
have seen similar, and, to
their way of looking at it,
indissoluble problems. McGuinness,
.

I

think,

is particu-

larly clear in his statement
of the difficulty!
Ihe structure of a fact or
picture j
thp wav
'"'
in which its elements hang
together ( 2 032
•)»
The form is the possibility of
the structure (2.0 3 2 2.1
It is first of
).
all necessary to see that 5 two
facts or pictures are of different structure
if
objects (or elements) aFili^ed'
in the same
di erent ° bjeCtS;
s ^h a case
h
y
same forrn
Thus a fact and
?+c J?\
haVG the Same form (must have,
indeed), buo cannot have the same
c-

.

•

;

t

S

UlTv
?
U
^

-

structure.^

(In a footnote at this point,
McGuinness acknowledges

that his interpretation occasions
difficulties with
other passages in the Tractatus
The reasons for this
)
.

interpretation seem clear, but he misconceives
the relation between form and structure.
It follows from his
interpretation that no two structures, i.e,, no two
relations between differing objects, can be the
same.

Structure (to use the language of Max Black's article"^
for a moment) is, for McGuinness,

only token, never

type, while form is then apparently the type of various

tokens
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However clear the reason
behind such an interpretation may be, it does not
seem to fit what Wittgenstein
es even in the very passages
McGuinness quotes. Why
Should the occurrence of
different

sets of objects affect

the "determinate way in which
objects are connected"
(2.032)? Mere change of objects
would not seem to affect
the relationship between the
objects necessarily (though
it might; we cannot say in
advance

whether it would or

not).

Put concretely,

if the structure is "loves

maternally", then it does not seem
to follow that "Marsha
loves Peter maternally" necessarily
has a different struc
ture from "Jane loves Marsha
maternally".
The "determinate way in which" Marsha is
connected to Peter, then Jane
to Marsha, need not be different
(though it might be).
Wittgenstein, it seems, intends to use
"determinate way"
(dj^e Art und Weise ) with token/type
ambiguity, while
form is apparently limited to type-occurrence.
At this point we can define "form" and
"structure"

more explicitly

,

though still in an initial and limited

manner (the full definition occurs below, Section II
I

B)

will concentrate for the moment on fixing clearly the

sense of
form".

16

same structure" and, to a lesser degree,

"same

One fundamental difficulty with these terms,

as Wittgenstein uses them in the Tractat us

.

arises from
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the picture theory.

"The chair in my office
is grey
fixtures the grey chair in
my office, therefore,
between the two (between
the chair and its picture)
there
is an identity of form
(see 2.16 - 2 1 7 and
2a8 . 2 18z)
The picture and the chair
have a given iogical form
"in
common", they share it.
Yet they al so have many
points
of difference,
I can sit in the
chair, but not its
.

sentence-picture, etc.

,

Indeed, such diverse objects
as

words, tables, chairs and
books, as well as people,
all
may share the same form by
signifying the same, things
(3.1431, 4.0311), despite the obviously
great disparity
in their normal actual structure.
Thus the definition’
of "same form" at which I
shall aim is one which will
allow that, if objects a and b
have the same form as
objects c and d, it may nevertheless
be the case that,
for example, c and d also have some
form which a and b
do not.
It is precisely this fact about
form and structure which would allow words to act
as symbols, to picture things which are actually quite
different from them.
Let a, b, c, and d be different objects,
and R.
R
r
,

-L

a nd

be different relations.

2

Then suppose that a and b

can be related as follows
(i)

aR b,
J

3

aR^b, aR^b,

Assume, however, that they can only instantiate one
of
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these relations at a time,
and cannot be related
by R
Since form is the possibility
of structure, the form
of
a and b is»

O (aR 1 b)v <>(aR 2 b)v O'CaR^b)

(n)

k

v^here the

v

(ill)

and

c

d

,

is identical to that of
a

1

O’ (cR

1

d)vO(cR d)vO(cR d)-- 0(cR d),
2
3
4

is not read in the exclusive
sense.

-v-

the 'v

(aR^b)

then it would bei

b,

where

-O

is read in the exclusive
sense.

If the form of

and

.

Reading-

in the inclusive sense
allows all the structures

which obtain between a and b
also to obtain between c and
d, though it allows
other structures to obtain between
the latter which cannot obtain
between the
former,

just

as certain possibilities are
open to my chair that are’
not open to its picture.

Let us suppose that in a given situation
the relation
(iv) S:

to b.

That is,

aR b.
x

In the same situation,
(v)

Then,

Si

aR-j^b

c

ture as £ and
S:

d.

aR b
x

bears the relation R

to d;

i.e.i

cR-j^d

.

in the situation S,

(vi)

a has

S,

If,
•

a and b have the same struc-

however,

cR d,
?

then a and b have a different structure than do

c

and

d.
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Because (ii) and (iii)
still hold, they would
still be
said to have the same
form, despite the
difference in
actual structure.
In S’:
(tj-i)

S'

I

aFi^b

•

(cR-^d

•

cP>2 d)

a and b have the same
struoture as c and d,
c and d also exhibit
a

even though

structure forbidden by
definition

to a and

b.

It may appear odd that
two sets of objects may
have
the same structure, without
thereby having the same form.
Yet this also reflects the
way in which Wittgenstein

thinks about form and structure.

It underlies the strain

most clearly expressed in:
5.5j 63:

in fact, all the propositions
of
everyday language, just as they our
stand
are
perfect logical order.

m

.

.

The task for philosophy is to
ferret out the logical order
from the chance similarities in
structure; to find out
which structures of the world have
the same form as those
structures of language to which they
are identical.
Philosophical confusion (a brand of
linguistic confusion)
stems from taking the occurence of two
identical structures as the occurence of two identical
forms.

3.

At one point in the Tractatus

.

Wittgenstein ap-

pears to distinguish between forms and the
sort of pro-

perties which

I

have called ontic.

In 2.0231 he writes:

2.0231i

The substance of the world
determine a form, and not can only
aHFmaterlal properties.
For it is only by
Propositions that material
kroner??
properties
are represented
only by
n ° f ° bje0ts that th
are prSduf“°

—

^

A full discussion of this
passage would presupp ose a
greater degree of clarity on the
difference between formal and material properties than
one could achieve at
this point.
I have, however,
pointed out that Wittgenstein uses "material properties"
in a technical sense
rather than an ordinary one, and
that this is my reason
for calling these properties
"ontic" rather than "material".
At present this brief and rather
dogmatic assertion must suffice to remove the
apparent difficulty.
B

Ontic properties by no means exhaust
the range of
possible properties or forms, however.
Perhaps Wittgen-

stein's most famous use of "form" in the
Tractatus is as
logical form.
In this section I argue that there seem
to be two different types of logical form,
which Witt-

genstein discusses:

the logical form of objects and

the logical form of the world,

I

set out two criteria

for the former, and add one further criterion for the
latter.
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.

he logical form
of objects
fiv. c ,+
J
iq first
13
encountered

at 2.0233.

2.0233*

If two obiectq hnvo
is that they are
different.

Here, logical form,
like color,
r-olnr
space and time above
is
said to characterize
objects.
How does logical form
(in
sense, the logical
form of objects) differ
from
properties? Only in this,
according to Wittgenstein, that the logical
form is more general,
less dependent on particular
circumstances, than any other
kind of
form of objects.
That this is the difference
can be
seen from 2.18 - 2.2, where
Wittgenstein links the notion
Of the logical form
of uujeccs
objects to that
th„+ of picturing;
but
it is made even more
clear by;

^

'

^

3-3151

.

.

.

eturn
constituent
h"
into a variable, there

of a proposition
is a class* of pro-

.

positions all of which are

values of the
resuming variable proposition
In gen!
eral

this class too will be
dependent
meani lg that our binary convent?™
tions have given to parts of
the original
on
B
if a11 the si ^ ns in
it that have
£
tarbitrarily
determined
turned int0 variables, we
shall still get a class of this
kind
ihis one, however, is not dependent
on
any convention, but solely on
the
nature of the proposition.
It corresponds to a logical form -- a logical"
6 ca±
prototype.
h

\

-

-

The procedure Wittgenstein intends
to carry out here
seems fairly simple.
Beginning with a proposition which
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represents a fully determinate
relationship between two
objects, one can first generalize
the constant which
represents each objects
(a)

aRb

becomes in two stepss
(b)

xRy

Wittgenstein points out that

(a)

is fully dependent for

its meaning on the meaning that our
arbitrary conventions
have given to its parts.
Remove those conventions (or

what we understand by means of those
conventions) and
the sentence ceases to express anything;
it becomes a

series of meaningless marks.
conventions, but less so.

*R<

a constant and not a variable,

(b)

still depends on those

is still fully determinate,

and as such requires the

system of conventions in order to be understood.

If,

however, we change (b) toi
(c)

x<|>y --

then we have an example of a fully general form, variables

having been substituted for all constants.

This, Witt-

genstein says, is not at all dependent on our "arbitrary
conventions"

:

it depends on the logical nature of the

proposition icself.

It does not of course rest on the

logic of (or the logical nature of) propositions in
general.

Had we begun with the three-place relation

i
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(d)

.

aRbc

we would have ended with
the equally general,
equally
non -arbitrary logical form*
(e)

x<pyz.

Although both (c) and

(e)

may,

as Wittgenstein holds,

correspond to logical forms, they
both lack some distinctive features of the logical
as Wittgenstein sees it
elsewhere in the Tractates.
In particular, both (c)
and (e) do refer to objects
(though not to any given or
pal ticular objects), i,e., they
have reference (B edeutung
though not any determinate
reference.
(e), for
example,

holds for any objects found in
any three-place relations

—

whatsoever

but not for those not found in
a three-

place relation (if there are any).

Closely tied with

the fact that we do not know without
looking at empirical

evidence whether there are any three-place
relations or
not is the fact that the logical forms
of objects are
not tautologies. Wittgenstein even
expresses doubt as
to whether thinking of them as a priori
(as, e.g.
tautologics) even makes sense:
5-5541:

It is supposed to be possible to
answer a priori the question whether
I can get into a position in which
I need the sign for a 27 termed
relation in order to signify something.

5.55 42:

But is it really legitimate even to
ask such a question?

)

ThB Eeneral
(5,554

'

even

11,16
'

5

l.o

°r

th

«
seem!

-

ask

;;uch a
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,

in this sequence of
proposi-

this,

1

1

it is not

question as "Will

n Placed relation to
signify something?"

l

•

need an

That question

an empirical one, and
to discover its answer
wc must
look to, on the one side,
our actual notational
i..

needs

(5-555>

and

’

r
(

°n

5.5561,

,

Bpssibile

th0 otl er
'

'

to what actually is the
case

first paragraph).

If W e could, p er im-

predict in advance that we will
need a certain
n-p.lace relation to signify
something, then that particular relation would have a
special status over those nplaced relations not so needed
or not so predictable,
This would also violate Wittgenstein's
earlier claim
that there "are no privileged
numbers" (5.453, repeated
almost verbatim in 5.553).
.

Thus it seems that (c) and

(e)

represent logical

forms only in a somewhat degenerate
sense.

They are

(°0

general,

(?)

not dependent on our arbitrary notational
con-

and

ventions.
ever,

They (or their quantified versions) do, how-

both depend on material or empirical conditions

for their truth,
I

he logical

i.e.,

they are not tautologies.

forms of the world,

or,

one might say,
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iully logical forms,
also fulfil! conditions
«,) and ( «j
in addition, they
are free from any
dependence on partic
ular empirical evidence
for their truth.
These are
tautologies and contradictions.
4 462
'

‘

pictures^of
n

reaUtT^Th'^d"
S

fo™er admit ili

e

3 3re not

sit at ^°ns? "FoTthP'
V
0 31018 SitUations

and the l^te^n-oL
?
6-11
0

.

1222

-

,

The pro P°sit:ions of
logic are tautologies.
This throws some light
on the que-tion
g Cal Propositions cannot be
confiLL° h e P r en< es any
more
thar
they
T
S
i
^
can be refuted
r pf J
by it.
Not only must a
° f lo
c be irrefutable by
f-n y possible experience, but
it must aJ so
e unconf irmable by
any possible experience.
>

i

an™

'

6.125;

^

It is possible -indeed possible even
ccordmg to the old conception
of logic
e in ad ance a descri
Ption
of ail
'trn^
i
y
true logical

-•

-

propositions.

6.

1251: Hence there can never be
surprises in

6.13:

6 22

Logic is not a body of doctrine,
but a
mirror- image of the world.
Logic is transcendental.
The logic of the world, which is
shown
in tautologies by the
propositions of
logic, is shown in equations by
mathematics.

:

.

In contrasting the logical form
of objects with the log:
cal form of the world, 6.12 1 is
especially important,
5
in its contrast with
5.5542.

prise that

I

It could come as a sur-

need a given n-place relation!

I

cannot
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Predict that.

,

But no feature of a
tautology

i s or can
be surprising, 17
for all of them are
predictable and

— Priori

.

Sinoe tautologies are,
according to Wittgenstein,
empty", i.e., without
reference to experience,
the last
passage quoted above
(6,22) raay seero pu22ling
How can
he refer to tautologies
as the logic of the
world? Does
this not give them some
empirical content?
_

ThS answer t0 these
questions lies much earlier
in
the l^actatus, and points
out a much more fundamental
connection between the two
types of logical form.
The
logical form of objects is
the logical form of
particular
objects or groups of objects;
that of tautologies
-

is the

of all possible combinations
of objects whatsoever.
Thus the logical form of
tautologies gains its independence of objects precisely by
a method sketched for
things by Wittgenstein much
earlier
form.,

in the Tractatus

2

.

01222

;

Things are independent insofar as
they can occur in all possible
situations, but this form of independence
is a. form of connexion with
states of
affairs, a form of dependence.

Tautologies gain their independence of
particular states
of affairs (objects in combination)
through being dependent on all possible states of affairs.

Although the

parallel with objects may seem startling, we
have
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already seen one much
like it in 4.462, it
recurs in,
i.a., the first sentence
"
of 6.124,
The propositions
Of logic describe the
scaffolding of the world, or
rather they represent it."
This too is a large part
of
the basis for Wittgenstein's
claim that logic is "transcendental" ( 6 13 ). The
logical forms of objects
are
not of a totally different
type from that of the
logical
forms of the world (6.211
and 6 22 ).
They are, rather,
the first steps on the way
to it.
,

.

II

Section

I

has shown that there are
three distin-

guishable, significantly different
ways in which Wittgenstein uses the word "form" in the
Tractatus
I have
called them ontic form, the logical
form of objects, and
the logical form of the world
(represented by tautologies
and contradictions).
The last of these, I have argued,
show three important characteristics!
.

(e^)

they are general

(p)

they do not depend on arbitrary conventions
free from any dependence on empirical

^

i

cl

O "C 0 1' S

i

The logical forms of objects fulfill
conditions («) and
(?),

though not condition

(?)

•

That a given (partial)

logical form is the logical form of an object depends
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on the fact that
there actually is an
object (more

correctly, there are
objects) which do display
that form.
It has, therefore,
proved no difficult task
both to
distinguish and to point
out the similarities
between
these two types of form.
Yet there still remains
a gap
between ontic forms and the
two varieties of
logical
form.
Are they related in the
Tractatus by name alone,
or is there a closer,
more integral relationship
between
them? In this section I
argue that the connection
between them is not one of
name alone.
Ontic forms fulfill condition (<*), but do
not fulfill conditions
(?)

This,

.

of course,

or

is nothing more than the
general

definition of "form” as "the
possibility of structure"
( 2
033 ) would lead one to expect.
These considerations
.

serve,

in one sense,

simply to reemphasize the
importance

of the notion of structure,
an importance which might be
overlooked if the connection between
ontic and logical
forms is not clearly demonstrated.
In demonstrating the
connection, I will also complete the
formal definition
of form begun in the last section.

Before doing so,

one point must be clarified.

What

does it mean to claim that ontic forms
do not fulfill

condition (^)?
^n

The most frequent example of ontic forms

rac tatus is

_i_

colon

does it make sense to say

that color does •'depend
on arbitrary conventions..?
( By
3 315
in faCt depends on
arbitrary linguistic conventions. )
I am obviously
committed to the claim that
it does, but I win
make no full-fledged
defense- of that
claim here.
I can, in fact, not
do so, because any such
defense would require an
understanding of the way in
»hich "arbitrary" is used
here, and that will first
be _
come clear later in this
section.
Rather, I shall point
out roughly what is meant
by the claim, relying
at present on ordinary,
pre-philosophical concepts.
'

'

U

It seems easiest to
approach the problem via an

example, continuing to emphasize
color as the representative for ontic form. Let us,
then, suppose that my
pen .is green. That it is green
is, of course, a contingent matten
we assume (at least) that it
could have
been another color.
But the contingency of its having
that particular color does not imply
anything, it would
seem, about the arbitrariness of any
convention, especially
of any linguistic convention.
The green color of the pen
is (or at least seems to be)
independent of any conventions, in the normal sense of the word,
whatsoever.

There are, however, many people who are
unable to
see the difference between certain
shades of green and

bluei

those particular shades of green simply look

blue.

Let us assume that
person A bees
sees the P
non
en as green,
...
lie person B cannot
distin-ni
+
nguish between
that shade of
green and blue
t S the
Pen
£ blue or green? What
n
ed iS SOme
0f
to determine indepene ntly of either
subject, when
color-concepts are rightly
aPPXied.
In the absence of
such further criteria,
it is
Purely arbitrary to
call the pen one
color or the other.
But suppose there
ere are such other
criteria, as there
normally are. Why should
onee accept
accent them
them, use them to
adjudicate differences?
One's decision to do
so might
based on yet further
rational considerations,
but
Ultimately the decision
to accept these
considerations
<?)-,

r

i

'^ia

r

,

v

-

arbitrary,

i.e., without rational
grounds.

Our predicament, somewhat
generalized, seems to be this,
attribution of a property
to a thing seems to be
arbitrary
insofar as there are no good
reasons for that attribution.
If we can give no reasons,
if there are no objective
criteria, our claim must be
considered arbitrary. When
there are criteria, they
themselves are either arbitrary
or justified.
To close off the opening chain
of justifications, and thereby avoid an
infinite regress, without making the chain itself
arbitrary, one of three things
would be necessary,
either a statement which is selfevident, or a statement which
is self- justifying, or
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qUeStl ° n

°f

the 0b ^^iv.U

G °d

.

y of criteria (such
as the

t0ld me S °"’ When
made by a believer
to a

believer)

Wittgenstein very
earry felt
earJv
foi-tJ
that an attempt at
a
solution the first way
would be bankrupt. 18
Any attempt
to answer the problem
the third way is
exactly what the
preceding paragraph seems
to throw into doubt,
at least
for most men who want
to rely on rational
thought and
Procedures. ' The middle
of these three ways
has fascinated philosophers as
diverse as Hegel and
Chomsky 20
all attempt to utilize
it seem prey to one
unanswered
and. it seems, probably
unanswerable question. Why
should we all accept that
particular standard of justi-*

f ication?^

A closely parallel
criticism lies ready at hand
in

the Tractatus.

Induction seems to be a
rational, and
therefore not an arbitrary,
procedure.
Yet according to
Wittgenstein
6.363!

The procedure of induction
consists in
accepting as true the simplest
law that
can be reconciled witlTour
experiences.

6.3631s This procedure, however,
has no logical
justification but only a psychological

tL ? ear that there are no grounds
hat the sim Plest eventu^
ality will
fact
be realized,
1

^

m

one
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utu. l.«,

include all scientific
6 .372:

„ n ,„ ll2 „

.

tMi

lav/s

Thus people today
stop atX thp
i
the laws
of nature
treating
aS somet hing
inviolable
lust af r G &nd
Fate were
treated in’past ages.°

T

as if

ever^mw ^y x^ a^yt
S

look

e

Much more needs to be
said about all of
these probIsras if they are
to be given a definite
answer.
But my
Purpose here has not been
to answer them; I
have shown
only that it does
make sense to say that
ontic forms do
not fulfill condition
(>?)
i 0
^ are arbitrary
i.o,,
that they
and do depend on our
conventions.
Now I will turn to
the main portion of
this section, the problem
of the

relation between ontic form
and logical forms.

Form,

as we have seen,

is the possibility of
struc-

ture; ontic form is the
possibility that objects be
structured in such ways as to
give us what we normally
call material properties.
Color, which as above I take
to represent all ontic
properties, is, therefore, the

possibility of certain structures
or types of structure

22 ?.

of objects.

This is whv
ny

"Tnn^
Inc identally,
,

’

colorless" (2 022?) ^2
*

,

'

,

oo colors actually
* arise
1Se

form

oi

structure,

*

,

objects are

y When the y are in
combination
*
0ntlc f
°rm,

is complex;

lik e any other

it is
io not n
nttologically
i
on

simple (though it may
J appear
ppear to
Co he
be simple, or be
epistemologically simple).
t

So far, we have seen
structure broken down
into
form and content.
Its division, however,
i s fi ner
as
the Trap tat us presents
it.
,

2

-

0131
'

wtssvsfc*
an

g

P
ls
argument-place.)
A speck in the visual
field thou vh
rCd mU5t
colour" Tt
colour:
it is, so to speak
crir*
rounded by colour-space.
Notes
must
have some pitch, objects
of
the
sense
of toucn some degree
of hardness, and
'

^e^mf

As Wittgenstein describes
it in this passage, the
complexity of ontic properties
is composed of comparatively
simple points related to
infinitely many other comparatively simple points.
Colors are located in color-space,
1 6
each color -point is related
to infinitely many
other color-points, notes in
note- (or musical) space,
'

'

etc.

Each fully determinate color
serves as a point in
that space! when compared
with the relevant space it is
simple, but not yet absolutely
simple.
That each color
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still has

.

see

(minimal) structure
is brought out clearly
the parenthetical
sentence to the first
paragraph.
There are, then, many
different spaces, each
of
which is independent of
any other.
An object located
a given space must
of course have a
particular place
or location in the
space (hence the second
paragraph of
2.0131).
But no given object
must have precisely
that
place which it does have:
in
ew
ln far>+
fact
strictly

^

m

*

•

speaking

-

-

since the form of objects
is (or is determined
by) relations, no single object
can have a place alone
in any
space (see also 2.0122).
objects can also occupy
several
spaces simultaneously, i.e.,
spaces may overlap to some
degree, though their
overlapping is limited.
Things can
be both spatial and colored,
i.e., simultaneously
at a

Place in color-space and in
regular space, but they cannot be both in mathematical-space
and in color-space (or
so we normally assume).
One space underlies,

or ties together,

Any space is also in logical
space.

all spaces.

A given place in

logical space is determined through
its having a large
number of relations which are unique
to it, possessed
by no other place in any
space.
It also has
a large

number of relations or forms which
are general, which
belong to it not in virtue of its being
that particular
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Point in that particular
space, but simply
because it is,
simply because it
exists.
This is why
Wittgenstein could
write
I

a

t

of 'two coiors at
visual field

s presence
ffy ltaneou
Game place

i~V

SSlble

“

logically Impost iSL°
out by the logical
shuSu^of

Individual colors

-

’

in the
fact

Colour!

places in color-space

-

also
have logical properties
which enable them to
stand in
logical relations to each
other, hence to make
impossible
certain relations. At
the same time they
have other
(material) types of relations,
which set them off first
as places in one
particular kind of quality
-space and
then as subsections of
that space.
,

This initial development
of the notion of space
allows us to complete the
definition of "form" begun in
I A2 above.
In completing it, I shall
also be
able to

explain more clearly the sense
in which Wittgenstein holds
ontic forms to be dependent
on our arbitrary (linguistic)
conventions.
These two problems
that of the nature
of forms and that of the
arbitrariness of ontic forms
arise together and must be treated
together.

-

—

Not to do

so amounts either to falsifying
the nature of ontic forms
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.

(»y not taking note of
their arbitrariness),
or falsify;ng the nature of
forms in genera! (by
simply not acknow .
edging ontic forms as
forms).

To define
e,

.1

and

••form..,

l et us assume
six objects,

Assume also nine
relations, r
As before, if a is
related to b by
R;l we write
(1)

p

p
'1

2

)

b,

R

?

.

,

aR^.

— snd b have relations
(

a,

f.

aR ,

n

*

inclusive, we write:

b

As we saw in the last
sub-section (XIA), a space
is a
system of relations which
is complete in itself
(though
rt may
the Sense ex -Plained
above, be able to overlap
certain spaces, and unable
to overlap others).
Let us
further assume that certain
relations define a
’

“

space, in
that all and only objects
which are so related are
said
to be in that space. 2 3
In particular,
of these 'relations defines one space,
R
a second.
Now consider the
5
chart following, on the basis
of which I will define
"logical form", "logical form of
objects", and "ontic
form"
R

•

1
5

b
aRt'b
aR-,

f

1

aR^b
bRxa
bR^a
cRid

R

/ «

5

cR ^d
cR Jd

9

eR^f

•

eR>; f

«

eR°f

«

eR f
2

«
f

JL
t
f

t

•

1

C
1

I

9

1

Logical form is
universal form, shown
by no matter what ob-

jects in no matter what
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aRpb
bR°a
cR°d

eRgf

•

Q
space

.

Rg alone fits

j

that description from

dR

8°
_______

among these forms, 2 ^

“

d0 °“ n0t depend on
an y given objects
or, as Wittgenstein has it in
2.0122, it depends on
all the

-

Four forms count as
the logical forms
of objects
R
*
an
d R
-hey
are
5
general, i.e.. appear
6
more tin
once on the chart
(R
even appearing in two
2
of the three
columns
But their frenm
-Hr is
ir.
generality
not purely formal, it
depends on empirical factors
the actual occurence
of
the relations more than
once.
The remaining forms have
neither kind of generality,
their occurence
'

-

V

.

)

.

1

i

-

is unique’

(with the obvious exception
of R

?

,

which does not even

occur once).

They are, therefore, in the
simplest sense,
ontic forms.
Our question for this
section becomes more
specific
Why (in what sense) are R
R
4 and R ? arbity
rary? That is, how can we
be said to determine
,

these

three relations through our
conventions?

There is one way in which all of
these forms are
general, predictable and therefore
not arbitrary. 2 5
Following the procedure Wittgenstein
outlines in 3.315
(see page 215), we could move
from
-

(a)

to

aR z ^b
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(b)

.

xR^y

t° the general
form 1for
° r an
a11 +,
two-place relations,
(c ) x(j) y

With complete loss
of arbitrariness.
In this sensS( no
expressible relation is
arbitrary. 26
ThS arbltrarine
of these relations,
then, does
not stem from their
lack of generality,
that is merely
the mark of their
arbitrary nature,
it stems rather
from
6
ln " hlCh We determine
'
the relations, the
way in
Which (to take a
particular case) the user
of a language
uses the words of that
language,
That Wittgenstein holds
this to be the case
is seen most clearly
in the following
propositions:
'

^

.

j

.

!?3»

Logic must look after
itself.
If a sign is possible, then
„ „-i__
capable of sfeylEg.
Whatever is
in 1 Sic is also
Permitted,
(Thfree
?
U
he reason why
’Socrates is identical'
means nothing is that there
property called 'identical'. is no
The
nonsensical because we
have°fs?n?
ailed o0 niake an arbitrary
deterbe ause the symbol
?,°\be ?
self, would
illegitimate.)
Grtain
sease WG cannot make
o ?0 P
,
mistakes
in logic,
.

T

^

5.^733

s

-

^c^e

says that any legitimately
constructed proposition must have
a
sense
And I. say that any possible
proposilegitimately constructed, and,
II it has no sense,
that can only be
^ecause we have failed to give
meaning
to some of its constituents.
’

2

’
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(Even if we think that
we have done so.)
h
a
hy Socrates
iden-’
UcaJ- ^vs noV'
that
we
have
not
rivtn anv
meaninr; to the ^For d
^denticilT^^i—
xuenxicai
p or when it
appear^
n
titJr
symbolizes
in
aS
entirely S???
f er

Lw

^

:

.

r

rTlllul

is a d

»

i£e^t~o n^

i^thTtw^cSe®,"?,
It

sees

clear,

on this basis,

enyire1 ^

di«”en?

e

that Wittgenstein would

certainly allow the possibility
of defining (redefining)
"is identical" in such
a way that we could
give "an ad-

jectival meaning" to

it.

There is indeed no reason,
as

far as the i^actatus is
concernedi for nQt doing
long as we are explicitly
aware of what we are doing.
The resulting language might
well contain a number of
statements not easily accomodated
by our present language, birc it would not be
incorrect in any sense.
The
three relations
R^, and R
like "identity" in 5.473
?
ana 5 .+r 33
have been determined by the
speaker.
They
seem to apply to the object (and
perhaps, so far as this
section is yet concerned, they do),
but they do so only

^

,

,

,

^

as determined by the speaker.

We have been examining a cluster of
four notions
the logical form of the world, the
logical

form of ob-

jects,

ontic form, and the arbitrariness of the
last of
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lorrns.

,

The devices

I have employed
have
allowed us to make
sense of all of them
but at an
apparent cost which now
becomes q uite clear.
Xs witt .
genstein justified in
moving
.
from
11 oni +
h
ll
4 he
claim
that R,
s
arbitrary because, as
nart of
n-r our
part
symbolism, it has been
fuven a meaning by us,
which we could just
as easily
(and correctly)
change, to the claim
that the relation
R
is itself arbitrary?
(f
if this is a fair
representation
of his claim, it
seems that he is (to
use the Quinean form
01 the objection)
guilty of confusing use
and mention
9Ulte
naUVSly aS
Aristotle.
If this were the
case, it would be a
most discouraging, if
not an impossible task to salvage
or defend his ontology.
To show
that, it is not the
case, that Wittgenstein
is not guilty
of a use-mention
confusion, is the task of
the next
section of this chapter.

.

f

•

j_

^

.

^

’

III

Wittgenstein would indeed be guilty
of the suspected
confusion between use and mention,
if the above way of
posing the problem were correct
for him.
It is
not,

ihe problem as stated above
presupposes that language

(descriptions of real relations) and
reality (the relations themselves, in the world)
are fully distinct,
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separated in a way in
which
concerned, they are
not.

m

.

as far as the
Tractates i=
.
this
" hls
+
section
•

1 wish first
clarify the wa in
y
which Tan eUd ge
ls differentiated
.
thSreby C ° rre0t thS
mdsun der standing
un Sr
the ab0V ° ° riticisra
of Wittgenstein.
I then
argue that two claims
about objects
Jecis follow
folio from the
notions of substance
and 10rm
form as tI have
a
developed them.
ibS flrst ia that
objects cannot be forms
orms fof
(Of any sort);
e second is
that objects cannot
have forms (of any
sort, at least,
that are known or
knowable by us).
From
th6n f ° ll0WS that
and must be simple.
W e have already seen
several ways in which
language
is ana must be
independent of reality. 28
Language, as
well
logic, must ca re for
itself, i. e ., it must
be
able to impart meaning
without reliance on the
way things
really are.
Nevertheless, it is not
somehow "above"
things in the world (to
use a metaphor which
Russell's
theory of types naturally
suggests). The words of
a
language, its signs, are
just as much things
as are
tables, chairs (see, e.g.,
3 .14 3 and 3 .14 3 1).
Language
IS a series of facts
which picture other facts:
.

o

,

.

.

^

;7

~

" ^

.

..

it is,

at least in part, a
sub-set of the facts of the
world,
and not something
completely different from them.

Language, with its forms, and
things, with their

•
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f0

™S

'

t0g6ther

mke

UP s '^tance.

.

Thus language and

reality meet on the neutral
grounds of substance.
The
metaphysical problems this
line of' thought
introduces
are not inconsiderable
particularly the question
of
What, exactly, the
ontological status of
substance is.
This, however, is a
problem which cannot be
solved until
look at Wittgenstein's
attitude toward Platonism,
in
the last chapter of
this dissertation,
the meantime,
«e can see how this concept
of substance allows
him to
escape the criticism that
he confuses use and

-

m

mention.
Substance, as we have seen,
is composed of two. parts,
form and content (2.025).
All three kinds of form,
as I
have shown in this chapter,
can be reduced to the ways
which objects can be related!
again, as 2. 033 tells
us, "form" is defined by
means of the more basic
’

term,

"structure".

States of affairs and facts have
structure:
objects, which make up states of
affairs, do not
have

structure, they are simple (2.02).

The distinction

between fact and thing is fundamental
to Wittgenstein
in the Tractatus.
To think of a form, whether logical
or ontic,

as an object would amount to
collapsing that

distinction.

Thus one cannot identify objects with
any sort of form 29
.

I

he order of things,

their structures, cannot be

237

known without experience
r x lence.

.

As w;-n
Wittgenstein

puts it,
things do not have an
"a priori order",
5.6331,
For the form of the
surely not like this!visual fiais 13
Eye

“

•

—CD

5 63 ',!
.

This is connected with
the fact thn
no part of our
experience if at the
thl
same time a priori
Whatever we see could be
other than
.

brother

Mt^sT

1 * 0 3t

a11

There is no a priori
order of things.
Although, as 5.634 claims,
there cannot be an a
priori
order of things, there
can be and is an a priori
order
of rooms. That is,
while we cannot know what
structures
actually obtain among things
(and hence cannot know
without experience what the
world is like), we can know
what
world could be like, its
possible structures, before
experiencing such structures
actually.
Of the logical
forms of the world (tautologies
and contradictions) this
is clearly the case,
they are for Wittgenstein
preeminent
examples of what is a priori
In fact, as we have seen,
in a sense all forms are logical
forms (as seems to be
reflected if we combine 6.3 with
2.0121).
That is, the
logical form of objects and ontic
forms
.

would, if the

defects in their generality stemming
from our arbitrary
limitation of them were removed, actually
be logical
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forms

They must

,

therefore, have some
a priori element,
If this account of
forms is c orrect,
no forms can belong
to an object literally,
since that would
make the object
itself also a priori
(insofar as the form
itself could
be said to be a
priori
.

,

)

ThlS ar ^ Ument

even if correct,

'

one as too simple,

too incomplete.

inevitably strikes

^

^^^^

more concrete, definite
proof, especially
for ontic forms
that Wittgenstein
held that they are
a Eriori (have an
a priori structure).
Such a proof is not
hard to find,
<5.

3751,.

^example * h simultaneous
presence
tha Same place in
tL visual
v su al field
f^fif is impossible
x._
^-

in

,

1Ca
im P° ssib le, sinie it
f'K the
is rulef Ut
l0gi0al structure
of colour

^

0"

this oont radiction
“ore or
i
follows
ollows -- a parxicle cannot less as
have
two veiocities at the
same time,
bat is to say, it cannot
be
places at the same time; that in two
is to
1
68 that are in different
places
Plaies^t
at the same time cannot
be
identical.

apLars^'in^hv
physlc ?'

_

^

at

dear that the logical proof two elementary
propositions
,,
n
can neither
be a tautology nor a
contradiction.
The statement that
a point is the visual field
has
wo different colours at the
same
time is a contradiction.
is

Colors, here as usual synecdochical
for all ontic properties, have logical structure,
and are thus, in some degree
at least, predictable.
That is, it is possible to predict,
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*now in advance

.

some properties
of a certain color,
even though we have
never seen
,

it.

Examples of the logical
glCal

(a

nrin
m°ri)
•

\

characteristics

of the logical
forms of objects
ccs are not
J
nnt hard„ to
find in
the Trastatus either.
The laws of ph ysics
are such
v,

forms

and Wittgenstein
clearly declares them
to he,
in actu ality,
logical forms*
,

6 321l!
'

e
P
e
SUr iSed that there
must be a°?iaw ori
t
3re
they knew exactly
hoTltVeT'
ff
as always, what is
certain a priori'
proves to be something
purelyT^ii^al
‘

.

6.33>

•

We do not have an a
priori belief in
a law of conservation^"”
but Frthlf «
10r knowledge of the
£
possibility
eiointy
%of a logical form.
j-

6.34.

All such proposition,
includine the
sufficient reas^nf thl
nUlty in nature aad of
least f-P?
effort
nature,
all these are a Priori etc. etc.
insights about
in Wh Ch the P r °P°sitions
Of science
01
scienee can ibe cast.

laws^Vf
^m

—

Thus all three types of
form are seen to be a priori
(in
way), and so logical.
Objects, however, are clearly
not a £riorij they therefore
cannot have form (in any
straightforward sense of the word
"have").
They must be
absolutely simple.
The two above arguments approach
the simplicity of
objects through the notion of the a
priori
In the Trac
tatus this notion is entangled with
another, that of
.

240

foreseeing; the two are tipa
n
tied +together
for Wittgenstein
the notion of
constructing.
"There cannot be/

.

^

,

g

Wittgenstein (5.556), "a
hierarchy of the forms
of elementary propositions
We6 Can fores ee
only what we our-

’

selves construct."

FOrms32

° an be

hierarchically

rising from
the forms of elementary
propositions to ever more
general
levels through the
application of what
Wittgenstein calls
,

"operations"
/

5,2S1
'

5.252t

1

itS

wnereas
whereas an operation can own ar S™ent,
take one of
its own results as
its base.
It is only in this
way that the steo
rom one term of a series
another is possible (from of forms to
one type to
X
1
hl archies of Russell
and Whl't
b
Whitehead).
(Russell and
did not admit the possibility Whitehead
of such
.

f

*

t

selves of

it?f

atedly aVailed them -

These hierarchies of forms
are what Wittgenstein tells
us in 5.556 that we "construct",
and that we can "fore
see
He continues this line of thought
in 5.5561 by
claiming;
.

5.

3361

:

Empirical reality is limited by the
totality of objects. The limit
also
makes itself manifest in the totality
of elementary propositions.
Hierarchies are and must be independent
of reality.

It is the last sentence of thi s
passage which guarantees
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.

us the independence
of fern, from reality,
from objects,
and thus the simplicity
of objects.

Yet there is a problem
involved with 5.5561
which
was not involved with
our prior arguments.
According
to it, we clearly
construct hierarchies by
means of an
operation.
But what of the first
..term.,
(or ..member,..

£iied) of the series?

As 5.556 warns us. we
cannot con-

struct or foresee "the forms
of elementary
propositions."
If our ability to do
these things with other
forms indicates that they are a
Eriori, and independent of
objects,
then does not our inability
to do this for elementary
propositions equally clearly
indicate that at least their
forms are dependent on reality,
on objects, and therefore
characteristic of objects in a
straightforward sense, and
not a E^ori?
(Needless to say, if this were
the
case,

Wittgenstein would simply contradict
himself at this
point.

To argue this way, however, would
be fundamentally
to misinterpret the nature of
elementary propositions.
Elementary propositions are not tied to
reality as the

argument supposes; Wittgenstein held that
they are as
independent of reality as any other propositions!
4.25i

If an elementary proposition is true,
the state of affairs exists:
if an
elementary proposition is false, the
state of affairs does not exist.
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.

"An elementary proposition,"
Wittgenstein claims in an
earlier passage (4.22),
"consists of names."
Names,
however, are elements of
language /and language
is a
human construction. 33
Thus it would seem
bers of the hierarchies
are independent of
reality, from
the first to the last
(if there is such).

^^

IV

This completes the arguments

I

shall marshall to

show that Wittgenstein, in
the Tractatus was committed
to the existence of simple
objects, objects much like
the "Dins
Hi Sich" of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 34
It by no means even attempts
a minimal treatment of
all
the problems touched on in
the course of the arguments.
In particular, two problems
in this chapter simply arose
and were promptly ignored. While
I do not wish to discuss them fully at this point,
it seems valuable to
indicate the lines along which they
can be solved.
.

The first problem is put clearly into
focus by a
comparison of what I have said with B. F.
McGuinness'
article,

"Pictures and Form in Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus

Let me quote from that article at lengthi

The Tra ct at ur hnwp VO
,
for it seems' to imply^hnt'
new problem
of n places are
^Predicates
of the
logical form,
whereas we have assumed
contradictory of
this.
The implies??™
th
about the form of an
alk
object
J
VoilM
l4l aa d 2.023j
(cf. 2.0121 and
2 0131)
ir f’° ob
different logical forms
^ ects have
thn^h
of affairs in which
are sta tes
the'nn«
Ure and the
other cannot, in the
way ^halta c™?
°lour can be
bright and a weight
cannot
S
we mi £ ht think
that there would be on tL
u
° na hand
ob jects
which could have w?+h
an other only certain
two-place relations an/
nd ° n the other band
two-place relate' f
U d h ° ld ° nly be tween certain rana| S
of°oh^
?
objects.
Tb us the
form of depiction 'of
sh owin S forth
that aRb would be
either "+??+
tion to
or
*.

.

mIT
T

V

.

*

*

™

r

.

"thal^as^e^f^tyla-

used accord
ing'^to^the^different’^types of"5
?nd r lation involved
in the state
?
ofTff

e

r, 7Vt

MarH--

d a rami fied theiry
o?

“S£'S u s"

«;*-

ttl

logical form, are of the
order of
tho HiS/
e1
en n -P laced predicates
and nil ?:ac°d Pret? C ate
4' +
?- ° r between propositions,
positions facts,
and, things.
'

Are all the relations
Wittgenstein uses in the
fnaotatus distinguished from
each other only by the
number of places (objects) they
range over, so that
all n-place relations would
ultimately
be the same,

o

does he hold that there can be
two different kinds of
relations, both having the same
multiplicity (both,
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being n-place)?

This
is miPQ+i^
question arises most
acutely
connection with Section
u
II B
nWr, where
b above,
I assume,
as does McGuinness,
that ail
all v,n-place relations
are the
Same
BUt h ° W C
«- conflict with apparently
contrary lines of thought
(none of which I have
yet
examined closely)?

m

.

“

-

—

Its removal is a very
simple task,

1

think,

once

Wittgenstein's theory of
objects as absolutely
bare
simples has been made
clear.
Objectively
i. e ., from

-

the side of the simple
objects
are eo i£so'one and the
same.

-

all n-place relations

Any simple object can
fit

into any two-place relation,
for example, and all twoPlace relations are (logically)
the same for simple objects simply because they
are two-place relations.
No
given objects can be excluded
from any relations, because objects, being simple,
have no qualities or forms

which would prevent them from
entering some relations
while enabling them to enter
others.
No ramified theory
of types as mentioned by
McGuinness will be necessary
at this level.
From the side of complex objects -objects seen
as having qualities or forms
objects which we

~

experience (which are part of the world)

reverses itself.

can

the answer

Each complex object has certain forms
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(or a certain form)
which .permits
permits it to enter
certain
re ations and forbids
if to enter
certain others,
the
logical multiplicity of
totally different
types of relations may
+
well
hp
y
be the same.
From within the world,
a ramified theory of
types clearly seems
necessary fir
the theory of the
Tr^tatus. That necessity,
however,
only appears to conflict
with our
,

'

immediately preceding

findings,

the two are consistent
if „ e keep Wittgenstein’s theory of objects
clearly in mind and
distinguish
between simple and complex
objects.
B

ihe .foregoing exposition
has concentrated on what
might broadly be called
the a priori.
The role I have
ascribed to it is much greater
than is normally the case,
at least for those
concerned with the Tractatus
Any
form is in some sense a
priori.
B ut this raises its own
problem. What is the role of
a posteriori elements in
.

experience?

How indeed can Wittgenstein
maintain that
there are a p o sterior i elements
if the a priori elements
are as broad as I have interpreted
them to be? Redness
(being red) is normally thought of
as something known
a posteriori

;

my interpretation (buttressed with
such

passages as 6.3751) implies that it
is a priori

.
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Wittgenstein himself
seems

m

.

n +h
Passages to declare
th»t all
n experience is
a E°steriori
(as in 5.634).
The full solution
of this, too,
must await a conaeration of complex ejects. The
answer may
ess be sketched here
as follows.
From' the standpoint
of simple objects
(which are outside
the world and out51(36 eXPeri6nCe)
311 f °- s «e a
Eriori.
But which Qf
the many possible
combinations of forms
do we actually
f-d, do we actually
experience? That is to
say. which
of the forms are
really found together
in experience^
That is not a question
which we can answer a
Eriori,
the
answer to it
to the question of
what complex objects
there are (exist) in the
world
necessarily involves
'

-

-

experience which is a
posteriori

.
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CHAPTER III
OPINIONS AND COUNTERS

What are objects

-

what is their real
nature? The
Tractatus has been enlisted
as support for nearly
every
ma Jor answer' aiven thic; n „ oc,+
13 qUeStlon
the twentieth century
with the notable cxopth nr, n-p 4-u
exception of the answers
proposed by the
Idealists.
1
Eric Stenius
Gustav Bergen 2 and
Edwin B.
Allaire attribute one or
another version of realism
to
Wittgenstein,
by -object-, they
claim. Wittgenstein
means
loth particulars and
properties, both, e.g.,
thing and
red.
Ellis Evans is even
more extreme, for he
holds
that relations as well
as properties and
particulars,
serve as objects for
Wittgenstein.
Irving Copi 5 and
6
G. E. M, Anscombe
on the other hand, deny
that objects
can be properties or relations
for Wittgenstein,
they
can only be, as Copi styles
them, "bare particulars".
Wilfrid Sellars/ while agreeing
with Copi that objects
can only be particulars,
argues that Copi and Anscombe
are wrong in limiting them
to bare particulars,
only
qualified particulars are to count
as objects, on Sellar's
interpretation of the Tractatus
Ky own position

m

i

i

,

,

.

,

(ex-

.

pressed in Copi's terms) is that
objects are, for Wittgenstein, absolutely bare particulars 8
that is, that
they have no properties at all, not
even the logical
,
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” p ' rti '* °° w
’**

,h

**«.«,

»

» <-~W w,

.

«.

In developing my
own views
Lel '“ JJ h
ha..
+
ave treated
this pan°Ply of conflicting
and mutually con
^ contradict
tradic tory opinions
" 3
aPPear t0 be a
high-handed manner,
I have
-

-

^

.

Sent, and

will do so in this
chapter
rapier.
Copi-s article, not only
because
I

T
i

h
begin
with
•

•

my own position is
closest to it, but also
because it is fundamental
to all
but. one (Ellis’) of
the above.
I then examine
Sellar’s
position, which lies
closest to my own of
any of the
above except Copi’s and
Anscombe’s.
Finally, ! will
examine some of the
grounds presented for
the realist
interpretation of the ^^actatus,
grounds given in Edwin
Allaire’s paper. His
defense of this interpretation

of
the Tra ctatus is able
to take advantage not
only of the
work done by Copi and
Anscombe, but of that done
by
ellars as well (to which
neither

Bergmann nor Stenius

had access).

It thus represents,

if not in every res-

pect the best, at least the
most broadly based defense
of the realist interpretation.
I do not concern
myself
with what one might call the
extreme realist position,
as represented by Evan’s
paper, because Copi’s article
pointed out its defects more
than adequately.
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in commenting on these
three papers,

I shall not
be concerned with a
detailed examination of
and reply
to all their arguments.
To do so with each
and every
one of these disparate
papers would be a task
sufficient
ly intricate and boring
to drive even the
legendary

Scholastic to tears

9

leave many arguments out,
and
am concerned with only two
things.
In Copi's case I
wishes show that at least two of his own
arguments,
carried to their logical
conclusion, would lead one to
admit that Wittgenstein
espoused absolutely bare particulars.
In the case of Sellars and
Allaire, I will. show
that their arguments, formidable
as they seem do not
show that Wittgenstein rejected
absolutely bare
particulars.
.

1

Of course, the best defense of
my position is constituted by the arguments in the two
foregoing chapters,
none of which has been examined by
any of the people
under consideration here.
If those prior arguments are

not convincing, my criticism of
alternative positions,
even if it is strong, is of little value
to met
hut if

those arguments are convincing, these
criticisms need
not play a very important role and need
not even be

themselves very strong.
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I

Copi

s

Paper, "Objects, Properties
and Relations in
the .Tractatus.", opens
with several powerful
argents
designed to show that
Tractarian
+
cxanan nhi
objects
are neither relations nor qualities.
Interesting
•icsoing as these arguments
are, I shall not examine
them
I °
1
shall
n all simply assume
that his defense of the claim + *,„ +
that objects are neither
qualities nor relations
succeeds.
Copi then continues,

v

are neither

j

relations nor proper?ief ?f?,
they cor ^cspond to any
of the'
tl

i
1
ca

??& ories they must be particur 'fstinction between
formal
(lopican
1 ^ and
anri material
™«+
(contingent) proper!•
ties permits three different
kinds of oarti
r
t0
distinguished
Fi«?
we note
?hi?
S
3 “ aterial Property
implies
P^session of°a ?o
r ° Perty
but
not
con e y
v
» particular
,
f possesses a matprlja
6
y ib mUSt alS ° possess the formal
propertv
1 h
being capable of possessing
y of
that
rty
No "
cleSL
af
abso^u?elfb^ ^^biifalai] as one
possessing
r
ather ~~r'
neixher
formal nor material properties
a
particular as one possessing formal but
no material properties, and a
quali tied particular as one possessing both formal
and
material properties.
With the possible exception of
Parmenides I
know of no historical philosopher
who discussed absolutely bare particulars.
Certainly Wittgenstein's objects are not
absolutely bare; they have "internal"
properties ( 2 01232 ) or "forms" (2.0141), where
form is a possibility (2.0141) and therefore
logical.
Kis objects are therefore either
qualities or bare particulars. 10
ia?s

nnn

r

Pf

w

L

.

*

•

,

.

tf

?

.

V V

.

i

'

•
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He immediately adds
to this that
several passages
2.01,-J, 2.0233, 4.023)
support the view that
objects
Have both internal
and external
properties, but ..there
seems to me to be
overwhelming evidence
that he (Wittgenstein) regarded objects
as bare particulars. 11
Thus
apparently by the argument
ent in the
th Q second
b
paragraph of
the first quotation,
Copi feels that he
has disposed of
the possibility that
objects are "absolutely
bare particulars".
Then, despite some
admitted counter-evidence
he presents four
arguments to show that
objects are bare’
particulars.
I shall first
examine two of these argumerits, and then turn
to the
ie ar
araumpnt
£ u ment nr
of +u
the second paragraph above.
,

The first (Copi's second 12
could be rephrased as
)
follows
,

(Al) Complexes (facts,
states of affairs)' can
be described, not named.
(A2)

Objects can be named but not
described.

(A3)

e?
a P ro P er> ty, the asser^ did so
tion th^+
that it
would constitute a
description of it.

n

(A4) But this would violate

therefore, impossible.
Copi,

of course,

(A2),

and is

limits this argument to material
pro-

perties, but on what grounds?

It seems to work equally

well against the ascription of
any sort of properties,

257

.

even logical, to
objects (if
,
1
11 actually
it
ao
establishes
anything at all^).
For there becrns
seems t0
to b
V e no
reason
Unc Copi gives none) to
limit wU)
pu
\D the
^
fundamental
Premise, to any given
sort' of property.
->

,

(

,

The second argument

I

win

examine' (Copi-s

could be rephrased
as follows

thirst

(Bl)

Propositional signs are
analysable.
(B2) Names are not
analysable.
(BJ>

r

posi?e° i
contain at

'

P ropositi °ral signs are
com,

}

1
r
had°thIfp^ope?trwoSid be a Perty
^
involving only

fFl
fact

'

one particular.”

(B5)

1

lars arfbare ?”

5

(B3)

’

S°

"

a11

P^ticu-

Again granting, pace
Sellars, the validity of
the argument, what Copi has
actually shown
is that objects are

absolutely bare.

For if we leave the object
with a
gical property, exactly the
same argument can be generated to show that that
property must also be removed.
Now let us turn to the
specific reason Copi gives
for eliminating the possibility
that objects are absolutely bare, i.e.,
or limiting these two
arguments
,

to the

case of material properties
instead of all properties,
that rea-on, again, is found
in the second paragraph of
the first quotation from
Copi's article. Here he argues
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SlnCe

2

'

01231

oycts,

«**»*•• —rnal"

they cannot he
ahsoXutely bare
attributes externa!
properties

.

Properties to
2>01231 als0

.

to objects,

but this,

copi tells us, is to
be discounted
in the face of
the
subsequent arguments,
two of which we
have examined
But with this, copi
leads himself into
a dilemma,
if
he accepts the
full force of 2 ,oi
23 l, he must accept
the
claim that objects have
both internal and
external propertreo. This is more
than he wants objects
to have, so
he presents the
subsequent arguments to
show that 2 .012 l
3
should be limited to the
6 cla
claim
\
i m that objects
have only
internal properties.
•

The two arguments we
have just examined, 16
when
fully and clearly worked
16
out,
have shown us that objects have no properties
at all.
Copi wishes to use
these two arguments to show
that:

Objects do not have "external”
properties.
But these arguments commit
him, as we have seen,
also
to the claim that:
(1)

(2)

or

Copi has,

external"?

it seems,

^^

pro P erties

.

"internal"

shown more than he wishes; he
needs

an argument which limits these
two arguments in such a
way that they show (1) without
also demonstrating (2).
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None such is in
sight.

.

Thus, at loast
two Qf h s
.

ments commit Copi to
a claim about
the Tractat.ua „hi
ch
he explicitly
rejects elsewhere in
his paper,
that
objects are, for
Wittgenstein, absolutely
bare particu-

lars.

II

SSllarS b6SinS

"Naming and Saying"
with
an important agreement
with Copi-s position.
He writes
that "all objects in
atomic facts
...
dtl,s are
without ex,

.

•

ception particulars
C opi

1?

»
.

position is tQo

*

*

‘

.

.

w
f
he
teels,
however,
•,

__

that

wittgenste n d d
.

.

not hold objects to be
bare particulars, but
rather held
that they may also have
material properties. The
heart
of Sellars' position
is expressed in the
following
passage
Now if a philosopher
combines
two theses
U) there are not atomic facts the
involving onlv
nit ted to a doctrine of
bare
speaking informally, he holds particulars
that though otf
1
^lations,
they have
no quaUUes ?
Now in my opinion Copi is
correct in attribut-

the second of the above
ion theses
th
two
(all objects are particulars)
if
therefore he were correct in
attributing to
fir
thesis his claim' that
?i
Wittgenstein is committed
to a doctrine of
are particulars would be sound.
Conversely,
.

,

-

’

’
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^ ~^&^

if Wittgenstein did hold

thesis^hat there
'

o

.

•

Tt

°

“

is
surprising, ^herefore'^to
pi
arguing that his contention
+h^ w-?2
^tgenstein
rejects monadic atomic
*
fact
S PP ° rted
what he somewhat relSctan^v
+ u
affirmation of the doctrine
of barfparticulars. 18
Sellars then contends at
length that Copi erred
in not
realizing that Wittgenstein
does indeed countenance
monadic atomic facts.
.

f

(

There are only two points
about his complicated
argument which I would like
to examine here.
The first
the contention that
Wittgenstein countenanced
monadic
atomic facts,
I do not think that
Sellars' evidence is
convincing.
I then v/ish to examine
the moral Sellars
draws from his arguments:
that i s> if there are monadic
atomic facts, is Wittgenstein
eo i^so committed to the
claim that particulars are not
bare (let alone, as in
my position, absolutely bare 19
)?

A

Does Wittgenstein countenance
monadic atomic facts?
Sellars says he does. He begins his
proof of that claim
with an appeal to Bertrand Russell's
tactics:
"Philosophers of a 'reconstructionist' bent
have often found
it clarifying to treat one thing
as a "limited
case" of

another; and if Russell, for one, was willing
to speak

°f "

qUaUty

35 "

-Nation, there

is no freat
initial improbability to
the idea that
Wittgenstein
be willing to speak
S
of a monadic
configuration." 20
SU ° h
SainS itS eff aotiveness
largely from the
assumption that Wittgenstein's
thought was actually
fairly close to Russell's
at this time, close
enough
that Wittgenstein might
well have been tempted
to make
the same moves Russell
made (or, at least,
that it is
reasonable to think he would
be).
As p have argued> 21
however, this assumption
is dubious at best,
Wittgenstein
letters to Russell from
this period and his
comments to
his friend Paul Englemann
both show that well before
the
Tractates was published,
Wittgenstein already felt (or
realized) that Russell did
not understand his (Wittgenstein's) work.
The two simply did not think
similarly
enough to justify arguing
that, because Russell did
something,
there is no great initial
improbability" to
the claim that Wittgenstein
might also be willing to
try it.

“

One of Sellars* principal
arguments ends with the
f ollowingi

The only point

I

have wanted to make is that

castrations, pertaining

to quantification
r to distinguishing between names
and
ments support the idea that the atomic statestatements ol a perspicuous language must
contain
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3-"t
least two name^ +hco^
do so not by
0118
^ ould
supportinp'the^ide^th^
that a miniraa
atomic statement
l
would con-^tn +fc
ames
^rticular^, but by supporting
of
two
]v ^ 3 that
would contain the
name' of a universal®
•

U

descriptive statements
would contain na ZTll

at the at omic

°
•

,

Sellars has attempted
in the passages
preceding this to
demonstrate that, as far
as quantification
theor y goes
Wittgenstein could allow
monadic atomic facts,
since
much of Wittgenstein's
argument in the Tractatus
is
bound up with the problems
concerning theories of quantification, if Sellars can
show this, then presumably
be has given one more
reason for rejecting the
nominalist
interpretation of the Tractatus
'

.

T ° demonst bate it he has
set up an artificial language, which he calls Jumblese,
by means of which he
'

feels he can arrive at what
Wittgenstein would agree to
be a logically adequate
notation.
He provides us with
the following "schema for
the translation from PMese
into Jumblese" (here reproduced
for convenience)! 23

PMese
I.

Jumblese

Names of particulars
a,

b,

c,

Tha same letters written

.

.

.

.

in a variety of neutral styles,
the variety being a matter of
height, the neutrality a matter of the use of the ordinary
f ont
a
c
(rest not reproduceable on my typewriter)
i

*

*

•

.

.

;
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nal statement s,
which will be°discSssed n
fhortlyl°
Green a. red a,
Y
a,

.

a

.Statement functions
^

•

9

•

•

.individual variable,
X V
9

fa!

variable

#

f

in^ivid^i constant,

63
nSUtral Styles
(see !)?

(ra8t n0t repro '

duceable j

fx!

^',,2^1

variable
fame variables in
neutral
styles

x

V

•

’

y*

z
>

*

,

•

«

»

(as above)

Quantification
(Ex) greerT x
(Ef) fa; (Eg) ga
(Ef) (Ex) fx,
(Eg) (Ex) gx,

(Ex)x
(E()a, (as above)
(E() (Ex)x (as above)

,

According to Sellars'
translation schema, where in
English
we have
(Cl) This is green,

in PMese we would haves
(C2) Green a,

and finally in Sellars'
Jumblese we get,
(C3) a

This last then is, according
to Sellars, a monadic atomic
proposition which Wittgenstein would
countenance,
since
the names in atomic propositions
are connected with objects in a one-one relation,
there can therefore be

monadic atomic facts,

2,+
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There ls no doubt
that the tran^Uf
translation table
with
which
ch cellars provides
us will ac T,«
1
us t0 ‘translate
a
p
rpqt many
great
statements from FMese
6 10
to Ju
TlJmhl
™t>lese (thus Engh ,t0 tumble
se )
The problem
em ls
is tha
that^,
accomplishP
ing this feat 01
of tran.i^translation, we« oo
do not show
anything of
-

,

.

•

•

*

f-’T'

translation

m
^

j
does
indeed appear mnot
much simpler than
its rnglish counterpart*
but
tv,^ +
1
bUt that
a PParent simplicity
vanishes on close
consideration. There is
a perhaps'
6Ven m ° re fUndamental
^iticism <* Sellars.
argument
WhiCh Can
br ° Ught
observing the way in
which
he himself refers
to (c 3 ) (and other
Jumhlese translations
of tins sort).
He writes, "I have
attempted to explain
how a propositional
sign can consist of
one log lcal iv
2
arti culated
name." ^ R Ut+ w
“
ttl ++
ttgenstem argues very clearly
bab
i s essential to
names that they
thmr lack
t
all forms of
articulation:

n-r

(Cl)>

,

'

^

*

.

.

i

3.

3^11!

So one could say that
the real name of
aU
symbols that
signified
gnified it
itVJf*
had
common.
Thus one
6
a11 kinds of composition
v/ni nri
d Pr ° Ve to be un
essential to a
name

m

’

A name must avoid any kind
of articulation at all,
even
logical articulation",
that is of the essence of
a
name.
If a propositional sign
is even logically articulated, it cannot be a
name at all.

265

.

Ihe fact that, in the
facec 01
of 3.3411
?
and other
statements to this
i- effprt
nn
ciiect, Sellars
calls (C3) a "logically articulated name"
suggests that he may
misinterPret Wittgenstein even
more severely at this
point.
It
suggests that, although
Sellars explicitly says
that the
proposition "consists of" a
namp he
bo is actually
name,
thinking of the proposition
as a name.
If this is so, it is
a^serious ignoratio elenchi
for a Tractatus scholar,
since Wittgenstein explicitly
castigates Frege for that
very errors
c-

•

3

.

143

:

;

P rop ° sltlon al sign is a
this
h
obscured by the
forr,’nf
form.
of expression in writing usual
or print.
ln a P r ihted proposition,
for exessential difference is apP°
Parent
66 " * propositional sign
and a word!

fact

.

(That is what made it
possible for
6
° Cal
3 proposition a composite
name )
"1'

Did Sellars merely slip when
he called (C3) a "logi
cally articulated name", or
does this represent something integrally connected with
his claim that Wittgenstein countenanced monadic atomic
facts? I believe the
error is deeply involved in his
position.
"A name means
an object.
The object is its meaning,"
(3.0203).
"Objects can only be named ..."
(3.221).
Thus if there
are monadic atomic facts, facts
consisting
of one and

only one object,
they can only be
named.
were so, some sort
of structure
would be
(at least some)
names.

ln

But if that

essential to

call nr- propositions
calling
such as
3) names Sellars
provides a £i^jic_ui_o
reductio Of
of his
hi
own argus
,

-1

ment.

Even if Sellars can
escape these criticisms,
his
alarm that (C 3 ) is
acceptable as a monadic
atomic fact
to Wittgenstein
would still contradict
other propositions in the Tractate
If (c 3 ) is what
Sellars claims
it to be, then the
single object a has a
form,, a form
which we are able to
know.
Wittgenstein writes,
2

'

° 123
'

° bjeCt

3130 know a11
impossible occurrences
in states
of
1

af?Ifrs
° ne

must*"?

obJect?)

P

these Possibilities
th6 mtUre of the

A new possibility cannot
be discovered later.

How are we able to know
a monadic atomic fact
which
consists of one object, a?
We can, it seems, know it
.

only in one of two ways,

other moans.

through experience, or by
some

If it can be known in any
way other than
through experience we can have
a priori knowledge of it,
but this violates 5
3 4 (as we saw in the previous
chapter),
If we know the object through
experience, however,
there is no reason why we could
not know it without
.
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s,

.

all its possibilities.

Mankind long knew
iron
example, without knowing
that it could be
mixed wHh
certain alloys to make
steel,
1 can
I
with a as iron
now it and yet
discover a new
possibility
oiDlilt y of occurence
ater, thus contradicting
2.0123

--

»

SSllarS might

°f

—

to escape this
conclusion by maintaining
that the form of
the object is
strictly speaking
unknowable (though I
doubt he would
d ° S °^'
If S0 thls a gain
seems in flat contra,
diction to what
Wittgenstein writes. The
unknowable is
the mystical, and:
.

’

.

6.44t

^

It is not how things
are in -h
that is mystical fut
it
,

Thus Wittgenstein
considers the form of a
knowable

-

how a is

-

To sum u P!

Wittgenstein claims that the
form -of a
is knowable and must
be known, so to speak,

all at once.

Sellars' interpretation
seems bound to deny one or
the
other of these, and therefore
must be false, at least
for the Tractatus
.

There is yet another argument,
admittedly weaker,
to show that Sellars is
wrong here. Sellars seems to
admit that Wittgenstein holds
(Cl) and (C2) to be com26
plex.
if SOf and if it ((Cl)) serves
as the English
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translation of

(c 3
?

.

en (t3) w °uld
have to have the
same logical
complexity as (ci)
}
to the contrarv
p
'
0f cc™Plexity
may not be a
Snt condltl °" of
synonymy for
Wittgenstein,
\

'i

’

-

‘

Frances

-

,

'

.

it

-east a necessary
condition 27

is

,

most telling argument
in Copi'c
„ ar
11 s Paper
against
+v
-°ea that the Tract^
countenanced monadic
atomic
facts, " writes
Sellars, is based on
the premise that
if
facts are monadic,
"surelv
surely tt™
they include such
factsas that a certain
point in a visual
field is red", 2 8
If
30
then n ° 0ther at0mic
fact could contradict
them
21, 2 0262
4 211 5.1241),
But obviously,
Wittgenem holds that it could be
contradicted
'"i’he

,

•

,

•

.

'

'

’

'

-

(6.3751), so
that no such proposition
could serve as an
example 'pf
a monadic atomic fact
act.
Sellars makes two comments
on
this argument.
The first is that,

t'ori^afquesUontr^fyn^f

have

to the hia ‘
t

.

question to which h^ lifnit* f a ? tUal ° ne a
the answer, and £0 which,
was not required to have as a^ogicLjTL
the answer. 29
'

’

As evidence cellars cites
a procedure of Moore's
and an
argument from Anscombe, though
he might also have
argued
from 5.55541 and the
surrounding passages. 5° And
were
it a question here of
the existence or non-existence
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(or necessity or
non-necessity)

of triadic or
thirty.
Place relations, then
one would be forced
to conclude
that aS Sellars in
«-ates, the question is
purely an
empirical one which
Wittgenstein as a philosopher
felt
that he^ could not
answer.
But monadic relations
are
unique in part precisely
because it can
’

be shown, not
only that they do not,
but that they can
not, exist.
Sellars then adds the
comment that "Wittgenstein
may well have thought
that there are monadic
atomic
I’acts, indeed that
their existence is
obvious, but that
no statement in ordinary
language represented such
a
fact, so that no
example could be given in
the sense of
written down."31 ln a way
this is true Qf

wittgenste
attitude towards many n-adic
atomic facts (e.g,, dyadic),
yet in a way it characterizes
his attitude unfairly.
However obvious he may have
felt the existence of any
given n-adic atomic fact to
be, philosophically he
remained neutral as to whether
it really exists.
This,
again,

is what he intends in
5.5541 and the surrounding

passages

i

it is not

philosophically obvious what the

world would look like, i.e., what
n-adic facts we would
need, if it were characterized
as it really is.
Even
if we prescind from the
arguments I have enlisted

m

before

this section, the argument in the
passage quoted

270.

above will not allow Sellars
to defend his claim that
Wittgenstein accepts monadic atomic
facts.
Wittgenstein
would have demanded more solid
grounds for their existence than their merely seeming
obvious (see his Kote~

—’

•*-?

P-

2e-3e); that "obviousness" alone

might well have made him
suspicious.
B

Is Sellars correct in claiming
that,

if Wittgenstein

admits monadic atomic facts, then he
denies the existence
of bare particulars?
If indeed Wittgenstein would. admit
that there exist a number of really
different monadic
atomic facts, then these facts could only
be different
by having different properties:

Sellars would be correct.

But Wittgenstein was not hesitant to admit
that there

could be many,

infinitely many, identical objects:

2.02331* Either a thing has properties that
nothing else has, in which case we
can immediately use a description to
distinguish it from the others and
refer to it; or, on the other hand,
there are several things that have
the whole set of their properties in
common, in which case it is quite
impossible to indicate one of them.

4.2211:

Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of
infinitely many states of affairs and
every state of affairs is composed of
infinitely many objects, there would

271

.

suill have to be obiect^
CXs and states
J
of affairs.
5.5302t

Russell’s definition of •=•
adequate, because according- i<. ln
to S'
we cannot say that two
objlots tave
r
Perties in
?FveS?f
(t-ven if +^°
xhis proposition is never
correct, it still has
sense.)

In view of these
passages,

it seems that

Wittgenstein
could conceivably have
countenanced monadic atomic
facts,
all of which could be
identical, without denying
that objects are bare.
Corresponding to them would be
monadic
propositions, which could only
affirm that they are different (2.0233), but nothing
more.
That is, it would
not follow from the fact
that the monadic proposition
affirms something about the
object (i.e., affirms simply
that it is different from
another object) that that object has any properties at
all.
There is another way. too, on
which one might countenance monadic facts, without
denying that the Bedeutung
of the names involved has no
qualities.

One could simply

claim that all such propositions
refer to one single
entity, and that that entity has
no qualities.

This,

think,

I

is by no means a position Wittgenstein
would

gladly accept (it resembles a linguistic
rephrasal of
Plotinus' more than any other 32
), but the point here is
not that Wittgenstein actually held this
position, but
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that he could have
held it, without
denying bare (or
absolutely bare)
particulars.
Cellars' argument, then,
collapses on two counts
First, he does not
give us' sufficient
grounds for be-’
lieving that Wittgenstein
would accept a (merely)
logically articulated language,
such as Jumblese, as
adequa
Even if he could convince
us of this, his argument
woul
fail, since it seems
that Wittgenstein could
countenanc
monadic atomic facts, of
a kind, without denying
his
(absolutely) bare particulars.
Ill

Diametrically opposed to my
interpretation of the
Tract at us is ihai of Allaire
and Bergmann.
it is with
Allaire
arguments in his "The 'Tractates'
Nominalistic or Realistic?", that
I shall be concerned
here.
I
divide them into three basic
groups.
First come those
arguments drawn from outside the
Tractatus itself, particularly from Wittgenstein's
Notebooks, 1914 - iQib
.

r

and his article published in
1929. 33

Then come a group

arguments replying to several arguments
presented by
Copi and Anscombe.
Finally, (in the order in which
I
3+
shall treat them ) comes a long
argument based on
2.0231, which Allaire refers to as "a stern
test for
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any realistic
interpretation" 35 of the
Tractatus
A
It is not certain
when
en thp
tne final version
of the

2!^±atus was prepared f 6 but

it surely seems to
have

been ready by 1919.

As G. H. von Wright
speculates it
seems more than likely
that all the Tractatus
was tlken
from earlier notebooks,
and the parallels between
Wittgenstein's lo
J
and the TraetatuR add
L9
support to that conclusion.
So Allaire's first argument, based on evidence
from the Notebooks would
seem
fairly strong:

ebo^i9U__ M

,

,

But

In the recently published
Notebooks, 1914 n
>
SageS enf ?rce realism. Thi
uV/o tn at 'fnT
+wo“that
?o
follow
are typical.
Could one manage without names?
Surely not
Names are necessary for an
assertion
tha?
this thing possesses that
property.
Relations and properties ...
are objects. 37

have already dealt at length
with the kinds of
passages Allaire uses here, in the
first section of
this dissertation. 38 As I pointed
out there, such passages do not indicate "a bold realism" 39
on the part of
the young Wittgenstein.
They indicate rather one of
I

two things:

they show,

on the one hand,

some amount

of confusion on Wittgenstein's part
as to what should

27

.

count as an o bj ,ct
(a confusion which
the Tractates
only partially
clears up), and on
the other
indicate a genuine,
deliberate comment
to using
JeCt amblcuousl
y. a usage widespread
in the Tractatus
a oe .f.
such passages as
Allaire uses,' at any
-t support the conclusion
that Wittgenstein was
a realist
his pre- Tractatus
period.
Of the material
written later by
Wittgenstein and
used by Allaire for
support of his interpretation
of the

^^

r^7~

m

A^Siatus

(the 1929 article and
the Blue Books
say little.
By 1929

'!

i

shall

Wittgenstein had ceased even
to

pretend to know what he
had meant by many
passages in
the Tractatus. 0
Whether or not he actually
did not
know, or was just not
interested in expending the
energy
to rethink and clarify
the old passages, the
fact remains
that he did not even try
to be a reliable guide
'

to the

iractatus.

Allaire is thus at best on
very shaky grounds
here, especially in regard
to the 1929 article, about
which Wittgenstein often commented
negatively. 41 Furthermore, if we accept Copi's
interpretation of Wittgenstein's
comment in the Philosophical
Investigations, p. 2 le, then
Allaire is simply wrong when he
continues
"He (Wittgenstein) never speaks of it (the
Tractatus ). at least with
respect to the nominalism-realism
issue, as Copi and
1
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Anscombe do,

Thus the evidence that
Allaire marshalls from outside the Tractatus. if* it. c
10 is not simply wrong
(misinterpieted), is at best weak
and scarcely convincing.
Let
us turn to what he does
with the evidence internal
to
the Tract atus
i

-

B

Allaire attacks only one of
Copi’s arguments
directly, the very one which
Sellars maintained to be
the strongest against the
affirmation of monadic atomic
facts, namely that based on
6.3751,
Let me quote it
as Allaire does:
,

r
rtle
re simple
specific colours
oLKFtn
+ ? among
ought
to hr
be counted
the simplest.
If
jec s are properties and
elementary propositions consist of names of objects
!
then
the propositions (’this is red’
and 'this is
blue j must be elementary
propositions.
But
can they both be true? Wittgenstein's
answer
is unequivocal!
"For two colours, e.g.
to be
at one place in the visual field,
is impossible,
logically impossible, for it is excluded
by
the logical structure of colour
if
follows that colour predications are not elementary propositions, and the implication
seems clear that objects are not properties,
’

.

.

,

.

,

,

As Allaire points out, Copi maintains two
distinct theses

here

j

(Dl)

il follows from 6,3751 that color predications are not elementary;

c.

}

(

o

f

r
S
le
arerit followrthat i
obie
t s f”?
c^
^
S1

not properties.

Allaire then arrues
g

th-vf
at

(

i ^
ln
the

'

colors
are

roples)

"

,

'

^SStatus, Wittgenstein

did not hold (D2)
to be true that
tnat «wi+t
Wittgenstein does not
believe, at least st
+•
+>,«
at the time of
the 1'ractatus that
if
a specific color
is not a property,
nothing is." 44
Rather, Allaire claims,
Wittgenstein held that
specific
colors are to be analyzed
into their specific,
atomic
shades
and that these
shades are objects for
Wittgenstein.
’

.

-

Allaire develops his
explanation of 6.3751 on
the
basis of two fundamental
assumptions, the first of
which
is that the program
and procedures outlined
in Wittgenstein's 1929 paper (which
Allaire calls "confused and,
even to its author,
disappointing") accurately
reflects
Wittgenstein's intentions at the
time he wrote the Tractates, ten years or more
earlier.
Such an assumption,
as I have just pointed out,
is at best a liability,
at
worst an outright disaster.

Even if Jit tgenstein*

s

later comments on the Trac-

tatus were accurate, one might
well wonder whether
Allaire is correct in reading the
passages he refers to
as containing a reference to
the Tractatus 5 In the

J

paragraph which Allaire quotes Wittgenstein
writes
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"Now if statements of
degree were analysable
as I
used to think
Tn
+v
... In the preceding paragraph
he writes,
'One might think
I thought so
myself not
long ago
....
Both the „ as 1
think „
long ago" are taken by
Allaire to refer to the
period of the Tractatus.'^
But the Tractates was
indeed
long ago" in Wittgenstein's
mind at the time,
these
Passages seem to me better
taken to refer, not to
the
Tj^ctatus, but to some line
of thought he had
been pur47
suing
Austria.
Thus even if one wishes
to trust
Wittgenstein's own interpretation
of his earlier work
(as Allaire argues we
should), it is by no means
clear
that these comments refer
to that work.

-

•»

-

-

.

.

^

^

m

Th ® second Point of
fundamental importance to
Allaire's argument is a critical
one.
He remarks that
6.3751 poses a problem more than
it gives an answer,
the problem of how to analyze
colors to show their struc
ture
1

i

The specific problem isi
in what sense is
this is red and this is blue'
(where 'this'
refers to a speck presently in the
visual
fieid) a contradiction? The
general oroblem
Given the truth-table explication
of
necessary* and 'contradictory' how
can
one
show as Wittgenstein hopes to,
that what the
tradition called synthetic a- prior i
sentences
express contradictions or necessitTes 9
No
solution is offered in 6.3751. We are
told
only that the components of conjunctions
like

2?8
6

vL TT,
SToffl’l “°?f* the
elementary ^

ities, that isAo
vague phrase >8

,

b ^ ue
cannot be
lo S ical structure
'

"

pos ibil soAtio^LT*
n>
? a
ls merely
1

1

fc

He then points out that
the nominalist interpretation
’’does not
provide a solution- to the
problem;
not even approach solving
the problem".
This he
regards as a serious weakness
in that position.
It is a weakness which
I shall make a brief
attempt
to overcome.
Like Allaire, I base my
solution along
lines indicated by the
parenthetical comment in
6.3751,
though I read that remark
quite differently;
.

8

.

3751

.

s

.

....
is °I ear that the logical
rroduct

elementary propositions' can
neither be a tautology nor a contradiction.
The statement that a point
the visual field has two different
colours at the same time is a contradiction. )
oJ:

‘

m

tvvo

.

The "logical structure of color"
refers, as I pointed
ou 49 to the logical and color
spaces surrounding the
,

object

.

The contradiction Wittgenstein sees lies,
not

in the object (as Allaire's interpretation
would have
it),

but in the structure, the conflicting
structures,

of the spaces surrounding objects.
red,

e.g.

A given (shade of)

occupies a particular point in that logical

and color space (though it is not an object),
and a

.

-

279.

“m “ "
1

».

involved ini
(

red and°entirely
blue

he SamS time)
entir ely

is one which lnvolves
the structure of
the piaoe occupiea

by objects when
red and when blue
objects themselves.

-

not,

however, the

That this is closer
to Wittgenstein's
actual intertions than the "soluti
nn" rs-p-p
ooiution
offered^ in the 1929
paper is
read ily apparent in
a moment's lenecxion
reflection on
nn an argument
have usee before. 50
As 5.554 1 and environs
show, we
cannot predict what actually
is the case, what exists,,
what must be independent
of any actual experience
in
order for us to be able to
predict it.
But (El) i s a
contradiction, l.e., it can be
shown false logically!
there is no need of
experience for us to know that
it
is false.
Thus it cannot depend on any
(existing) objects such as shades of colors
for its falsehood.
Perhaps Allaire would feel that
we cannot, strictly
speaking, predict this contradiction
on the basis of
•

Wittgenstein's theory.

Kis interpretation takes Witt-

genstein's philosophy to be closely
related to Hume's
on the essential point here,
as is most clearly expressed
earlier in his article, in connection
with his comments
on 2 0231
.

!
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As the context (roughly
o „,
2 oil
c,
02 5
clear, the main point
)
makes
of j n ,,7 ?'
no logical connection
th< re is
betweei^unfnH
tv and! the
entity
facts in which it actual
„
occurs.
2.0231 is
therefore a variant of
eS1S of lo P ic al
atomism.
It declares + J£?
atomic facts are timpip ha T h ? constit uents of
logical connection Set^en
is no
two
too there is no logical
^acts, so
rn nn"
and the facts in which
ifaclSuy
:

S™
,

Here Allaire clearly
attributes to Wittgenstein
a version
of atomism very much
akin to Hume's. Yet
to interpret
the iractatus this way
is to foist upon
Wittgenstein
problems which, though they
plagued Hume, never arose,
never needed to arise for
Wittgenstein .^ 2 He blocked
them,
part, precisely by
maintaining that the pseudopropositions of logic (tautologies
and contradictions)
are predictable.

m

C

Either proposition 2,0231, or
the immediately
following proposition 2.0232, plays
an important role
in all three of these papers;
2

.

0231

:

The substance of the world can
only
determine a. form, and not any material properties.
For it is only by
means of propositions that material
properties are represented
only
by the configuration of objects
that
they are produced.

—

'

0232

;

In a manner
colourless

of

speaking,

objects are
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have of course
provided my own
interpretation of them
a cing 2
even more radicauy
does
of these p assages
is critical fQr
interpret, ation of t,hp
4
the Thnot
TraetatHB,
they deserve and
win
receive a separate,
special treatment.
On this one point,
Allaire 55 and Sellars 54
find
themselves on one side,
opposed to Copi and
Anscomhe
on the other:
neither of the former
feels that 2.0231
e used 00 buttress
the nominalistic
interpretation
Of the Tractatus.
and their reasons for
arguing that it
cannot are verv similar'
ar.
Consider 2.0231 first*
Anscombe
argues, on the basis
of it, that propositions
are necessary to represent
material properties, names
alone cannot do the job.
But properties are
configurations
1

'

-station

'

of

names, each of which
stands in direct connection
with
an object:
since configurations are
necessary to represent material properties,
the latter must, as
Wittgenstein puts it, be formed
only by "a configuration
of
objects".
Objects, therefore, have no
material properties. 55 Anscombe thus
interprets Wittgenstein's propositions in a straightforward
manner.
She conceives the
last sentence of 2.02
3 1 genuinely to be divided
into
two parts, connected through
an analogy between them,
the first of which concerns
language, the second of
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.

which concerns the
Daraiini
lei

non-linguistic (ontological)
(Wittcen^to
ttgenstein ueas this
kina of analogical
easoning elsewhere,
of course,
61
see
bee
e g.
2.0122.)
Against this Sellars
maintains

phenomenon,
i

i

*

n

•

,

3

im P 1 a misunderstand ing \he c orr t ^
ec
Pre ation of the
Passage in question r
?
„
1 ca
reading of the context
e ul
r T
What Ji+t*
Ltt
says is "Roughly S
nstein
(*'
pea>5 nJ Bei laue:fl
f?
sprochen):
objects a^p ? j Ur ess " g geand this
remark occurs as a
}
Wittgenstein is telling \i® 0n ./ 2 O2 31). V/hat
010 18 that objects
do not determinp
+
S
GV n if a iF
green, the fact
?
° a Sis
green
is not determined by a
3'’

?^

•

V
-

-

:

t^f

Why Sellars wants to
interpret the passage
this waySeemS ClGar en ° U£h
^eonbe. Copi and those who follow
the m have to argue that
fact and object-world
are parallel;
they, have to argue
that the two halves of
the second sentence in 2.0231 constitute
an analogy.
Sellars singly
reinterprets that relation,
he argues that what
this
proposition in fact helps to
show is a difference
between
facts and objects (namely
that the latter cannot
determine
the former).
Sellars' reinterpretation,
-

if correct,

would thus block Anscombe's
argument.
But is cellars

reinterpretation correct?

It seems

perfectly clear from both the
English (in the Pears and
McGumness translation) and the German
versions
of this

proposition that

in,

"only by the configurations of
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Ejects are they
produced", the
"they" refer „
131

Properties- in the
ri
precedinseeding ssentence
t
then what
Wittgenstein is telling
'

eg

that,

/

f0

if

a

•

er0en

’

Admittedly, the fact
that

I™

1

-

T-r
'

,

„

t

'

'

i+ j
Q

° eS

’

us h ei ® 1S
cloarl y

thSn a is ^
complex object

'

2

°

•

bje ° tS

023
l
‘•31,
as read by
Sellars

'

is

oddity (to say the
least) is not the
mist
mg argument. But the
proposition, when read
nor.
does support
Anscombe's interpretation.
Why should
xnoute Sellars' aberrant
reading to it?
Sellars
himself gives us no
reason to do so, it
seems that the
rSad
StUl remains th at of
Anscombe and
Copi,
•

•

^

/

^

n thl ° baSls

^

'

to °- Copi's
interpretation of 2 o
232

25 Clail" ing (aS
s ^cdochical)
that objects lack
all
material properties
is, if not
justified, at least
strene

^

-d.

Wittgenstein is indeed
remarking ("incidentally"
PaSSln§ " ° r " cas ^lly",

are colorless.

not "roughly") that
obiects

So they must be since
(as follows from
2.0 23 1) color first
arises from combination
(configuration)
of objects.
Any other interpretation
seems to press
Wittgenstein's words far out
of the shape they have
in
these tv/o passages,

That polemical twisting
of Wittgenstein's words

becomes even clearer
ait
learer in Allaire's
paper.

m

enceletwee^formal

•

6

He writes,

1S enf rcin a
g
differ?

^

mat erial properties.
the subst ance
unangl’v'^h^^
world determines a
0f the
fSrm
titles have formal
T bl ° means that enPend on tLi? be?n/in P eer^ S Whi ? h do not dedetermine the conf i nn* « 16 ® at *? ns but which
n W ioh the
occur.
can
He also s^yffw
'V
!?
material
are not Sso determines
properties
e
the
fic.pro P e rty an™n? ty
t
deteri
by its formal pronortv
pned
a+1
nate this differpn^o A Attempting to illumihe f urth ® r says that
material prwertiet
6
Presented by
the propositions
?ed
the
figurations
?hirm eanftLT
_-at, unlike the formal properties +frr-,In so doinp- he fir^t
(in the sense o^

ll

*

m

V

-

“s^l

’’

’

&

——

SlOh^mateHir-^^
S

ence between Ihe’ facTthat°
coloured and the fact that
a
r
-e
y

s s/sesa

^week^s?^’

™

s^ck

gss
In particular, note the
sentence which

red

*%*

?
I

redb
$7

have italicized.

What Allaire claims is
undoubtedly true, as far as it
goes,
material properties are accidental
and do appear
only in configurations.
Wittgenstein simply
goes fur-

ther than Allaire,

he says that they actually
"are

produced (ge bilde t)" only through
the configurations.
Allaire, too, pays too little heed
to what Wittgenstein
actually is saying in this sentence.
Furthermore,
his

interpretation commits Wittgenstein,
as we have seen,

285
to a Humean version
of atomism.

ittgenstem

m

.

That in turn involves

problems, centering around
the a prior i
_
predictable characteristics
of colors, in which
he was
actually not involved.

There is undoubtedly much
that is valuable and
defensible both in Sellarsand Allaire -s comments
on
these passages.
That objects do not determine
facts,
e.S., or that 2.02 3 1 is also
concerned with "enforcing"
and clarifying the difference
between formal and material properties are comments
which do help clarify the
complex of problems with which
Wittgenstein tried to
deal in these passages.
But there is no good reason
to question the fundamental
correctness of the interpretation of the propositions
originally given them by
Copi and Anscombe.
Indeed, as Sellars and Allaire
show,'
attempts to interpret the passage in
a way which does
not support nominalistic
interpretation of the Tractatus
result in a highly abnormal reading
of its words, a
reading neither the German nor the English
structure of
the sentences supports.

IV

The three persons

represent,

I

think,

I

have chosen to criticize

the high-points of the three major

286
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erpre uations of the
ontology of the
Tractatus.
Many
°
6rS haVS Written Wel1
° n th at subject
to deal with
all the arguments,
all the- papers, I
would have to unleash a raging torrent
of words, a torrent
which might
be more difficult
to end than
thsn to
+ n continue
indefinitely.
I have no desire
to continue it,
115 it is, at any
rate,
not germaine to my
task.
i

Set out to show th at
all arguments oppos-

ve

the nominalist
interpretation of the Tractatus
were
clearly wrong, nor even
that those I have chosen
to
consider are so. What I
hoped to show, and hope
I have
ahown is that some of
the principal arguments
which
have been adduced to
block that interpretation
are, when
not clearly wrong, then
at least by no means
clearly
coirect.
If i have done this, it
is enough,
I must
then rely on my prior and
forthcoming arguments to convince the reader that my
(extreme) nominalist interpretation is the correct one
,
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Allaire does not explicitly state this.
It is
however, the only reason I can find for
ascribing the
reasoning of the 1929 article to Wittgenstein's
earlier period (otherthan that Allaire
wants to do
so, 1 or obvious polemical purposes.)

This seems all the more likely in view of the
obvious
overtones of logical positivism found both in this
article and in his 1930-33 lectures as Moore recorded
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CHAPTER

.

IV

COMPLEX OBJECTS
I

have often warned,
throughout the preceding

chap ..ers

,

"thaL

*

0

*

ic? ~ 1v v
ls
ambl SUous in the
•

,

Tractatus

.

y interest so far has been
to show that Wittgenstein does affirm the
existence of absolutely
simple
objects in the sense of
absolutely bare particulars.
Emphasizing this line of
argument, this meaning
of object', to the exclusion
of the other has led
us into a
strange situation,
simple objects lie outside
the world;
though they may be said
to be in logical space,
etc.,
•

neither spatial nor color
qualities can be said to characterize them, or belong to
them, in any straightforward
manner,
simple objects can shed all
their properties as
people can shed all their
clothes, and no property is
any closer to, more essential
to or really a part of,
an object than any article of
clothing is of
people.

But what has happened to our
familiar world, the
world of complex objects replete
with qualities? Obviously we have lost it, just as

Wittgenstein warned us

at the very beginning of the
Tractatus we would, This
is the gist of 1 - l.ll,
objects lie outside the world

outside of all spaces (even logical
space).

The purpose
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or this and the following
chapter is to return the
world
to us in the way
Wittgenstein returns it.
I„ this chapter I have three principal
aims.
The first is to show
how we can introduce and
use complex objects in
the TractatU “'
* hen 1
Sha11 ^ iscuss the
nature of complex objects. in particular how
they have qualities.
In this
I Pay especially
close attention to
Wittgenstein's use
of 'internal', 'external',
and 'formal'.
Finally, I

shall provide a brief summary
comparison between simple
and complex objects.

What is the world?

In one sense this is a very
easy

question for Wittgenstein to
answer; in another. sense it
is a question which, though
answerable, is very complicated;
yet another sense it is unanswerable.

m

We can derive the first of these,
the simple answer,
from the following propositions!
1*

The world is all that is the case.

1.1:

The world is the totality of facts,
not
of things.

1.12:

or the totality of facts determines
is the case, and also whatever is
not the case.
P

v/hat

1.13: The facts in logical space are the world.

r

•12 and 1.13 are of
special interest,

since they uoint
out an ambiguity in
Wittgenstein's position which
will
bo of some concern
later.
The latter implies that
the
world consists of two
parts, neither of which
alone can
be the world, but which
together make up the world,
objects and forms (or
"spaces").
A conflict arises between
1.12 and I .13
1 and 1,13

(

or 1 ).

In

Witt Senstein defines the
world as "all that

is the case",
°a^ S that the

i.e.,

the "totality of facts"

(

1 1 ).

'totality of facts determines

(

bestimmt

what is the- case" (italics
mine).

.

i >12
)

The question thus

arises:

-Did Wittgenstein distinguish
clearly between
being (what is the case) and
determining (what is the case)?"
If he did (and the natural
assumption is that he would

probably do so), which claim is
closer to his actual
overall intentions:
that the world is the totality of
facts,

or that that totality merely
determines the world?

That this question arises here points
out an ambiguity
in the word 'fact' as Wittgenstein
uses it, which I
cannot develop until the end of this
chapter and the
next chapter.

However, in light of this problem, our

simplest answer to the question of what the
world is
must take the form of a disjunction:
either it is all
the facts in logical space,

or it is determined by all
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the facts in logical
space.

According to the above,
the world is split
into
two Clements, neither
of which alone

is the world.
The
second, more complex
answer, in contrast,
attempts to
answer the question
from within the world,

“

tlng

“

without split-

C ° nside

-

^cts

enced world known a
Posteriori.

as part of an experi-

Thus, empirical scien-

tists give the best
answer to the question
of what the
world is.
Important philosophical
questions nevertheless arise, and perhaps
chief among them (for
Wittgenstein
the Tractatus, at any
rate) is "How is this
world-picture related to the
one we have

m

just examined-

Or,

more precisely, the first
answer took properties
away from objects, but
this one seems to give them
back.
How can one reconcile the
conflict between the two
answers?
xhis,

chapter.

of course,

is the central question
of this

Its answer may be previewed
briefly in the

following propositions!
6.13t

6

.

341

Logic is not a body of doctrine
a mirror-image of the world.
Logic is transcendental.
!

but

Newtonian mechanics, for example,
imposes a unified form on the description of the world.
Let us imagine a
white surface with irregular black
spots on it. 7/e then say that
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whatever kind of picture
these make
fPProximate as closely’
a
asTw?rtT
° 1
Y lsh to the aescription of it' bv
covering the surface with
a sufficient]
fine square mesh, and
then saying of
Sq ar
hethe r it is blacker
white
?
white.
In S^
this way I

t
hn
JS

.

shall have imfled f ° rm ° n the description
p
6
The forrn is optional,
t
haVS achieve d the same
result by using a net with
a triangular
or hexagonal mesh.
Possibly the use of
ri n
^ fV lar nesh would have made the
^
description
simpler:
that is to say,
ht be that we could
describe the
cm-r?n^
surface more accurately with
a
triangular mesh than with a finecoarse
a
0Sh -° r oonversely
and so on.
)
The
H?r?
-he different
nets correspond to .different systems for describing
the
world.
Mechanics determines one form
or description of the world
by saying
thar all.propositions used in
the
description of the world must be
obtained
a given way from a given set
of proPositions -- the axioms of mechanics,
it thus supplies the bricks
for building
the edifice of science, and it
says,
Any building that you want to erect
whatever it may be, must somehow be
constructed with these bricks, and with
these alone.
.

a

,'

!

.

,

m

(Just as with the number-system we must
be able to write down any number we
wish,
so with the system of mechanics we
must
be able to write down any proposition
of

physics that we wish.
6.

3^2

j

And now we can see the relative position
of logic and mechanics,
(The net might
also consist of more than one kind of
mesh:
e.g., we could use both triangles
and hexagons.)
The possibility of
describing a picture like the one mentioned above with a net of a given form
tells us noth ing about the picture.
(For that is true of all such pictures.)
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t

2 5

is that if !

c
f

.

laracteri2 e the picture

aesori »lng
the^world
5
tells us nothing about
IhTvTrid^w^
what dees tell us
something aboSt it
n
hlch it is possible
i
to describe xf
1 by
b
tv
these
means.
We are
about thc world by
the fact

L

,J;

thT'T^

Logical space and the quality
space of Newtonian mechanics
are here declared similar
in this respect:
they do not
arise from within the world,
from the qualities of facts,
but lie,

so to speak,

at its boundaries.

What lies in

the world (what the world
is) is combinations of
objects
(facts) as they are shaped by
the spaces lying around,
but extrinsic to, them.
It is also,

in a sense,

impossible to answer the

question of what the world is.
6‘
•

/|A< ’

!

s not
things are in the world
H
thati is mystical, but that it
exists.
.

The how of the world can be known,
but that it exists
cannot, and this is the mystical.
If we follow this
approach, the world again divides into
two.

On the one

hand we have the knowable, the how
things are, the way
which they are or the way in which objects
combine

m

ultimately, the forms of the world. 1

On the other hand,

2 99 .

we have what is,
according
b to this
U,lfa Proposition,
essen+ rally
, al1
P
mysterious,
that the world
u is.
is
In a very real
sense, the question
itself is declared no
nonsense under
uhls approach.

w

m

.

in

rr

obiOects.

an

°f

tMs

is there a pia °
e f ° r c ° m piex

Nowhere

In each of these
three views Wittgenstem has, one might
say, been trying
to view the
W ° rld fr ° m itS
edge or *ith
special concern for its
limi s
(
S iS least
the second view,
;
In tMS
We can a PPly again
a passage from
one of his letters
concerning the Tractatu
s,
»der Sinn
Buches ist ein ethischer.
Ich wollte einmal in
das
Vorwort emen Satz
geben
Ich
-

™

’

-

^

....

wollte naemUch
schreiben, mein Werk
bestehe aus zwei Teilen,
aus dem,
der hier vorliegt, und
aus alledem, was ich
nicht geschrieben habe.
Und gerade dieser zweiten
Tail ist das
Kichtige. Es wird naemlich
das Ethische durch mein
Buch
gleichsam von Innen her
begrennzt
,» 2
.

.

.

complex objects occur within
the world.
They are
introduced through an analysis
of facts (unlike genuinely
simple objects).
Facts are said to be comprised
of
states of affairs which are
said to be
objects in com-

binationt
2*

—

—

What is the case
a fact
is the
existence of states of affairs.
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A state of affaire
is a combination

.

l

of objects (thingsff*

hen^ approached from
within the world,

perties, even essential
properties.

things have pro-

2 012!

elC nothin
is
if a
thinf can occur S in accidental:
thing
a state of affairthe possibility of
•'
the statP
8
must be written into
the thing it^elff
Objects in the world also
have forms, in a
'

normal, straig,

forward manner
2,0141: The possibilitv o-p -i+o ^
or .its occuring in
tii
stafpq Af affairs
ts the form of an
object,

•

2.033:

Form is the possibility
of structure.
Wittgenstein uses -object', in
the sense of 'complex
object', very broadly in
both the Notebooks

m

21^£l^tus,

and in the

the former it is clearly
the case that

the word can be applied to
anything one wishes:

What seems to be given us a
prio ri isS the
Id
ical ^irthe concept
0
’

toof^

^

IT

^

"

^

properties

*

etc.,

are objects,

The T r a ct at us is not quite so
clear on this point, but
I believe one can still
see that Wittgenstein held there
that, wit_hin the world, any
proposition or relation or
property could be (or could be thought
of as) an object.
object' is, so to speak, a word
constantly shifting in
meaning and type of reference, to meet
the needs of the
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moment.

Thi^

t
’

’

13 the

waning

interpret to concern
more than
tion

ii

of 4.12 3

,

which

u -t that
ust
that one proposi-

s

^•123

1

a property is interm l
r *
unthinkable that it,S °1 * l* 13
bject should
not possess it
•

:

t?

stand
latioA ST

°f

*t ue and that one
n

rna r
^ter
to'darker
Ci
i^
it is
i'
unthinkable that +u
1

-ouib not*stand

•

^is^^)
S

h
object '^corresponds
to°the s h ift? n
rdS
^relation \'J°
'

’""W

Perhaps a more appealing
interpretation, at first
nee, would be to
e,
claim that Wittgenstein
is pointing
out here that 'object'
can be used at any
level
in a

series of types.

if the series

-

.

object, property of

the object, property of
the property,
represents a
series constructed in
accordance with Russell's
theory
of types, then one may
plausably wish to read Wittgenstein here as claiming
that 'object- can be
shifted from
one level to the other,
from the first level, e.g.,
to
the second.
Then the property (of the
object) becomes
an object (the sense of the
word 'object "shifts", Wittgenstein says) and the property
of the property becomes
merely a property ('property
undergoes a corresponding
"shift").
This interpretation will not
do, however,

-
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th>w
3

.

.

twi

of

331 and 3 332 )
.

Further evidence that
Wittgenstein uses -objectthio broadly occurs
later in the Fractatus
,

5.4?3:

Logic must look after
itself.
If a sign is
,
possible
capable of sigHfylK?’ thpn xt+ ls also
+
at6Ver ls
possible in lo^ic
U t-L c i,
is ';i,
also
u_
_
f
+ pH
uhe reason why -Socrates pernnif
! “f .7 ,
is
identical*
means nothing is the? Jh
n ° Pr °~
Perty called* MenUca^
mb"
he
pro P°sition is nonsensica?
fisical i
because
we
foppj
have
iai.ied Lo make an arbi tnru
oixrary
determination anH no+ vbecause
the symbol
in
ltseli would be
illegitimate.)
-

:

5

i

,•

.

'

.I.

,

.

v

nt^/
,

/

'

mistakes^inkogic

?

'

"" Cann0t “ ake

(See also 5.4 ? 33.)

If there is no good
reason to prevent
one from interpreting
identity as a relation
(if one is
willing to "make an arbitrary
determination" to do so),
there is likewise no reason
to prevent one from
seeing
it as an object.
Anything can be an object,
too, provided only we "make" the
proper "arbitrary determination".
The range of objects in
the world can thus be
exceedingly
great indefinitely if not
infinitely so.
,

We can exhibit something
which is common to all
these things we know as objects 4
namely in the claim
that all objects in the world
are complex.
All such
objects, in other words, are
subject to analysis, to
breaking apart into yet simpler
components until we
,
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roach the position
outlined in the first
two chapters.
which we have on the one
hand forms and on the
other
absolutely simple objects.
All the objects of the
world
are complexes formed
of simple objects
in relation.
From
this an apparently very
startling thesis follows

“

(startthat is, for the Tractates
as normally interpreted):
complex objects, objects
in the world, are a
type of fact.
The thesis appears as
startling because for the
iractatus fact and object are
normally taken as belonging to two fundamentally
different, exclusive categories.
Thus, e.g,
Max Black writes:
ling,

Agairst the background of
earlier metaphysics
he outstanding innovation
of Wittgenstein* o
ontology is his characterization
of the Si
S
an “egregatl
fact",
not Qf tthin
in S s U. l.D.
] ??
This sets him off
u
n
2
sharply from Aristotle, Spinoza,
indeed :from any of the 'classical Descartes
philosophers'
who come readily to mind, the
earlier Russell
d
me ta P^y s icians search Tor
?ruthfnt
rutho oi th*
the highest generality about
the
ey usually' conceive of
themselves
® investigating some
nameable entity, or
in +the language of the Tractatu
s
a thing
A supremely important one, to be
sure"
^umma rerum, containing everything
’

'

'

’

^

.

'

that is
hut a ‘thing nonetheless.
Wittgenstein breaks sharply with this
tradition.
He rejects at the outset the traditional conception of the universe as
something
tnat can be referred to by a name.
as a P ar_t

I,

»

of course, have used the same point,

the fundamental

difference between fact and thing, to criticize
Sellars.

6
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Yet however surprising
ing thicthls claim might
seem at f irst
it was after
an +t0A ^te expected
r 311
T-r wu+
Wl ttgenstem holds
aVe 1USt
he d0es
that anything can
be an
Je0t
th n faCtS can also
objects,
furthermore,
;
:
Wittgenstein equates world
with fac
Wlth
foot+
ts (+
(totality
of facts),
"
° bjCCts
^utMde the world. Yet he
does not
deny that there are
objects in the world
(as 4,123, i.a.
shows); but then such
objects
Lbs must ho
J
te radically differ
en
r ° m th se ° ther
objects
By the definition
:
of fact
given
2 - 2,01 above,
we have no choice
but
t° say that complex
objects of all types
molecules or
colors, pens or sounds
are all actually
'

.

’

‘

'

'

.

^

'

.

x,

7

•

’

.

u

-

-

facts.

But does this not
vitiate the sharp
distinction
Wittgenstein has always been
held to make between
fact
and thing, as well as
that between their
linguistic
counterparts, sentence and
name? It does not; in
fact
it forces one to make
the distinction even
more clearcut and accessible.
To show this, I will
examine the
historical roots of Wittgenstein's
distinction between
propositions and names (which is
reflected precisely in
that between fact and object),

Wittgenstein was undoubtedly under
Russell's
influence when he made the
distinction between proposition and name, particularly
under the influence of
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Russell's work in "On
7
Denoting"
T n +Vl +
ln
6
that article
Russell presents a theory
of sentence-analysis
whi^h
enables one to escape
from the kind of
extreme Platonism
e had held earlier.
The theory is based
on a vital
distinction between genuine
proper names and merely
apparent proper names;
confusion of the two,
Russell
claims, has seduced many
philosophers into accepting
had arguments for the
existence of numerous
abstract
objects; after clarifying
the confusion, we can
return
to a more sensible
ontology.
Apparent proper names look
(or sound, etc.) like
names, but they can be
shown to
have a logical structure,
and therefore to be
disguised
descriptions which need not
refer.
Genuine names lack
the .structure necessary
to a description,
disguised or
overt
•

How does one know whether
what appears to be a name
disguised definite description
or a genuine name?
Russell's early answer, accepted
initially by Wittgenstein, was that of logical
analysis. We analyze propositions until we come to what are
obviously
fully anal-

yzed propositions; such names as
appear in them must be
genuine names.
As I have shown, Wittgenstein
early rejected Russell's method, substituting
one of his own.
He retained, however, the
distinction between propositions
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von a ter he gave
up the program of
logical analysis as
lf
Wr ° nS Slmply
-achievable, he maintained
that
tMS Central disti -«on
was both true and
useful (see
f ° r ° nG expressi
this in the 'i'ractatus l
Ap .
Plying this to the world,
to ontological
problems, he
made the obvious
distinction between what
has structure
and what has none
ione,
Phe> former
the
he called "facts"
(or
"states of affairs"), the
latter "objects".
ThlS 18 obviousl a very
y
unusual, extended use of
the word .fact' (
'Tatsache. )
but its oddity is no
guarantee of its uselessness.
Wittgenstein is trying to account for two things which
had bothered him in the
Note,
books,
on the one hand our
strong feeling that there
must be simple objects, on
the other the certainty
that,
if an object appears in
our perceptual field, it
is eo
'

-

r

,

•

,

i£so complex.

He accounted for both by
excluding simple
objects from the world (from
our fields of perception)
and making the world the sum
total of structures or complexes, facts and states of affairs
which make up facts 9
By this maneuver he both
satisfies the analytical requirements of logical analysis (by
providing for the existence
of genuine names and things to
which they can refer), and
at the same time does justice to
his belief that we can
,
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never rid ourselves of
complexity in the world,
x.e.,
that we can never find
an
proposition, 10

example of a fully analyzed

Thus my claim that things
are a species of facts
(though there may be facts
which are not things) is
not
so improbable as it may
have seemed at first.
Both the
genesis of the distinction,
and passages in the
Notebooks
and the Tractatus, tend
to support that identification.
Furthermore, it casts new and
interesting light on a
number of propositions in the
Tractatus
The thesis of
1.1, for example, would read,
the world is the totality
of complexes, not of simples.
In line with this interpretation, 4,2211 and related
passages become more than
an idle speculation for Wittgenstein,
for it would seem
that, often at least, he was tempted
to view the world
as precisely such an infinitely
complex group of complexes.
to end the series of complexities
is to leave
the world.
.

Does this use of ‘fact’ have anything to
recommend
it outside the context of logical
analysis?

oddity

,

I

think it does.

comparison.

Despite its

We can best show this by a

Many philosophers, such as Aristotle, view

concrete things (which they of course admit to be
complex) as in some sense ontologically basic, able to

exist independently,

or that upon

^^^
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^

Pend, without itself
depending on other
thi,
Aristotle holds in
the Cot
that the primary
sub^
are thinSS like
indi
cows, ete.
:
Ihl .
S re
eCted
11
la
histone claims, by a fun .'
Rental -Ufference betwee „
his
the one
hl S Whlt6
in
place'
on the other.
T
flrStt
th6Se iS
ultimate sublet, that
which
cannot be a predicate;
the other two,
though similar

"

«'

^

'

;

"

^

—
™
,

'

^

^

^

,

in

structure, can ultimately
be predicated,
if f read the
Categories Correctly,
and that of things
like the first
Wittgenstein wants to blur
this type of distinction
man tMS WMte “0
this-in-the-market -place are
all facts, they are
all similar in that
they are complexes.
There is no genuine
one-way dependence
(as Aristotle of course argues
there is),
u- +
+
s Jt
this white
may not be
able to exist without
this man
but this man is equally
unable to exist without
this white.
For one or another
purpose, Wittgenstein might
agree, we may wish to lay
stress on one or another
of complex,
Aristotle on
men, or Bergmann on
colors, etc,, but Wittgenstein
remains indifferent to all
these possibilities, since
none
of them brings out anything
of genuine ontological
significance.
The only genuinely significant
ontological
'

-
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distinction, for
Wittgenstein

that between
h ^
inat
facts

is

’

and things,

between all complexes
exes

.

1

»

n
on +
the
one hand,

and

absolute non-complexes
P exeo on thn
u
the other.
Wittgenstein is
thuo, unlike
Strawson and ^rrawson
no
Strawsnn*^s version
of Kant, 12
a genuine revisionary
rae ^physician
J metanhvc-ini
in the Tr actates
at
least, and his revisi nni o+ +
revisionist tendencies
are clearly visible
the way he redefines
the word -fact'.
•

.

>

m

II

Complexes of all sorts
are distinguished
-from each
other by the relations
they have to

one another.
If two
things have all the same
relations, they are
indistinguishable but not therefore
the same thing (as,
e.g.,
Leibniz would have claimed):

2.0233: If two objects have
the same logical
the
n y distil?ction between
i
thpm’ a P a] iu from
their external prof
perties, is that they are
different.
0233 1 sEither a thing has
properties that
nothing else has, in which
case we
can immediately use a
descrintion to
1
lt fr ° m the others
and
ref^Hfo
t0 11
or
on the other hand,
tuf® are
there
several things that have the
woie set of their properties
in common, in which case it is
quite impossible to indicate one of them.
,

:

^

>

;

’

5.5302: Russell's definition of =
i s inadee ause Recording to it
we cannot
?
Slf+u
say thatJ two
objects have all their
properties in common.
(Even if this
•

a ^°^eT
o8
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u
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Properties are reduced in
all cases to rolations
tQ
say of two things a and
b that they have
"the whole set
of their properties in
common" is to say that
they are
related to all and only
the same things in
the same way.
That properties are
reduced to relations is
nothing more
than one would expect
from the arguments and
rebuttals
of the first three
chapters, but a very brief
review of
the reasoning behind it
may be helpful at this
point,
since it serves as the
basis for
,

this section.

Following my own second chapter
(and most commentators on the Tractates.) I
divide properties into two
kinds (the former of which
again divides

into two but
that division is not now
relevant), logical and material.
That the latter are relations
is shown (as Copi has already pointed out 1 ?) by 2.0231 2.0232, where Wittgenstein claims that they are
"produced by" "the configuration of objects". That the
former are also reducible
to relations can only be indicated
briefly at this point.
In 6.12 Wittgenstein equates formal
and logical properties.
6.12.
The. fact that the propositions of
logic are tautologies shows the
formal -- logical -- properties of
language and the world.
The fact that a tautology is yielded
by this par t icular way of connecting
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C " tS

characterizes the
constituents.
if p ro
aI e t0 yield
a tautology
v/nen
when^thev
they are connected in o ~ZZ.tr
1”
way, they must have
certain'
st™^
£
ruc
tural properties
?
1"
a tautoio^hel
combine^L^Ms 5
that **><* PossesrtKsH
structure! properties.
structural

Wio°Sr 1i^
k

‘

'

•

As Max Black points out,

'formal' and

'internal' mean
the same for Wittgenstein,^
and Wittgenstein himself
also identifies 'internal'

with

122

•

structural

•

In a certain sense we
can talk about
P
tieS ° f ‘>'>1*°*^
states ofTrr
Ja rS
or
in tha case
:
of lacts
fact” about
»K
.?
structural
'

’

proper-

»

formai
relations^

Che Same sense about
atl ° nS
d Structural

“

(Instead of ’structural
property’
also say ’internal property,
instead of ’structural
relatioA’
internal relation’

I

.

Thus both material and logical
properties reduce to
structures, i.e., relations between
objects which do not
have those properties.
If the above view is correct,
and if, ultimately,
objects are absolutely bare,
Wittgenstein's reduction of
properties to relations of objects seems
to make no sense
If objects are absolutely bare,
they have no properties
at all:
even great clusters of them would
seem incapable
of producing (or being^) properties.
Following this

line of development

have emphasized
in Part II,
" haPtSr
the l>ro P er t y“
spaces within
whlch’object
find themselves do
not helon g to the
objects themselves
'
d ° n0t belon
S
°^ects, what sense is
there in saying that
they are (or are
formed by) rela
tions of objects?
They would seem to
be entirely i nd ependent of the obiect
Jec-. as isc oour
perceptual apparatus
(our "faculties") on,
e.g., Kant's view.
Either way
here seems to be no
good reason for
reducing all properties to relations.
,

I

'

^
.

r

i

The problem can also
be put another way.
Wittgenstein would maintain that
there is a very strong
relation between configurations
of objects and
material
properties. Material
properties cannot arise except
through configurations of
objects; such configurations
are necessary to their
existence. 1 *
(The same, of course
holds true on my interpretation
for logical properties).
But it would seem that
there is an insurmountable
difficulty in accounting for
a necessary relation
between
material (or logical) properties
and configurations of
absolutely bare objects,
if their configurations
can be
correctly said to produce
material properties, then bare
objects must have at least the
property that, in certain
combinations, they will produce that
property (they must,
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wo.wm,,,.

COmment about ''Plato'

,r

^

haS thS CaPaMli

s

«.

"although "formless"
or

_
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that "° P1

^

ld

Z

recep

an y Particu-

<* receiving form
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The problem that
faces me, briefly
stated, is how
1,0 eet from
a world of obiects
t„ + = 11
ts totally
J
Without denying
the necessary
relation between the
configuration of obJ6CtS and the qualities
configurations produce.
The source -of the
y 13 that absolutely
simple
objects do not seem ahio
produce anything (and
for
this reason the dll
+,
di ff
*
faculty does not arise
for either
Copi or Anscombe).
,

i

r

Let me attack the
problem in two ways,
the first
via the net metaphor.
6.341, 6. 3 4 2 6. 3 4 and
3
6. 35
clearly express a metaphor
which is at the heart
of the
£fflctatus theory of properties
and descriptions,
since
the first two were
quoted above (page
4), I ehall only
quote the last two at this
point:
,

6.3^3:

Mechanics is an attempt to
according to a single plan construct
all lie
true propositions that
we need for
c description of
the world.

6 -35

Although the spots in our
picture
geometrical figures, nevertheless are

.
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ous -ly say nothing
f
61r actual form and
Msition
position.
A he network,
however i
r
geometrical;
Bi -i^LZ
all its nroperties can be given a pr
iori
ik
he prin iple of
sufficient
reason etc.
reason,
eJ are about
^
the net and
nou about what the net
describes.
>v

!

°I

«?

.

The metaphor is clear, and
so are its limitations.
"The
form is optional (belirtig)-,
the properties „e end up
ascribing to the world and its
objects, the relations
oee there, can be changed
as we change the "form
of
description".
"Thee P°
Doqqihin+u
*
ssl Dility of describing
a picture
like that mentioned above
with a net of a given form
tells us nothing about the
picture.
(For this is true
of' all such pictures.)"
To rephrase this in a way
similar to that in which I stated
it in Chapter II, our

- P— 0

~

conceptual schemas attribute qualities
to ob-

jects (put the objects in various
places in different
spaces), but those qualities do not
characterize the
objects themselves, What does tell
us something about
the world is "the precise way in
which it is possible
to describe it by these means" and
"the fact that it

can be described more simply with one system
of mechanics than with another."

This last part is of special concern for the
problem at hand.

The "precise way in which" we can describe
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the world means
preoiselv tu
precisely
the +true sentences
which do
fa0t
° n a £iVen
describe the world.
T hatU
a contingent matter,
depending on what
objects there are
ln terms of the
metaohor
i +
etaphor, it
^
depends on the location
of
the dots on the rage
e
even +k
though it can not
describe

"

’

—

their,

•

-

and can quite easily
(if perhaps somewhat
un _
naturally) be said to be
produced by them. The
relation
between the properties
and the description
(the net) is
necessary in this sense,
if there were no
dots
there are, there would
not be that particular
natural
property; if there were no
-a,
uu QO0S
dots at all
di there
would be
no properties (material
or logical) at
all.

The metaphor is exciting,
but its many limitations
are both obvious and at
times exasperating.
Expressed
less metaphorically,
Wittgenstein's position can be
seen
as the

conveyance

and reconciliation of two
lines of
thought.
The first of these is
already very familiar,
the world is the totality
of facts and facts are
(essentially) complex.
I have dwelt less on
the second, so it
is less familiar.
We can construct a priori
numerous

combinations of material properties

-

for example, this

white page (that this page is
white, to express it as a
fact), this red page (that
this page
is red),

we pick out only one as actual,

etc.

Yet

only one description as
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true (though the
false descriptions
are none the le . 8
meaningful)
Why ? We do so because
that is the way the
W ° r " d rSally
1Si bSCaUSe
of those descriptions
which
our "net" makes available
to us, those fit
the world best
though once again, the
necessity of the existence
.

-

of

simple objects shows
that the descriptions
do not fit
exactly).
The complexity of
propositions is reflected
in the fact that many
simple objects exist;
the propositions that we pick out
as true are reflected
in the way
in which the simple
objects fit where and as
we say
they should, even though
their actual structure
lies
forever beyond our grasp.
Throughout this, of course,
it is always necessary
to remember that simple
objects
do not even have the
capability of receiving form
that
Copi attributes to Plato's
objects,
Wittgensteinian

objects are totally indifferent
to any form.
Ill

The reduction of all properties
to relations seems
justified.
It allows us to speak of the
relation between objects and properties
(configurations of objects)
as Wittgenstein in fact speaks
of them.

Instead of talk

lng about relations and
properties, we can from this
point on limit ourselves to a concern
with relations
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alone.

.

Wittgenstein divides
relations into four
prin-

cipal kinds,

internal, external,
formal and material. 18
Of these, " material"
is used only twice
in the Tractates
2.0231 with "properties"
and in 5.44,
"Truth-functions
are not material functions".
There is no objection
to

m

interpreting it as it seems
to be interpreted
normally
to mean contingent
properties characterizing
contingent
objects.
My main concern here
win therefore be with
internal, external and
formal relations and
properties
n
ca “ e 01 formal', with
the meaning of 'forraal

series' and, to a lesser
degree,

'

'formal concept',

too.

Unlike standard approaches, 19
my approach begins
with an explication of the
first two.
This reflects
Wittgenstein's own procedure, he
introduces

•internal-

in 2.01231,

but 'formal' does not even
occur until 4.122
(where it is used of formal
properties).
Formal concepts, which occupy Anscombe
and Black almost exclusively,
are introduced only in 4.126,
after a thorough discussion
of internal relations (4.122 4.1252), and are introduced with the words:
"We can now talk about formal
concepts
This implies that an understanding
of formal concepts requires, as background,
a competent under-

....

standing of internal relations (and
formal properties),
ihe procedure in Black and Anscombe
is incomplete,
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though not therefore wrong.
shall restrict myself initially
therefore to
internal relations. What is
an internal relation?
A
careful examination of the
Tractatus (made with the reducibility of properties to
relations in mind) seems to
produce two answers to that
question:
I

4.014,

A gramophone record, the
musical idea
e written notes, and
the sound-waves
all suand to one another in
the
internal relation of depicting same
that
hola between language and
the world.
Ihey are all constructed
according to
a

common logical pattern.
(Like the two youths in the
fairytale, their two horses, and their
lilies.
They are all in a certain
sense one
.

.

4.123:
.•

A property is internal if it
is unthinkable that its object should not

possess it,

(ihis shade of blue and that one
stand
APso in the internal relations of
.

lighter uo darker..
It is unthinkable
that these two objects should not
stand
this relation.

m

(Here the shifting use of the word 'object' corresponds to the shifting use
of the words 'property' and 'relation'.)

Recast in terms of relations, the first sentence
of 4.123
would read:
4.123':

A relation. is internal to an object if
it is unthinkable that the elements of
that object not stand in that relation,

It seems clear that Wittgenstein intends these two
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definitions to be
synonymous (though
this
aSSUmPti ° n ° n **
*>»
I" they?
Are

^

-h,«

is

.

admittedly

says he docs)
s;

’

At first glance
it would seem that
they are not, for
there are good,
commonly known and
most' unexciting
reasons (which I have arran<r^ k t
arran Ked below
order of their importance) for disputing
their synonymy,

m

4.014 concerns itself
with facts, while 4,
123
concerns itself with
objects.
1)

4.014 calls for internal
relations to-be "constructed according to a
common logical pattern",
since
they are all so constructed
they, like a picture
and the
3)
depicted
(see 2.161 ), must in
some sense be one,
"there
must be something identical
in" the one and
2)

the other.
On the other hand,
4.123 uses the apparently
psychological^ term "unthinkable",
nothing is mentioned about
a
logical Pattern
nor anything logical
at all, and in
the examples which follow
parenthetically, no sort of
lden uixy of being "in some
sense one" is even mentioned
in passing,

-

,

1 he principal point of
nonsynonymy seems to be

one which since the criticisms
of Descartes’ Meditations
(at least) has been common
philosophical coinage,
there

seem clearly to be many things
which are "unthinkable"
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but which are nevertheless
not therefore logically
-Possible.
'Unthinkable' is a
mcholegical term
Wittgenstein needs (and
gives us in 4.014) a
logical
term.
Thus either our inability
to think of the object
without that relation, or
the construction of
relations
according to a common logical
pattern, could serve as
our
criterion for internal relations
but not both.
_

^

-

The nonsynonymy is merely
apparent.
To prove it
so I shall show three
things.
1) the psychological
overtones of 'unthinkable' do
not exist for Wittgenstein,
that /+ -° 14 COncerns ^cts,
and 4. 123 things, makes
no
difference; 3) the two can then
be eliminated
in favor'

of a third way of stating
the requirement for internality, a way which combines

both Wittgenstein's intentions
in 4.014 and his intentions
in 4.123.

We can, claims Wittgenstein,
think only that which
is subject to laws
6.361s

One might say, using Hertz's
termin°l°Sy that only connexions that are
sub j e c t to law are thinkable.
>

But this simply means that we can
only think that which
is (in some sense) logical
6

*

3

*

i he
exploration of logic means the
exploration of everything that is
subje ct t
law
And outside lo^'ic
everything is accidental 20
.

.
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Thus "thinkable" for
Wittgenstein loses any
psychologies!
overtones and gains logical
connotations.
One might say
"unthinkable" in Wittgensteins use of it here means
not
'I cannot think; of if
iu
>-m+
tut
i t cannot be thought
of at
all, and that for logical
reasons (i.e.\ because it
is
illogical).
Thus (to continue for a
moment to use the
object-terminology of 4.123),
4.123 says that an internal property of an object is
part of the logical form
of that object)
so that one cannot think
of that objec
without also thinking of its
logical
,

,

’

_

form,

internal relations. 21

i.e.,

its

Thus the third, and most serious

criticism above is obviated,
4.014 and 4,123 seem, as the first
criticism above
pointed out, to concern different
types (categories) of
things, 4.014 concerning facts,
4.123 objects. We have
already seen reason to doubt that this
is a very farreaching difference, when I argued above
that complex
objects should be thought of as facts.
Objects and
facts,

both being complexes, must both have
structure,

and this structure must have logical
characteristics in

order to be recognized by us as structure at all.

Thus

4.014 says that certain structures have the same
"logical pattern" in them, governing their construction,
and

that therefore their relations (to each other) are

f
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internal.

4 123
.

It oo,
4-v
^ays that,
,

,

read in this wav
y

for any
complex
J
PlGX

’

^

’

nQ

.

+h
Lhe more general.

•

internal properties

.

Relations) are those relitiono
(among the elements
that
<

it up ) which are
determined a pr j ori

1Ch the C ° mPleX iS
Unthi

^^e

h
hence
without

(as that complex),

and

WhlCh theref ° re co
^«tute the "logical pattern"
in aecordance with which the
obiects
CXo exist.
exist
J
w
We
can now form
the following amalgam
of the two
propositions,
'
,

relat ion
its “elements )^is
fong
internaf^
a
^
1
com Plex
or obiect) if it i (fact
unthil k able
that that complex
?
shoul^not^
.

internal relation i4

of the complex

\ih

Possess it.
This
en ??
thG lo £ lcal pattern
r^+
com le es
+v

stand%o°e£h ithe^L^n

Int^i ±elatlon
?
they are constructed
according to"
'•““i
-*«*>»

«

?

>

is external relations,
which are never explicitly
defined
in the fr actatus
However, there is little
difficulty
.

m

defining them by contrast to
internal relations.
If
lormer are logical, and their
denial unthinkable (for
that complex)
then the latter are non-logical
,

and contingent, and their denial is
quite thinkable, without changing the complex under
consideration.

External relations

occur in addition to internal
relations; they, as it
were, often obscure the basic
identity between two internally related complexes (a
score and a record do not
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ook Identical) and
can be changed
without affecting
the (common) logical
pattern.
Thus, according to
Wittgenstein's theory in the
Tractates, there is a
logical
identity, i.e., an
internal relation,
between exemplifications of the same
universal (or examples
of the same
concept )

Passages like 2.01231
tempt the reader to
a different explanations
2

'

01?31
'

J

n ®? d not
Fneed"™?

1

t

now

n ob j^t, though
£ ow ?
kn
its external pron ° W alb its ihter-

nal properties?3

Here one feels inclined
to say that external
properties
are a subset of internal
properties,
that internal properties are all those logically
possible
for the object,

while external properties
are those which happen to
be
exemplified.
If so, then external
properties are also
internal (though not all
internal properties would be
exemplified, i.e., external).
This, however, encounters
grave difficulties with such
passages as the last paragraph in 4.023:
4.023 (last paragraph):
Just as a description of an object
describes it by giving external
properties, so a proposition
describes reality by' its internal
properties.

This suggests that in giving the
external properties we

d°
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alS ° give the in
^rnal properties.
conflicts with*
4 122
,

,

it also

An internal propertv n-p Q
f
fact can
also be calledd «a
featur> e of that
fact rin he sanse
in which we
speak n-F £faClal
featur ^exIrnple)^

1

-p

+.

.

A given face has
and must have its
features in order to
be that face.
Likewise a given fact
has and must have
ltS ° Wn intel' nal rela
«°ns (features), if that
fact is
to be exemplified
(assuming, just for the
moment,
Black th
unex etiplif ied factmakes sense for Witt'

'

^

f

genstein) 3 then all its
internal features must
be exemplified along with it, not
just some of them.
Thus 'internal property
('relation') is best read
as 'relation which
characterizes the logical
form (in
sen^e) of the object’,
i.e., the way the elements
be related, if the
object is to be that
particular
object.
And 'external property
(relation)' is likewise
best read as 'relation which
characterizes the ontic
form of the object', i.e., a
relation which the elements
of facts may have, contingently,
but which they may also
fail to have without thereby
destroying the preconditions
for a given object to be the
particular object it is.

—

V/e

cannot,

of course, actually express the
internal

properties of an object or the internal
relations among
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ject^ or facos.

Any proposition which
would attempt
to express such would,
in order to express
it, have to
be constructed according
to the same logical
pattern as
the fact to be expressed,
thus, it would end up
showing,
not expressing the
internal property or
relations.
As
Wittgenstein says, the internal
relation of the fact (or
between the objects)
"expresses itself in the
proposition
representing the situation, by
means of an internal
property of that proposition"
(4.124).
The proposition
and the "situation" it
represents are therefore one
"in
a certain sense", as
Wittgenstein says in 4.014, the
same thing, in so far as the
proposition manages to represent it correctly. That is,
in so far as the proposition and the "situation” it
represents both have the same
internal relation, they are the
same.

Although internal relations ana
properties cannot
be expressed, but only shown,
we can construct a means
of reproducing them.
That is, we can present a formula
which enables us to order other elements
by the
same

logical rule, thus to make otherwise
different structures
identical.
This formula, or rule, Wittgenstein calls
an
operation!
5.2:

The structures of propositions stand
in internal relations to one another.
.
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5.21,

internal relat:

Pnorainence to these

A ^cbbion:
we
can renrhcoyit „
he
result of an operat
ion^hat p ^ ces
xt out Of other
proposition
opositions f°^
(which
are the base^
cases of the operation.)

^

~

5.23:

T

5.231*

Since operations concern
internal relations, they
too
cannot literally be
expressed and anythin
e attesting to
express one 'correctly
would have to share
with it an
identity of structure,
since one operation, no
matter
how often applied,
does nothing hut repeat
the same structure, the same internal
property or relation,
operations
can "vanish" (5.254),
leaving only the numerous
identical
structures. An operation
is ultimately an
unessential
device, one which may
perhaps have pragmatic
value, but
which could disappear in
a fully perspicuous
language.
Operations, unlike functions
as Wittgenstein conceives of them (see 4.271,
5.2341, 5.5301), can take
propositions and propositions only
as their bases
5.23.
The operation is what has
to be done
to the one proposition
in order to
make the other out of it.
5.233:

Operations cannot make their
appearance

proposi«nn

P?int at which °ne

h9
S ;'^4
proposi-

tions begins.

They have nothing
to do with the
truth or Parity
the various propositions
which result fro m
their

oatiom

as in a proof in
logic> thg operaUon

0f

appli-

^

eeed correctly and
even necessarily, hut
only the resul:
will be true or false
5 25
.

:

The occurence of an
operation
characterize the sense of does
a
a
proposition.
_

Indeed no statement is
made bv an
r
n bUt nly by ^s^esuit?"
and ?hf° d
u°
* °"
baSes ° f
the operatic?

^

(Operations and functions
must not
be confused with each
other.

operations are exclusively
concerned with generating or producing propositions
from propositions, and
not with the sense of any
given proposition or propositions. and because they alone
(rather than functions)
can use the results of their
own application as bases
for further application, they
alone are able to account
for or generate hierarchies:
5 2
'

*

1

'

A function cannot be its own
argument
whereas an operation can take one
o^
its own results as its base.
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5-2521

fro^one^erm of^ series^f™ '

Sg«£
Vhi^headlid

0te

?

:F
^not' adrait the"

p^ibif

At least part of
what Wittgenstein
c.exibtein intends
u
intone
here
is thisi
hierarchies (which, as we
have seen, are and must
be
independent of reality and
hence of sense) are
related
solely on the basis of
internal propositional

relations

tP other members of the
same hierarchy,

operators,

since logical

on Wittgenstein's
theory,

can only show an
internal relation among
properties (through generating,
tautologies and contradictions,
e.g., which are not
genuine propositions since
they lack sense), logical
operators are also, or are the
results of, operations,

truth-functions of elementary
propositions are results of operations
elementary propositions as bases with
.these operations I call
truthoperations. )
(.

5.23'H,

The sense of a truth-function
of *~
o
is a function of the sense
of p,
Negation, logical addition,
logical
multiplication, etc. are operations.
(Negation reverses the sense of a
proposition.

Max Black writes thats
|

wishes to make a distinction between
an
operation and a function (5.251), yet

W.

the

J 29.

««

jssaa

Point of view (and
a
conscquen«v
lnology),
W. himself
Lly calls
truth-function of n- cons^.t^tW
a
,,
al ^natively
that-£ results from o
lh
Y th^
°P era fion of
negation (5. 2341b) V /p bv
4
at
character of the rule
f ention on the
°
deriv ^£ ~£ from
And so in yenerllT^o fn^T
p.
indifferently
that x 2 is a certain
natively, that yZ^c, f^Coion of x -- or alterfr ° m
the
operation of 'sparing'
*
•

:

•

4=4

•

4

4

at ^^l^Senstein
restricts
tiJn- to ?h
W
e th
ases
the"
°
result ° (5?22fof
*
tte operation
are internally
related, 2 u
'

'

J

^

'

In this passage Black
shows himself insensitive
to the

real differences
Wittgenstein makes between
operation
2
and functions.
If x concerns numbers
(i. e .. extralinguistic or extra-propositional
entities), we could
on Wittgenstein's
account of operations, call
the
derivation of x from x an
operation.
Mathematicians
might be quite willing to
do so, but Wittgenstein
did
not feel himself bound by
their usage any more than he
felt himself constrained to
use 'fact' in anything like
a normal sense.
We can represent visually
the difference between
operation and function, where both
are taken to apply
to propositions.

Since all propositions are made
up of
elementary propositions and elementary
propositions
of

configurations of names only, 26 we can
represent the
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base proposition
1)

bgc

''hero each

s

.

as»

f

letter represents a
name.

applied to the proposition

s

The operation -o--

(0-s, to use Wittgenstein's

notation) might do the
following,
2)

b

then 'O'O's
b

3)

00"

d

c

b c
d

i

1
s

d°

b

d

c

b c
d

is the wedge,

'V

in its normal logical
sense).

The basic structure
s remains and must
remain unchanged
through all applications
of 'O'*,
a function 'P' on s
might work as follows*
b>

b«0

0

b

a.

The function obviously
does not preserve the
fundamental
•internal relation- (the
"one-ness") which the operation
must preserve.

Although the distinction between
the two is sharper
than Black would lead us to
believe, it is not always
preserved as clearly as one might
wish in the Tractatus
Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes two
kinds of functions
(though he is not always clear
as to which one concerns
him in a given proposition),
truth-functions and
material functions
.

5.^

l

U

Truth-functions are not material functions.

.
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Although the actual
term 'material
function' is US ed
only in this
proposition
P
position, it is
t
nevertheless fair to
assume thac all functions
which are not
truth-functions
(and these appear
in many passages,
e.g.,
5 25 )
.

are

material, functions.

They are clearly
distinguished from
operations in the manner
indicated above.
Truth-functio,
however, are not so
clearly distinguished.
In 5.234
Wittgenstein called
truth-functions the "results"
of
operations, but in such
propositions as 5.2341 (second
and third paragraphs)
and 5.3 he seems to
come close to
identifying the two.
But these passages
especially
5.3
actually highlight yet
another important difference between function and
operation!

-

—

5.3»

All propositions are results
of truthoperations on elementary
propositions.
Per i0n iS the Way in which
a trntb“?
truth-function is produced out of
elementary propositions.
It is of the
essence of truth-operations
that, just
as elementary propositions
yield a
truth-function of themselves, so too
the same way truth-functions
yield
a further truth-function.
When a
truth-operation is applied to truth1 unctions of elementary
propositions
it alvvays generates another
truthfuncoion of elementary propositions
another proposition. When a truth-’
operation is applied to the results
of truth-operations on elementary
uropositions, there is always a single
operation on elementary propositions
that has the same result.

^

m

-
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Every proposition
is the result
nS ° n element
^y

.

o-r

p£oposU™°

P ration is here conceived
of as essentially
incomplete, i.e., not
including its results,
while a function

includes its results
(compare here also
5 .2 5
second
Paragraph).
Truth-functions are thus
what we have in
completed, non-elementary
propositions, truth-operations
consist of a procedure
which generates a final
proposition from one or more
elementary propositions
,

(see 4 12 7 )
.

but not that last
proposition itself.

struc ture of

"tho

5)

a.

One might say that

function
unction nnn
can be represented ast
-i

f(x) = n

while the structure of an
operation as,
.

6)

O'x

(see the examples of operations
which Wittgenstein writes
cut, e.g.
5.2521, 5 2522 6.02, 6.021).
,

.

,

/

The distinction between
internal and external relations, with its attendant
theory of operations and functions, seems adequate for the
Tractatus
it allows Wittgenstein to develop as fully as he
might wish
,

all the

themes which center around relations
and properties.
Is there anything added, except
excess terminological
baggage, by the terms 'formal concepts'
and 'formal
relations'? I do not think so, and I believe
that
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Wittgenstein was aware that
he could continue by
using
'internal' alone,

This,

I

take it,

is the brunt of the

second paragraph of
4,122s
4.122s

in
certain sense we can talk
about
formal properties of objects
and
states of affairs, or, in
the case
a Ut structura l
«°
Properties
and in thp
the same Sense about
formal
relations and structural
relations.
(Instead of 'structural property'
I
also say 'internal property'*;
instead
r
ation '- -internal
relation-

f

and again of the talk of
structural properties ins

ihe^fact that the propositions
of
ogic are tautologies shows the
formal -Properties of language and

thfworld"

(that -internal’ can replace
-formal- can further be

verified oy examining all the occurences
of 'formal' In
the Trac t at us and showing that
'internal' could be substituted for them
a task too tedius to carry out here.)

—

Why then does Wittgenstein introduce
the term 'formal

.

ihis one can only guess, but he seems
to have

introduced it because of an ambiguity in the
word 'internal'.
(a)

Two propositions are internally related if
they

are in a hierarchical series such as,

and 'this is an animal".

"This is a cat"

But (b) two propositions can

also be internally related,

it would seem,

even if they
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T
*"

'"

“
1"

"*

lnt * r"*

n»

*

b„

»«

.

«na

no,

V/ittgenstein does not eynii^i+i
eXPllCltly

out this ambiguity
believe he was aware
of it. and introduced
Iformal
to apply only to
those cases of
internal relations of
(or in) a series.
For thicthis interpretation
I will give
but one argument.
Consider 4.1252 and
4.126,
4.1252,
1 call a series
that is ordered bv
1 oration
a series of forms.
u

.

—

•

4.126,

•

•

a

We can now talk about
formal concepts
W6 Speak ° f
formal p^perties
.

Why does Wittgenstein say,
we
concepts" as if we could not

’'can

now talk about formal

before?

The answer is that

the notion of a series
of propositions had not
yet (as
of 4.1252) been introduced,
when this is made available
he immediately
himcoi -f +to a j
devotes nimoelf
j utvutes
discussion of formal
concepts and properties.
•

IV

In the next chapter

question which

I

I

will turn my attention to a

may seem to have answered already,

Wittgenstein a Platonist in the Tractatus
hold that there are abstract
objects?

.

i.e.

Since

I

(

is

does he

have
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-braced

a radically

finalist

tanan

.

interpretation of Trac-

objects, as opposed to
that of Allaire and Berg-ann („ h0 are avowed
Platonists), it may se em
that there
any point in continuing
discussion of the
question.
But the answer is not
as straightforward as
it may now appear.

Since that is the theme of
my next (and final)
chapter, I will not directly
discuss the nature of objects any further,
A point-by-point comparison
of simple
and complex objects, as
we have seen these differences
develop throughout the preceding
pages, will be helpful
in fixing the distinctions
between them in preparation
of the final chapter.
Simple objects are not in the world,
but at the
edge of the world.
Complex objects are in the world, a
part of it; in fact, they make it up.
'

1)

2)

Simple objects are absolutely simple,
without

any properties at all, even "logical"
properties.

Complex

objects, however, are characterized by
properties in a

straightforward sense; that is, they have
properties
(especially logical properties) without which
they cannot be, without which the object is
"unthinkable".
Thus
we can speak of the essence of a complex object,
though

not of that of a simple one.

3)
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Simple objects cannot,
strictly speaking
be
known.
We can only know that
they exist, and this
we
kn ° W thr ° Uffh C °
raPleX
arguments.
Complex
objects are experienced,
hence a posteriori,
and ofte „
known without the nece^itir
necessity of any formal
argument to
show that they exist.

^—dental

'

4) N01:hlne Which we

peweive could

be a genuine

simple object.

Anything we can perceive
is able to be,
or be seen as, a
complex object.
Simple objects correspond
to genuine names in
fully analyzed propositions.
Complex objects correspond to the merely apparent
names met with in the unanalyzed propositions of
ordinary language.
5)

'

6)

SimplG objeots

'

‘

lacking structure, can only
be

named, never described.

Complex objects can in fact
be
described, never really named;
Russell's theory of

descriptions shows (in Wittgenstein's
reading of it)
that all "names" of complexes
are
deceptive.

?)

Properties reduce to relations.

have two kinds of properties,

Complex objects

internal (formal, logical)

and external (proper, material).

Seen from the side of

simple objects, these relations
constitute various
spaces" (e.g,
logical space, color
space,

8)

etc.).

The simple object is independent
of any space,
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ana the space from
it.

The complex object
is not independent of certain
spaces, though the
spaces still are
independent of it.
Seen from the standpoint
of simple objects
there
is a sharp division
to be made between
object and conceptual scheme.
From this point of
view rii
11
nrno *•
properties
seen to be a. ppi
„
ori (6.35).
to
o
- -r-=°£i
Seen from
the viewpoint of
complex objects, however,
it is not the case
that all
properties are a priori or
predictable.
In particular,
we cannot predict what
elementary propositions
there are
(will be) (see 5.634 and
5.5571),
9)

>

-E

-1 -

(

V

I
,

began this chapter with a
question,

What is the

world?

To that we saw that Wittgenstein
gives three
answers, the second of which
has received an expansion
this chapter.
Perhaps the most important point
to
realize, if our ultimate goal
is to arrive at an understanding of Wittgenstein's theory
of the world, with its
wealth of complexities, is that he
uses 'fact'

m

in a

most unusual way

,

to cover objects as well as
what one

normally would take to be a fact.

The terminology, con-

fusing as it undoubtedly is, does
at least help emphasize
the importance Wittgenstein attaches
to complexes in the
Tractatus.
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In a sense this chapter
is a commentary on
I.13.
Seeing the chapter as such
immediately raises two
cuestions I have avoided.
The fir^t is,
ie
u
are +there
any facts
that are not in logical
space, or is "in logical
space"
aljtic to fact'? The
second arises from my
particular
treatment of "facts in logical
space".
1 have so far
considered only what one might
call existing facts, facts
which (to put it another
way) also are found in
timespace or spatial space, etc,,
facts which are observable.

What about unactualized facts,
about what Wittgenstein
seems to call "possible
facts"
(see 2.0122, 2 0124
.

2.02)?

is the

'possible-

,

and

in "possible facts" really,

Black calls it in his comments
on

2

.

202

,

as

a "pleonasm",

or does Wittgenstein hold
that there are merely possible,

unactualized facts (or states of
affairs, etc.)? it
will be my purpose in the next
chapter to answer that
question, which, in its turn, will
imply the answer to
the first question.
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CHAPTER

.

V

WITTGENSTEIN'S PLATONISM

Wittgenstein espoused a
peculiar version of
Platonism
thS 2 ract_atus.
But what is Platonism?
This question
difficult one,
I Will simplify
it here by taking
Platonism to be the0 beli^-P
+u0
4-'
Dellei that
there are abstract entities of some sort,

“

+.

The claim that
Wittgenstein was a Platonist
in the
flatus seems to conflict with my earlier
chapters
(particularly Part I, Chapters
II - iv).
since Platonism and realism have so
often been closely associated
in
P ilooophy, it may also seem that
1 am here maintaining
a position like that of
Edwin B. Allaire, 1 who presents
what he calls a "realistic
interpretation" of the Tractates (though not, again in his
words, a "neatly realistic" one).
am neither changing my former
position nor rejecting my claim that Allaire's
interpretation is wrong.
Instead, I claim that Wittgenstein
was a Platonist, though
not,
Allaire's sense, a realist.
Allaire defines
realism" as the simultaneous acceptance
of two theses
I

m

"

(1)

properties as well as particulars are
constitutents

of atomic facts;

(2)

properties are different in kind

J>'l M-

froin

Particulars"

Alla

.

like

-i

-to

n
eXPlains
th
•

«

- Proposition

,

(1)

This is red

consists of two
objects di-pfv^
aiiferent+ in kind
un a, +v,io
this and rod
n+
^•^^'^cufeh I internret
ocx
vji++
cx V/ ltt.o'en^t
_
n to
_
b enstein
be a Platonist
I
do not feel thr,+ + u
1S g °° d evidence
that he is, in
,.
+
this
sense, a realist,
•

,

,

P-*-

p. i

j_

-i

Wittgenstein, then,
believed in the Tractatus
that
ro absti act
entities of some sort,
Two questions
immediately arise, What
sort of abstract
entities does
he think there are?
Why does he think
that there are
such entities? The
latter question is,
of course, actually two questions
Why does he think there
are abstract entities at all,
and Why does he think
they are
of the type he declares
them to be? I shall
concentrate
on the first question
and, to some degree,
on the second
Part of the second.
I shall not
concern myself directly
analysis of his reasons
for embracing the existence of some form of
abstract objects in general,
:

i.e.,

with a presentation of his
arguments for Platonism.
Critical literature on the
problem of the existence
of abstract objects has
been immense in the twentieth
century.
Particularly, Willard van Orman
2
Quine

Nelson Goodman-

5

and

have led the attack on Platonism,
but

J r J.

Noam Chomsky 4

and J. j

Kat4 . 5 am
araon E many
others, have
attempted to withstand
and even defeat
the assault
y
concern with th is
entire literature
will be minimal.
ly
Purpose here, as in
the- first
lrSl two
„
tw ° chapters of
this hadf
G Q1SSertati0n
iS t0 devel °p
Wittgenstein's posi1011
ClSar and coh ^ent
a manner as possible
’

..

-

,

.

’

.

“^

Where it is unavoidable,
this debate:

I

do refer to
participants in

Quine in Section
ctlon tr
IB

Sec tions IC and TTR

p 11+

t

rn
Chomsky
and Katz in
,

’

although much more can
\
be said
especially in defense
of Wittgenstein's
version of Platon
rsm against both
Quine's and Katz' attacks,
.

i

•

this again

not the Place to say
it.

These others, formidable
as
they are in themselves,
are used here entirely
as foils
to Wittgenstein's
theory.

A

Platonism is the belief that
there are abstract objects,
But what are abstract objects?
This question is
nearly as difficult to answer
as the question of what
Platonism itself is. Rather than
confront
it directly,

will present three conditions
which, together, are
both necessary and sufficient
for an entity's being considered abstract.
I

111

*«

-»«*.

„

°p»°.,d
that the former em
are n °n-material,
the latter
material-p~
So, for
example the sheet
of paper before
your eyes is materini
r
„
ler ef ore concrete!
the whiteness
('ich the paper
exemplifies)J lo
is no
no+° 1_
ittself
it material,
...
so
abstract,
fhis condition alone,
however, j s not
sufficient to guarantee
abstractness,
after-ima,es
visions and hosts
g
would all be non-material
ye t
no
means abstract entities.
ones

m
.

,

+-

'

,

’

.

,

*

(2) N °
.

abStract ob

^ts

are perceptible by
the

Physical senses, though
mav nt
6 we may>
of „
coarse, perceive many
exemplifications of them.
All concrete objects,
on the'
other hand, can be
perceived by the physical
senses.
If
we can be said to
perceive or know abstract
entities in
any way it must be
different from that by which
we ret
to know concrete objects.
This condition is one
which
links Platonism, a
metaphysical theory, with
epistemologi.
cal theories,
the Platonist will not be
a strict
em-

piricist, and the empiricist
will not be a Platonist.
Even where the universal
is said to be in many
places

simultaneously, what we actually
perceive is a particular
(or many particulars) which
exemplifies this universal.
(3) Abstract entities are not
in space or time (they
do not,

so

i,o

speak, have spatio-temporal
coordinates),

3*t7.

°° n0rete Sntiti

T
V^o
p

change

,

863 SPaC6

-

^ Ume

•

’

i ns ofar as

aWaCt

change

cannot

concrete ones can.

Wittgenstein's simple
objects fulfill
criteria (2)
U)
and (3), but not
(l)
sinpp
“
+h
lnce the y !ie outside
the world
and have no forms,
they cannot be
perceived by our
Physical senses, and
our knowledge of
them comes from a
P ric al source.
Since space and time
° f ° bjeCtS
0l '” e

'

are the forms

(2 '° 251)

either

-

objects are not in space
and

-

ThSy are

ho

™,

concrete in .the sense
that they are the
ultimately material element
of the
world,
substance is form and
content, and, as we have
seen, objects ultimately
are (or form) the
content.
Thus
if we restrict
ourselves to simple objects
alone, v,ittGenstein's position on
Platonism is somewhat
ambiguous.
If, however, each of
the above conditions is
seen as at
least necessary to a
Platonist position, then as
far as
his simple objects are
concerned, at least,
'

Wittgenstein

is not a Platonist.

B

The late nineteenth and early
twentieth century saw
a rise of renewed and vigorous
interest in Platonic ontolo.ico.
Although there may be others, four
varieties

«»»...

“*

'

nW
t Ua ,
'

'

"'

h.«

—
“S

„«
*

«*,

»•

tW ° f °™ S

and UneUlStic

^

1

cal1 straightforward
objoc-

"i**™*.

Platonism.

The flrst of
SlmPlY h ° ldS that
the abstract entities
which
Cxist are ob Jects
which, except
fw being abstract,
Cept for
are
very like concrete
objects
tS
At lts
it
J
At
Purest, it embraces
a thesis to the
effect
1 ec
that
-r
if
we can talk sensibly
about something then tto-tS Xnen fchafc
bmg must exist
if not
concretely, then
abstractly.
Russell 6 and Meinong
both
the former for a
short period only,
held this version
of Platonism.
It was Russell's
"On Denoting" which
sparked the attack on it hv- 0 +
y attacking a theory of
reference closely associated
with it.
6

i

'

•

*

i

>

•

’-

—

fc

.

'

-f-

,

•

Although Russell, many
of his colleagues,
and those
who followed their lead
no longer spoke with
gay abandon
about abstract objects
like Pegasus or the round
square,
they continued to assert
the existence of such
objects
in other areas and for
other purposes,
particular,
Russell,
irege, Moore, and numerous
others held that
there exists a peculiar kind
of language-oriented
abstract
entity known as a proposition.
Although many different

m

definitions of 'proposition' were
proposed, the main
thrust of the claim that
propositions exist may be
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captured in the following
claims about them,

synonymous Sentences
languages;

the v * rious
different

in^n^o^
n “ or man y

which

Kuarantees^that
the

wordsf
(c)

d ° lng S °'

a

a

-le ?hi^? t Sy can°
even "hen using different

the proposition is
an abstract entitv

*he philosophical
position that there are such
abstract entities we may
call objectual linguistic
Platonism.
It originates in a
concern with problems of lan,

guage (particularly with
the problem of the
meaningfulness of sentences, in
distinction to their truth or
falsity)
and sees propositions as
very similar' to
everyday, complex concrete
objects in their structure.
(This is a position one would
expect from Russell, whose
views were colored by his earlier
acceptance
,

of the

first kind of Platonism.

In the case of Moore and
Frege,

more needs to be said, but again,
they are not my concern here.)
in particular, propositions
have the following object-like traits:
(

)

fhey exist independently of any
necessary
relation to most other propositions
(as
objects seem not to be necessarily
related
to one another)
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^

.

have no necessary
y relating
elation to any
language-speakers;
h

(iii) They have
no neces^arv
sentence of any
given
(iv)

r*r>i

+•

lan^age?

t0

^

They themselves
and +h 0 ;
interrelations 'must h- d^ quallties and
Vered (as
we discover
objects
jeers and their
properties).

?^°

The other two
varieties of Platonism
are not,
perhaps, quite so
commonly represented
in philosophical
literature as the above.
At least one of them,
g

"mg

rapidly

m

however,

importance.

One might call the
two Of them structural,
as opposed to ObjectPal,
Platonism.
The first variety of
structural Platonism has
been
developed largely by
Noam Chomsky and his
followers,
such as J. J. Katz.
Their fundamental concern
is with
problems in the philosophy
of language, not with
many
traditional metaphysical
questions
though, as Katz
makes clear (in the work
cited in footnote five above),
they feel that answers to
these problems will be
found
through their researches.
Neither Chomsky, nor Katz
therefore shows much interest
in such questions as,
"Is
there Greenness (as well as
green things)?" or, "Does
Pegasus exist?" The abstract
entity which concerns them
is not any sort of object,
but rather rules, laws or

-
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Procedures in accordance
with which certain
speciai
objects (syntactic and semantic
structures)

——

tracted

aSWe

.

are con-

These rules cannot
be observed either
direct]
with the aid of some

as a microscope.

device

They are innate to
the human mind, howGVGr
Can bS dlSCOTered
(as Katz points out)
through
a Process analogous
to the way in which
atoms were first
discovered.
They thus hold the
status of theoretical
Postulates, but the
differences between them
and such
theoretical postulates
as atoms or electrons
mahe clear
that these linguistic
rules are abstract.
Thus,
'

^

for
example, while atoms
are in space and time,
the rules
are not (though, of
course, the sentences
which they
ultimately generate are).
One might add, in a
Leibnizlan vein, that if our
senses were fine enough
we could
Perceive atoms, we could never
perceive these rules, no
ho.v fine or gross
our senses became,
all that is
perceptible are the sentences
(=sentence-tokens ) of our
languages.

We may sum up the major theses
of this form of
Platonism, i.e., structural rule
Platonism, as follows,
(i)

Structural rule Platonism is not,
at least
not directly, concerned with
many traditional
questions answered by the Platonist
such as
Does Pegasus exist.
’

U11

S

ratM
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8S8S.“* f "~““ S

.

*>» existence

SRffiS,

(iii) These abstract
on^i+ie

0t be
known directly
S«t their*”
lr
existence
is
inferred from
-?
0
^ntencetokens of various
-

Structural rule
Platonism is a development
of linguistic
o Jectual
Platonism.
In place of the
latter's cumbersome reliance on
propositions, with all the
deficiencies
h thSm ' ,hlch
Philosophical development
in the first
half of the twentieth
century brought out, it
substitutes
a much more -elegant
system of rules which
create sets of
sti uctures which
are then the meanings
of sentences in
languages, and the
knowable identity of which
guarantees
our ability to understand
each other and other
languages
too.
It thus accomplishes
many of the goals of
linguistic objectual Platonism -esneciallv that ofx. guaranteeespecially
mg our ability to understand each
other
in a more
elegant way, one which also
avoids many of the problems
which beset the earlier form
of Platonism.
.

-

The last form of Platonism

I

shall consider here is

the form Wittgenstein embraced
in the Tractatus
That
which exists abstractly is an
irreduceable structure, a
structure which, being irreduceably
complex, cannot be
treated as an object.
It is, rather (to use Wittgenstein.
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distinction)/
1

p
a.

-PTo-tlact,

an abstract
acx lacL
fnr>+

WU1

’

.

*4,
neither
rule nor

eXPliCatC this version
of Platonism in
3 " C " 0n 111 ° f
thiS ChaPtSr but
I shall show
why
ln W ° Uld haV ° re
ected the other three
forms. 8
ln
think WU1 C ° Unt
our natural tendency
to
)
read Wittgenstein
as if he actually
adhered
'

’

'

™
<i

’

’,

to one of
It Will also
provide a convenient
introduction
by W3y of con trast,
to his own theory.

:

II

Wittgenstein’s criticisms
of the first three
forms
f Platonism form an
interesting study in
themselves, 'but,
llke the ° utllne of the
four forms of Platonism
itself,
they are of interest
here only as they will
aid in understanding Wittgenstein’s
own theory.
lhe fundamental aim of
these forms of Platonism is
right,
there is a need for a realm
of abstract entities
of some sort which can,
but need not, be actualized.

Althougn their goal is justified,
each form suffers from
both its own special weaknesses
and one basic defect
which, in Wittgenstein’s eyes,
would underlie them all,
that of being too simplistic.
Each one attempts to set
up the realm of Platonic
entities in a way which will
escape the complexities of the
concrete world (and each

Of the criticisms
which follow below
is
in a
CnSe
merely an elaboration
of this one
cri t 1G i sm )
They thus
crp-it 6
proble ^s for
themselves°
nrrhi
P
blems wh ich they
cnnnn+
’

-

•

.

*—

::

-1 » “**-

**•

::

-—

«... ......

.....

The clearest
example
Pie nr
of thls cc™es,
Of course, from
..
the simplest
tv -op o-f
pi
t Platon ism
str?i
i rrH+
“ trai
Shtforward objectual
Pla+ „ niSm
ItS
iS *
one, from the
Status*
standpoint though
none the less fatal.
Those who
pause this form
simply confuse abstract
fact with abstract object (or,
linguistically, name with
proposition)
following shows.
Objects in the world,
as we have
seen, are a species
of facts*
thn-t
u
that is, they
like facts
are endlessly complex.
Ky pen or Smokey the
Bear are
both capable of endless
analysis, breaking into
ever
simpler combinations of
obiects fthm^h
though never wholly
into objects, as 1.2
tells us). When complexity
ends,
we have a genuine object
which can be given a
genuine
name:
but it is no longer
describable, i.e., no longer
in tho world at all.
The straightforward
objectualist
tries to defend a theory
of abstract entities
which lack
the endless complexity
of genuine (world)
objects.
Pegasus is the winged horse
of Greek mythology
and
.

’

i-

—
’

.

'

,

,•

.

{

—
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that is,

basically, all he

.

Tho endless
^
complexity
essential
Soential to facts fann u
(and he »« to
world-objects) i s
totally lacking
Ths
dioates we can apply
to that
_
ab +
abstract
obiect sr>o ° VGrC
y llmited when compared
with
6 which
apply to world
u object*
Jojecus or to
propositions
gaSUS ° an be fUUy
Pen or Kelso cannot
be
riat ° niSt ° f tMS
"
been misled roughly'
p r6Se WaS
(3 143)
Fr0H the structural
similarity of
e names
'Pegasus- and -Kelso-,
both of which are
disguised definite
descriptions on Wittgenstein8
s theory
the Plat on i st
concludes that both
function in the saml
way, as names, i.e.,
that both pick out
objects which
are named.
Yet the actual
structural dissimilarities
between -Pegasus- and
-Kelso- clearly show that
the
latter is a concrete
object in the world, but
the former
lacks sufficient complexity
to count as one,
yet it has
some degree of complexity
and cannot therefore count
as
a simple object.
Thus -Pegasus- is supposed
to act as
a name, yet lacks the
structural preconditions
demanded
by the analysis of names.
It is neither a genuine
name,
nor a disguised definite
description (the name of an
object of the type we find
in the world)
is

'

•

•

.

*

“

’

^

-

’

i

it is a

defect, a misconception.

The same criticism easily
applies to linguistic
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^ectual

Platonism, and Wittgenstein
himself applies
111 3 143
Pr ° POSitions
this view conceives
them
cannot be endlessly
analysed.
They thus lack the
pre requisites which would in
d
ln Wittgenstein's
eyes, enable
them to make sense,
i.e., sufficient
complexity. The
two also share
another defect which is
perhaps more
clearly visible in
linguistic ob jectualism.
They conceive of abstract
entities as existing
independently of
language.
Linguistic forms can try,
more or less successfully, to embody or
express a proposition, but
that proposition itself remains
eternally what it is, apart
from
all languages or conceptual
schemes. 9

H

’

'

-

,

.

’

Wittgenstein is quite clearly
opposed to such independent., though knowable
existence as 6.341, 6.342 and
,

6 -35,

i

•

a*

show,

if there are propositions
of the sort

defended by linguistic ob
jectualism, we have no access
to them.
We must look elsewhere for a
usable guarantee
of sameness of meaning either
within a language or
between languages.

Rule-Platonism does not pretend to set
up, or di
cover, the existence of any sort
of abstract object
directly; hence it cannot be faulted
with using the
concept of an object while at the same
time denying
the essential prerequisites of its use.

It therefore

requires a criticism
somewhat different
from the f irEt
given ob jectual
Platonism
« t
+h
Sam ° time
so far
as tJie
the rules
,
*5+ ^ ^ _
1V6S ° f are strictl
"
y n on-linguisti c
or P
rro
1
^-conceptual it does
run
Qf tfc#
of criticism.
'

•

‘

^

'

,

" h6re iS

’

h ° WeVer

.

Position from the

3 more germaine
criticism of the

'

^t^

point of view. AU
laws of
anguage, in so far
as they are genuine
laws, have at
east two characteristics
in Wittgenstein's
view,

not^things °"but

\ one eptual

'

schemed

(2)

SsTuF^
The

X
•

^nd KaU

)

"are

6

^4

''

)

^

f
h ° Se

°f

l0gi °’ When tb »y are
seen in connection
with language and not
world-objects, are ultimately
reducible to operations
(as we saw in Part II,
chapter IV)
But operations cannot
even begin to work until
there are
propositions already there to
work with, i. e ., the bases
of the operations
22
( 5
5.233).
Thus from
'

Wittgenstein's standpoint at the
time of the Tractatus the
laws of generative grammar
may exist but, if they do,
they presuppose already
extant linguistic structures.
They cannot, he might have
said, generate syntactic or
.

,

.

semantic structures ex nihilo,

the bases, the elementary
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propositions,

nrnst

Clear that Witt
'

°f

—~^

already be given.

-

Furthermore

-e

.

u

argued that

generatiV ° e

-e ultimately dispenPre ° iSely because
operations are dispersible
thSre are SUCh
«** -ber (1 ; 6ical .
y) USGleSS (th0Ueh
have a pragmatic value)
0
they cannot explain
linguistic structures
because they
Presuppose precisely
what they would have
to explain,
A11 ° f the first
three forms of Platonism
must
therefore be abandoned,
not (again) as wrong
in their
concept of what must
be done, but rather
as botched
attempts to do a necessary
and defensible piece
of work.
'

17

^
«
^T

"

U

,

III
V/

ittgenstein*

task is therefore to find
a version
of Platonism which e
scapes from the three basic
criticisms above
ono, that is, that does
not arbitrarily
set up (or claim to
discover) a realm of abstract
entitles knowable but independent
of any conceptual scheme
(language)
one that does not arbitrarily
limit the
number of predicates an object
may have; and one that
does not presuppose what it
at the same time denies
itself.
All these defects must be remedied
without
s

—

i

being as arbitrary in correcting
them as those whose

/
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theories involve the,
were to begin with.
As an example
one cannot simply
remedy the first defect
hy arbitrarily
adding this, that, and
another predicate to, say,
Pegasus, and then,

so on

,

to top it all off,
add perhaps an "and

Complexity must be present
necessarily (or, as
Wittgenstein was wont to say
in the Tractates
essentailly), Whether one is
aware of it
.

,

or not

(just as in

the concrete world).

We have Steady, in the
first section of this dis12
sertation,
previewed the direction
Wittgenstein's solution takes.
There we saw that, in certain
passages in
his Notebooks, Wittgenstein
views sentences as, so to
.

speak,

forming a world of their own.

This line of'

thought survives in the Tractatus,
though not so clearly
there as in the Notebooks, in
such passages as.
2

.

2.

202

A.picture represents a possible
situation in logical space.

Hi

A picture presents a situation in
logical space, the existence and
non-existence of states of affairs.

4,031:

In a proposition a situation is,
it were, constructed by v/ay of

as

experiment

Instead of, ’This proposition has
such and such a sense', we can simply
say, 'This proposition represents
such and such a situation'.
(See also 4.01, 4.93,

5.473

-

5.4733, and 5.526).

One
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.

may therefore
characterize Traetn-ri
- rac tara an
Platonism as a
,
mguistic (or, at least
i 1
east a
language-based) Platonism
ihe abstract
entities i + laims
exist are related
to
anguage in a close
way which will be
explicated below.
i0re 1 d ° S0 a
Caution
we may fairly
characterize
ittgenstein's Platonism
as linguistic, but
in doing so
read the
*» a
that is Slightly
foreign
L0
intentions at tbp
u
the time he
wrote the book,
As the
Passages from 6.3 to
6.372 show especially
clearly,
Wittgenstein relied heavily
on the intuitive,
metaphor!-sal notion of
conceptual schemes or,
worse yet, of a
"net" or "mesh" which
we "throw over" or
use to "cover"
objects when we describe
them.
The metaphorical and
the ..precise battled
in the Tractatus, and
neither won
there decisively.
-Fi >*<?+•
The
j.
~no iirst,
nd ? « +•
T
inaication
I have been
able to find that the
precise, i.e., that which
is concerned with language, won
(as the Philosophical
.

’

•

’

;

«

.

i

liStions clearly shows

it did)

,

is

Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1930-33".

in'^7s

"Notes^on

In ignoring the

metaphorical lines here 13 we do
not interpret the
T ractatus wrongly or
unjustly. We simply
,

give to it a

more precise interpretation,

in our eyes at least,

Wittgenstein himself could have at
that point.

than

36l.

A = '+.031 shows
very clearly
y

itL

i, the P r
°Position
which
Ch ((somehow)
'•constructs- (literallv
Morally 1translated, "
puts
together" ,
,

-tuatron" as an "experi-

wont",

Despitc'TnTT
211 th£ dimCUlties
"
-th

lt d0 68

a*

'

,

” US

abSt

- Ct

this passage

entities are not
conceived

eating

independently of language.
The propositions
P
them together
without propositions
(and, ultimately
" °° nCePtUal SChSme)
thGre W ° Uld bS
abstract’
65 UUSt 33 there w
°ald be no concrete
world without a conceptual
scheme, as
;

V"

-

'

1

1 21
.

and

. 6

3?2
Yet both this and
other propositions (e.g.,
2
seem to attribute
some degree of independent
_

show).

.

u)

existence'

t0 thG

"

crtuation " Presented by
the proposition.
independent is the
"situation"? How, in what

way,

How
is it

independent?

And how does it come by
this independence?
I will turn to
these questions after
answering a more
basic, though easier,
question.
i’his

concerns the propositions
themselves.
We know
that a proposition is also
a fact (3.14), and that
it
'nvolves or, perhaps, must
involve elements which are
actual, i.e., concrete.
But then it would seem that
the linguistic structures,
i.e., the propositions, are
themselves concrete, not abstract,
and that they therefore do not constitute a realm
of abstract entities.
It
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W ° Uld

em

S

’

thGn

.

"possible fact" or

'

„ pos .
makSS S6nSe f ° r
,Uttgenstein ao interabove, "possible
proposition" may not
a
consequence Wittgenstein
would have to limit
a Riven
to the set oi
propositions actually
already
constructed in that
language
gUage
tv-is
Yet xh
seems to contraact certain
passages in the Tractatus
e .g.,
4,02?!
ill® 1 ? ?? 8 t0 the essence of a
Proposition
that it
to communicate a new should be able
sense to us
How could a new sense
be communicated if
no new propositions can be constructed?

:

Um

'

'Z\'T

-

_

^

-

.

1

'there can be no doubt
that,

for Wittgenstein, some-

thing must exist concretely
before there can be any
Platonic realm,
in this respect Plato's
Platonism and
Wittgenstein's are far apart,
since,

as we saw above,

there would be no abstract
entities without propositions,
Wittgenstein would hold that
propositions (which all
must have a concrete sign,
as 3.12 indicates) must
exist
in order for abstract
entities to do so. The existence
of concrete structures is
even said to guarantee
the

existence of abstract or logical
structures,
3.h,

A proposition determines a
place in
logical space.
The existence of this
logical place is guaranteed by the
rnero existence of the
constituents -by the existence of the
proposition
v/ith a sense.
.
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But Wittgenstein
is well aware
(4.002) that the permutations of language
are endless, though
this remains a
minor theme in the
'Traotatus.
Not all of the permutations tha. are possible
within a given language,
dialect,
or idiolect will
or need be made,
many sentences will
never be spoken, though
they could be.
There is nothing
puzzling, abstruse, or
contrary to Wittgenstein's
thought
in calling these
"possible but not actual"
sentences,
where "possible" is
understood as "can be constructed,
out of elementary
propositions".
For we can give a
priori the .ora of all
possible non-elementary
sentences
J
(5.5)
by giving the rules by
which these sentences must
be constructed, whether
they actually are constructed
or
not,

their possibility is guaranteed.

Furthermore, they

share with actually constructed
sentences the full degree of complexity that
Wittgenstein demands, without
even a hint of arbitrary adding
of predicates.
They
have that full degree of complexity
because their place
in logical space is guaranteed
through one's ability to
construct a sentence of this particular
form out of elementary propositions. Thus Wittgenstein
is indeed committed to the existence of possible
propositions (or
sentences) among his Platonic entities.'

But how we

construct these entities, what their nature is,
how we
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have access to
them, and how they
are related to the
concrete structures
they presuppose,
are no longer
puzzling,

NOW we can attach
the problem of the
relation between the proposition
and the •'situation”
it puts together.
it is here that
Wittgenstein approaches the
traditional forms of
Platonism most closely.
A propose txon xs constructed
out of elementary
propositions as a
fact is out of atomic
facts.
The person constructing
the proposition takes
the elementary
propositions as
elements and orders them
in certain ways:
the result is
elemental y proposition which
"makes sense".
Now
& proposition is a hicruie
o
Dicturp /U,
1
3.1), and a picture "is
laid against reality like
a measure" (2.1512);
"That is
how a picture is attached
to reality;
-1

\

>

it

out to it"

reaches"^

1511 ); though only "the
end-points of the
graduating lines actually touch
the object that is to
be measured" (2.1
5 21), it is still true that the endpoints do touch. There is nothing
between the picture
and the depicted; the sense of
the proposition, the
"situation" put together by it, is none
other than the
(

2

.

proposition itself when seen, not as merely
a structure,
but as a "thought",
(3).

j.

i.e.,

a "logical picture of facts"

he same ,.hing is implied above in
3.3, which
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seems to -Luonuiiy
identi "Tv

.

*i+u_

the mere existence n-r +
° nce of the constitu°" a proposition
with
lth "+h„
the existence of
the oroposition with a sense"
rpu.
Eense 13 not an
independent
e^ect or entity, it
is the
v,

,

’

.

.

'

proposition.

lhlS

°f

course

represents the culmination
of
another tendency we
have observed in the
Notebook
’

Chapter V)

’

(

see

ana a full acceptance
of the implications of this theory
that language
,

-

sentences

-

constitutes its own world.

There is a way in which
the
sense^ of the
proposition must be separated
from the proposition,
the sense is the
proposition seen logically.
It is the logical
figure the proposition
cuts, or the
area of logical space
the proposition carves
out.
Put
more sooerly, the sense
of a proposition is
the. complete
and infinite logical
structure of that proposition,

while the proposition is
the finite concrete (or
abstract)
structure which has that
logical structure as a form.
Independent senses are entia
otiosa as well as incomprehensible.
.

Let me illustrate this briefly
by constructing an
answer, on Wittgenstein*
s position, to the question of
whether Pegasus, the winged horse,
exists.
The simplest
answer, a straightforward "yes",
Wittgenstein, of course
would reject (Section II).
But we can construct
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sentences about
Pegasus
an

inflni

E ° me

•„

'

5'

„

01

-

indeed

.

it can be
Pt
"hown that

’

thG “ Can be
obstructed,

falS6

some true and

speaking, seen in this
l ight
there ^s little
difference between
Pegasus and Kelso,
except that, more
than likely, we know
more about the
latter.
From the standpoint
of the constructions
we
make
lanSUage led
conceptual scheme (to
return to this basic
notion) both neiso
Felso and Pegasus
P
have
equal claim to exist.
'

“

>

^

lhlS approach clearly
seems to fall prey to
many
Unos of criticism which
originated either with the
Logical Positivists or
with the attitudes they
engendered.
Particularly, despite all
the philosophical
trouble one has pinning
down a satisfactory
explanation
of the notion of
verifiability, we still feel
intuitively
that there is an important
difference between the two in
that many more statements
about Kelso are verifiable
(m theory, at least) than are about
Pegasus. We can
or could, if we had a
time machine
observe Kelso and
verify or disverify many
statements about him; the same
is not true of Pegasus.

-

-

Although Wittgenstein was later
attracted, to some
degree, to logical positivism, 16
there is absolutely
no

visible evidence (pace Carnap) that
he had any sympathy

36 ?,
a

Une

°f

arSUment like th0
above when he wrote
the
~
° r eVen that
'
~
lt had ocoured to
him at all.
•ad one presented
it to Wittgenstein
at that time, he
mSht " eU haVe dlSmissed
as irrelevant.
Concern
Wlth Verifi ° ati0n °
f Position or
theories plays no
part
the Tractatusi
_17
wi ^genstem
sees himself
there as a logician,
not an empirical
researcher. This
is shown clearly
by his attitude
toward the natural
sciences and the
comparisons he made between
them and
Philosophy (4,11 4.113).
But, if he did not
choose
to simply ignore
the above criticism,
he could
’

“

m

—

-

:

have

deepened his own position
through a response to it.
Wittgenstein could justifiably
attack the Positivist
on the grounds that
he demands something
which is irrelevant.
If Wittgenstein were a
straightforward objectual
Platonist, then one would
expect him to be prepared to
offer some substantive reply
to that sort of criticism.
Since such a Platonist denies
any necessary connection
between abstract entities and
us or our language, and
maintains instead that such entities
are discoverable
(as are objects), he is responsible
for providing an
account of how they are discovered
(see Section lie),
But,

as we have seen, Wittgenstein does
not even think

of complex objects as they normally
seem to be thought
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,

°f'

he ass iroilates
them to factdoes
es lu
it m
, ake
al
+k
that
the fan+
‘

I

"-

«
a what
And
difference
,

’

fact-complex which
is Pegasus

11

«

- <« •»*«) ..W, l„
roe «

,»
loti
have facts or
fact-complexes, and that
is all
we need in oroer
order to have an
object.

case,

..,

0

v,

ThUS Wittgenstein's
conceptual
4cU rev
revisionism
ioionism carries
1
° 0nSeC!uences
even beyond the way
in which it
instructs us to see,
to interpret, the
real world.
Once
we acknowledge
his two basic
categories, simple object
and complex fact
act, in the way
in which Wittgenstein
presents them in the
Tractate +>,
^i^iiabus,
then we are committed
to
one version or
another of linguistic
Platonism.
At the
very least, no
scruples can arise from
difficulties in
verifiability to counteract
the tendency towards
it, f or
the whole problem of
verifiabilitv
io rendered
liability is
philosophic
ally totally irrelevant.
-

'

.

'

Hy omphasis on "he
linguistic character of Wittgenstein^ Platonism may well give
rise to a needless puzzle.
Suppose one acknowledges that
the fact-complex, Pegasus,
. ists
in the way I have claimed
Wittgenstein would hold,
namely on the basis that
'Pegasus' or 'winged horse'
functions in quite definite ways
in our language.
That is,
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use a Phrase too
often used, they
bave a definite
structure.
Does Wittgenstein
not run the risk
ere of reducing
Pegasus, and ail other
abstract entities,
to mere .linguistic
structures
rucxures, into mere
collections of

propositions?

He does not.

That linguistic forms
are necessary
to the existence
of abstract entities
is, again, undeniable, but that does
not make the abstract
entities themselves into mere
linguistic forms. The abstract
entity
egaous is as different
from the propositions about
Pegasus as is the sense
of those propositions
from those
propositions themselves.
It is related to the
"name"
(i.e., trie disguised
definite description) 'Pegasus'
as
the. sense of a proposition
is to that proposition,
•Pegasus' has a logical form,
which is not the same as
the logical form of anjr
proposition about Pegasus (or any
set Of propositions about
him)
but which figures in such
propositions.
But just as there is no fundamental
difference between facts and complexes,
concrete objects,
so there is no fundamental
difference between propositions (with their logical structures)
and 'Pegasus’
(with its logical structure).
'

,

Wittgenstein’s structural Platonism

—

be called a Platonism of facts, not
things

which could

—

can be
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summarized by the
following
owln S four
To,
propositions,
(
ere are abstract
entities,(2)

I'hGSG

00%^^^^

analyzable
(

3

)

These entities are
eeptual schemes,

“

""

a

e^onT

l

a'

endiessly

"« «*S.

1

°n

our con -

WC&£3U„

concrete
T.iiTT UreS
with
1

.

Propositional signs

“

entities
their

’

iS therefore
quite Clear that
the "possibl
Possible situof 2,202 et a2
a
•

ation"

-

“"

& PlS
’
Possible situations
+
are propositions
cona-d
a
considered
relation to their
sense, their full
com
6X StrUCtUre
ratheP «“» exclusively

Black claims.

,

m
-

1

’

in

Pr ° P0Sltl0nS (aS
in a language)

'

to

The same, of
can Be said of
possible, but not
actual, facts
2 0122)
aU
'

actual

'

COnCSPtUaP SChSme

^

^

(i - e

-

.

^

""

Yet PrSSUPP0Se actu

'

'

relate

^

^

-

structures, given by

l-guage), on the basis
of

P ° SSlble ° an be defined
clearly,

demon
onst.rated to be a
possibility.
are dt the same

t ime

and

possible facts (pD<r
p)

the two categories
are not exclusive,
but real, existing
facts are a subset of
possible
bsioie fan
u
+
i acts,
how
does a possible
fact become an existing
fac+o wn,
g fact?
'Wittgenstein never explains
i

c.

.
’

371

.

this explicitly
in the Tractate
v
L£latus, +
though
I think one
can see what must
happen,
(j shal
a11, dlscuss Wittgenstein s answer f ir<?+ o +
aetaphorical level.)
Possible
... have
facts
seen, are parts
of the structure
of
0Ur COnCGPtUal
EChe
0
hach to' 6.34, they
are
PartS ° f the
parts Of the net,
however,
actually seem to
"catch"
catch something,
these represent or
Picture real facts.
A real fact, therefore,
,

—

is one

which is both described
(or describable) in
our language
nd which seems
also to exist outside
language.
This sounds suspiciously
i ike a confused
rendition
of a truth few have
ultimately doubted, real
facts
exist independently
of us.
In fact, however, there
is
-ch more to it than just that,
for Wittgenstein is
trying to maintain as
much of this truism as
he can without
denying that objects are
ultimately
'

simple.

He cannot,
therefore, maintain the
straightforward correspondence
theory of truth that this
truism would suggest. True
propositions do not simply
correspond to reality, they
define the reality to which
they correspond.
Thus a
possible fact, which is presented
via a linguistic
structure, is also an actual fact
when we see it in the
world outside of language, where
language shapes the
world.
For if there were no language,
if there were no
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possible facts, there
would be no actual
facts, either.
IV

indicated in the last
chapter that there seems
to
e some confusion
in the Tractates
about what the mys ti031 1S
6 44 SSemS t0
the way things are,
their
\
forms, is not the
mystical:
'

6-U

+Li
that

‘

5 2

° n tfie

’

S
-

n0t -°-% thin s are in
e
the world
but that it exists?

is mystical,

° ther

hand

d °es

-

not seem to say the
same

thing:
6 522
'

e
a
inde
things that cannot
De put inln
be
into words.
They make themsel ves manifest.
Thev arp '"h'rt T”
ls

‘

f

’

mystical.

Taken with 4 116b
f

.

m

k
4,121

.

^

es P ec ially 4.121),

this implies

that the mystical is
precisely the form of things,
and
especially, the logical form
of the world.
This, of
course, raises a very important
question about Wittgenstein' s Platonism:
are the forms given to us in
possible
facts knowable or not?

That the bulk of the Tractatus

.

at least,

supports

the claim in 6.44, that the world
and its forms are knowable, cannot be doubted.
Just one example of this:
^•53*

he correct method in philosophy
would really be the following:
to
say nothing except what can be said
l

,
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j- e

propositions nf nntll
so^JithiHTT^^
with Philosophy -i teE nothln - to ^o
'

_

.:

n

i.e.

.

(italics mi ne).

But that the

—

.

worUi^o.

it is

is a

reflection of the
structures or forms of
the language
We SPSak ° f ° Ur
conoe Ptual schemes.
Actual facts,
found in the world
Id, nnn
can be expressed,
i. e>
pictured,
y the P ° SSible faCtS1
the f °™er are not
therefore
mystical.
But there is nothing
by which we
'

,

can pict(Jre
to ourselves the
forms of the possible
facts until we

create an actual
thought-picture of them.
cause, as Wittgenstein
says in 4.12

This is be-

j

Lr

'

1Z

'

nS
n
PreSent the whole
of°?eaiitv
b,°?
+ hey
b
y
0annot re Present
what thev m,.
have ln corr mon with
realitv T n
r
b ® able to reo?°
x
resent
esenu it
il -- logical
n
form,

?V

•

r

-

‘

-

r t0 bS able t0 re r
P ®sent
lorica? r r
We should have to be
abfi to station
? h
abie
ourselves
positions somewhere outsidewith Dethe'
logo; that is to say,
outside

S

the

Thus the apparent conflict
between 6.44 and 6.522
vanishes in the light of
Wittgenstein's theory of
Platonism.
The former concerns the world
as it actually
is, its forms as they
actually are, the world
as

described by the natural sciences,
the world as a reflection of language.
But language
and its forms, the

unreflected forms, cannot themselves
be described!

.

Propositions which try
y to do co0n t(preeminently
the
Propositions of philosophy)
dr
are^ n
'
nonopn
°nsense
they are th«
mystical as 6. 5 22
defines it.
,

1

t

^

have mentioned tho+ vm++
Wlt tgenstein
reverses Plato-s
Plfl+
la tom sm at one
rnaior
-p
ooint
° lnt
J
P
for
he believes that
the
a street presupposes
the concrete
that unless there
-re actual linguistic
structures, there could
be no
poosible facts, states
of affairs,
situations, or anything else, Cither,
Here we co rae across
another decisive
poim, on which wi
lttgenstem reverses Plato.
For the
0
n
F
tor...s
are preeminently the
knowable; we. can
have at the very
best true belief
1 or ooininn
opinion concerning
the reflections of
the Forms in the
concrete world
For
Wittgenstein it is the
concrete world which is
hnowable,
the abstract world,
the world of possibilities,
while it
13 rea1
is unhn 0 wable
It is the mystical.
I

.

,

'

-

•

V'NV*

'

.

•
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Edwin B
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tm
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i n G oSi

^
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«
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foUo inc tw °
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.

froi;
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s*?
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against Plat
.

i"

oS^
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P kant a
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Bobbs
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.

Harper and Row,
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6

Harper ^ and °H ow
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Wen ork,
5

n Plato *-

^h

See Goodman,

Merrill Co.
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R

-

.

foists the blame ^on^einona-H
g a
£°E*!E-Of
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S
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Problems in the Phi 1
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anston, me., New York,
311.
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;

f rst three essays
3
in this h£nv
ok
vi and viii
contain
a
°

3

*

-

’

*

K °lt,

1 9 6 9;

pp.

300 -

.

issue^'He^defines* nrono^ft^^ 1 ) confused °n the
ofSthe External
World, Chapterkl) "" ^_Knowled|e
1

.

P
1
as what may be
me
significantly' ass^ied°or
Lnied^

8

.

SMSaS

'

C0
I°I,

Wi :^-tein. s view
or theB
01 this

C h5l; r °?
-LV,
v
-

dissertation.

.

It would be more
natural
+
all languages.
ay apart from
But Wittgen-tSin
had not yet realized the fundamental
puage "' hen he wrote
the l^actatus; that role of
came i a t er

hV

and

'

thefaws of° thefariouf® ,f C ° Urse about science
fences,

Physics (except for 6 1 whieh^
especially
laws whatsoever).
apply to a11
However sinefff?
c is
general, and the sub-emiont V
quite
f?
6*3^, 6.341, 6.342 and V. ^c.) p oposi tlons (particularly
y
^
3
co
ents on it, i
consider such iideni^r
??
wiacnin g ci
nf +u
their applicatioITq^Ite
justified.
'

^

'

See again Section II,
Chapter IV.

This dissertation, Part

I.

We dealt with it in the
last chapter.
See Part II, Chapter I.
I ]

1910

;

°° re s "Notes on
Wittgenstein’s Lectureand /lt tgenstein* s own
J
'

'

’

t
Berne rkungen
was never a

v

PhilosouhisohaThey
aiso show
also
shr^TipPr
^
°
that he

show clearly.
whole

its more ardent

disc^fffff £

C

Aa. Introduction to V/ittgen*V
Harper and How, I§3?Tp ?£“
18
1
^’ Par X Chapter I' and 'Part II
?^^
Chapter IV, ior
Chapte^IV
iurther

—

stein^s °Srartoti^I
a-ggg^tus_

—

>

’

'f

evidence of this.
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INCLUSION

introduction to -t-hio
thlS dissertation
opened with
+1
"
16 qU6Stl ° n
What does Wittgenstein
mean by -thingobjec,-)
(
his early philosophy?"
0 ur answer to
that
15 n ° W qUite ClGar!
Wittgenstein uses the word
ambiguously throughout his
early works (his
Notebooks ion.
1916 and the Tractatus)
'

m

.

qualities?
B.

It means:

iS absolute

^

simple, with no

Any particular we may
wish to rail1 a 'thing*
possessing any decree n f
(fr °"
merely logica(
the'Sl
C °m "
plement of material
properties)?
-

,

,

Sidles

The first three chapters
of Part II established
that
Wittgenstein held (A) in the
Tractatus

and gave some
of his reasons for doing
SOi the concluding two'
chapters
did the same for (B)
.

Part

I,

devoted to the Notebooks

ambiguity within that work.

,

developed this

It also answered another

question asked in the introduction:

"What led Wittgen-

stein to interpret -objectin this way?" The answer
given there, principally in
Chapter V, is this, Through
his picture theory, Wittgenstein
attempts to do away
with the necessity of having
any theory of reference at
all.
Later, in developing his ontology,
he is thus

subject to two
pressures.

7

nS
'

33 13 n0

™

J
ly eXtralln,aU1StiC

°^

’

ThereG i~
lo th
P ^
Lhe
desire to inter
ally *"*> i"
connection with
•

0r ^traconceptual, 1

elenents.
do so, we can
then only mea n it
in sense (a),
WS haV ° n °
refererrtia l apparatus
which would allow
us
Project (to use a word
Wittgenstein uses in the
Tr ac
-tus) characteristics
from language onto
reality (objects).
On the other hand,
Wittgenstein also felt
the
Pressure exerted by the
fact that, both in
German and
in English, 'thing'
(or 'object', 'obiekf
-rGe_genstand
— elv B
or Dim ) are used
in an immensely
wide variety of

Whe£ n
'

^

’

TO

thlnf ’'

„.

„„ *.

„

<1

be

,

'

comtUy Ti.,

Fr0m Wlthln the context
of a language 2 then,
^thing'
is used in sense (B).
,

I

have not,

of course, continued
the discussion of
the picture theory
in Part II.
For this there were two
reasons,
Wittgenstein developed his
ontology with minireliance on that theory,
so a detailed explication
of it would have been
a digression from our
main concern.
As a digression, it would
have proven interesting

-

perhaps too much so.

A great deal of material
has been

written on the picture theory
P to discuss it adequately
would have expanded the
length of this dissertation
beyond any desirable point.
Nevertheless, comments on
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it inevitably
crept into Part

comments which

I
1
’

u

'

in th .

think d ° n0t
t,Unkl

-

,

devel
developments here.

flMt„

.

° hapteri

to yet further

The question with
which we beran
e ^an onn
can be asked very
riefly! its answer
can, in outline
at least
be equally
_
lof
Wittgenstein's answer as vm
we saw throughout
thi-rh, was anything but
“
brief.
It involved him
in the
tempt to interpret,
in his own way,
many concepts, such
as that of substance,
which his contemporaries
largely
ignored
Both in the depth of
his analysis, and in
its
"b.i ead bh
the ^rsotatne
„
actatu s is an unusual
work,
it is the
brilliance of Wittgenstein's
work
XA as well
wen as
=
+
its
influence on philosophy
today, which
; lcn
iu«vH-ri
justifies
a work of this
length devoted to
clarifying it.
i

,

.

>

’

,

>

.

*

’

.

,

•?

-

’

‘

.
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±

nv,

11
our temp1Ca ly "
bub Wittl
J
loupht
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•

i

’

-

^

,

2

,

l om within
th'3 c nnfpy+ r\-p
sense established above
by Part^Ilf
-f

i

11

"chapte^I^

^

3

^tglnstlin^^T^-t atu s
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thl

5h

s

s

?
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•

SSSf

flit

eish
?
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S
w j? Ian c o Ss

fpV2
ork>

w«s
a^otid L
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-ntenti°nauty and Self in the
tus", Nous? v
Tracta-

author,

"V/itt^enstei n
Happened to the Picture
»

«=

'

<-

'

\

.

°F»

the same

Whatever
Iwhicn I have
bthi^hVh
an unpublished version) The^y"
!,)
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such more recent articles
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